Posted on 04/22/2002 6:55:59 AM PDT by SJackson
Edited on 04/22/2004 12:33:16 AM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
I won't be criticizing the Clintonistas for their peace push in the future. For whatever motive, which was no doubt selfish, Clinton had his guys in there swinging. It didn't work out for, I believe, exactly the reason(s) Ross cites here.
Arafat's gotta go.
Dennis Ross's comments yesterday should have been picked up by the lamestream media - but weren't. What is needed is for billy boy his-bad-self to make similar comments and then the CNNPMSNBCNYTIMES crowd would pickup the "story" that Arafat turned down the mother of all deals and converted his fellow "Palestinians" into human bombs because he is needs to kill Jews in order to maintain his "Legacy".
I find this truly astounding and replusive, but consistent with Arafat and his cronies taking over Jewish and Christian holy places and making them Muslim. It is less surprising that the Palestinian leaders would lie to their own people. It's the Big Lie theory.
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Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him to end the conflict is to end himself.
Once a terrorist, always a terrorist. He belongs in a prison cell, doing time for his string of murders dating back decades.
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ROSS: It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought he could do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt in my mind that he thought the violence would create pressure on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the world.
And I think there's one other factor. You have to understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.
Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a terrible way.
The Palestinians are professional victims, culminating in Arafat's plaintive bleatings from Ramallah and their propaganda machine working overtime in Jenin. They know nothing else.
Here are the excerpts from this interview worth repeating again , not necessarily in the order they were said.
ROSS: The ideas were presented on December 23 by the president, and they basically said the following: On borders, there would be about a 5 percent annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the Palestinians.
On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.
On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there would also be a fund of $30 billion internationally that would be put together for either compensation or to cover repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.
And when it came to security, there would be a international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the Jordan Valley.
These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in our best judgment as to what each side could accept after thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.
ROSS: The Israelis would have gotten completely out of Gaza.
...So that map there that you see, which shows a very narrow green space along the border, would become part of the orange. So the Palestinians would have in the West Bank an area that was contiguous. Those who say there were cantons, completely untrue. It was contiguous.
...And to connect Gaza with the West Bank, there would have been an elevated highway, an elevated railroad, to ensure that there would be not just safe passage for the Palestinians, but free passage.
FRED BARNES, WEEKLY STANDARD: Now, Palestinian officials say to this day that Arafat said yes.
ROSS: Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with the president, and I was there in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to give.
HUME: What was he supposed to give?
ROSS: He supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious significance to Israel. He rejected that.
.....He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-existent.
He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace.
You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't -- there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.
So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he rejected.
BARNES: I have two other questions. One, the Palestinians point out that this was never put on paper, this offer. Why not?
ROSS: ..... We did not want to formalize it. We wanted them to understand we meant what we said. You don't accept it, it's not for negotiation, this is the end of it, we withdraw it.
So that's why they have it themselves recorded. And to this day, the Palestinians have not presented to their own people what was available.
BARNES: In other words, Arafat might use it as a basis for further negotiations so he'd get more?
ROSS: Well, exactly.
HUME: Which is what, in fact, he tried to do, according to your account.
ROSS: We treated it as not only a culmination. We wanted to be sure it couldn't be a floor for negotiations. ....It couldn't be a ceiling. It was the roof.
HUME: This was a final offer?
ROSS: Exactly. Exactly right.
HUME: This was the solution.
BARNES: Was Arafat alone in rejecting it? I mean, what about his negotiators?
ROSS: It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood this was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted him to accept it. He was not prepared to accept it.
......HUME: What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in effect, said no?
ROSS: Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.
Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him to end the conflict is to end himself.
.......HUME: ... might he not have concluded that the violence was working?
ROSS: It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought he could do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt in my mind that he thought the violence would create pressure on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the world.
And I think there's one other factor. You have to understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.
Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a terrible way.
All I can say is, Wow!! Ross really nailed Arafat there. Unfortunately, the ploy for Western and European sympathy seems to be working.
How much of the West Bank did Israel offer the Palestinians?
MAY 2000 PROPOSAL (before intifada)
DECEMBER 2000 PROPOSALS (four months into the intifada)
Projections of the Israeli offer in December 2000, and the December 2000 Bridging Proposal of US President Clinton
US Bridging Proposal
Israeli Proposal
A map showing the projection of the bridging proposals of U.S. President William J. Clinton, December, 2000. Dark Gray areas are currently Areas A and B of Palestinian control. Light Gray areas would become part of the Palestinian state. Gray-striped areas would become part of the Palestinian state after an interim period. Maps are adapted from . A map showing the projection of the Israeli proposals of the government of PM Barak, December, 2000. Dark Gray areas are currently Areas A and B of Palestinian control. Light Gray areas would become part of the Palestinian state. Gray-striped areas would become part of the Palestinian state after an interim period. Maps are adapted from .
FINAL JANUARY 2001 PROPOSAL
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That's absolutely right.
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