Posted on 03/17/2002 3:23:06 AM PST by Clive
GARDEZ, Afghanistan (AP) -- To some veteran Afghan commanders, the recent U.S. offensive against al-Qaida fighters in eastern Afghanistan failed because most of the enemy escaped.
Moreover, they said, this month's Operation Anaconda, the biggest U.S.-led offensive of the Afghan war, should serve as a warning of what lies ahead if the United States wants to crush al-Qaida and Taliban forces still in Afghanistan.
The Afghans, veterans of the brutal 1980s war against the Soviets, said the United States must be prepared for a protracted series of battles, in which an elusive opponent seemingly suffers a terrible pounding, only to disappear into the formidable terrain -- perhaps to return and fight another day.
"There will only be a guerrilla war with al-Qaida," said Cmdr. Abdullah, a leading Afghan military figure in Paktia province.
"They know how to fight from the jihad (against the Soviets) in small groups in the mountains."
The U.S. military has declared Operation Anaconda, which began winding down last week, a success. The U.S.-led coalition seized control of the Shah-e-Kot valley after nearly two weeks of punishing air strikes and ground combat -- losing eight U.S. and three Afghan troops.
"Operation Anaconda...is an incredible success," said Maj. Bryan Hilferty, spokesman of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division.
"It took only 20 terrorists to kill 3,000 of the world's citizens in the World Trade Towers. We've killed hundreds and that means we've saved hundreds of thousands of lives. This is a great success."
However, Afghan commanders questioned that assessment -- as well as the estimate of hundreds of al-Qaida and Taliban casualties.
"Americans don't listen to anyone," said Cmdr. Abdul Wali Zardran.
"They do what they want. Most people escaped." "You can't call that a success."
U.S. officers have publicly downplayed the significance of body counts, perhaps trying to avoid a repetition of the Vietnam experience where ground commanders felt under pressure to report elevated enemy casualties.
"I don't know why we get into a body count," said Col. Frank Wiercinski, brigade commander of the 101st Airborne Division, dismissing questions about the numbers of al-Qaida and Taliban dead.
Apart from killing al-Qaida members, the operation was successful because it broke up a major concentration in a strategic area and yielded valuable information on the terrorist network, U.S. officials said.
To the Afghans, however, killing or capturing the enemy is the whole purpose of guerrilla warfare and the principal measure of success. Otherwise, they said, the opponent will fight again somewhere, someday.
"In my opinion, the campaign failed," Abdullah said.
"There were some forces there but during the very heavy bombardment and air strikes they left."
By that measure, the Afghans find little evidence of success.
Shireen Gul, the first Afghan commander to enter Shah-e-Kot at the end of the 12-day operation, found 10 bodies scattered about the area. Cmdr. Zardran, who entered the Shah-e-Kot valley from another direction, said he found 20 bodies in one place and three in another.
Other al-Qaida fighters may have been killed during punishing bombing raids that collapsed a warren of caves burrowed into the mountains.
Asked about estimates of hundreds dead, U.S. special forces troops cite an intelligence report which said during the fighting, al-Qaida commanders sent word to a nearby village to prepare hundreds of coffins.
"We heard this thing but it's not true," Abdullah said.
"We don't put our dead in boxes. During the jihad, we buried the dead where they died because they were martyrs."
"These people would do the same thing."
The Afghans believe al-Qaida and Taliban forces began leaving the area in small groups once the U.S. bombing intensified, using exfiltration techniques refined against the Soviets.
"I remember once the Russians were bombing and bombing," former guerrilla Mullah Mohammed Khaqzar said.
"We left the area in groups of five and 10. We stayed away hidden in the mountains until we knew it was over and then we returned."
Cmdr. Zardran, wrapped in a brown woolen shawl against the wind that whipped thorough his command post south of Gardez, estimated as many as 300 fighters escaped Operation Anaconda and headed toward Pakistan through Urgoon in neighbouring Paktia province.
He believes that constituted most of the al-Qaida and Taliban force arrayed against the coalition when the offensive began March 2.
Abdullah agreed the al-Qaida and Taliban force was smaller than the upper estimates -- some of which ranged as high as 1,000 -- which circulated at the height of the battle.
"When we entered the area, I didn't see any big ammunition stocks and no signs of a big force," Abdullah said.
"It's my idea that there was not that many people even in the bunkers and the caves."
Abdullah knows the area well because he fought there in the 1980s with the U.S.-backed Harakat-e-Inqilab Afghanistan, or Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan. Khaqzar said the al-Qaida and Taliban fighters will probably travel in small groups throughout the mountain ranges that crisscross Afghanistan until they find a safe place to regroup.
His advice for winning the war is "to know where they are hiding and then send in small commando units to take them out."
"Bombs from B-52s won't defeat al-Qaida or the Taliban," he said.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in Washington it is too early to tally the success of the 15-day-old assault on enemy hide- outs in mountainous eastern Afghanistan. Even if some survived the assault and eluded capture, they will be pursued so they cannot find safe haven elsewhere, he said.
More such operations could be ahead, U.S. deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Saturday.
"There are still significant numbers of terrorists. It's a huge country," Wolfowitz said in an interview on CNN's Novak, Hunt and Shields.
The Pentagon has said repeatedly during the five-month war in Afghanistan stamping out terrorists would be a long, difficult task. And Rumsfeld shrugged off a suggestion the military campaign against terrorists so far has simply pushed al-Qaida from Afghanistan to new refuges in Pakistan and elsewhere.
Rumsfeld said that's not necessarily all bad. He acknowledged fighters had scattered to not only neighbouring countries "but have departed neighbouring countries and gone elsewhere in the world, some to the Middle East and some to elsewhere."
Rumsfeld acknowledged the threat to those countries. But he said the situation is better than it was five months ago because Afghanistan is no longer the sanctuary it was for terrorists when it was run by the Taliban.
What?
I wish I could ignore the nagging surges I am feeling, but I can't. And we simply can not be drawn into another "guerrilla war" without end. I am all for using tactical WMD if that is what it takes to put a punctuation mark on this thing. Either that or simply pull out now and build "Fortress America".
I am smelling incrementalism and it is more pungent than Napalm in the morning.
My father (who is a Vietnam vet) just told me a few. He also had some advice: don't trust flakes... makes sense to me.
And of course we're not.
EODGUY
And, of course, to secure the country politically so that construction of the pipeline can begin.
Politicians and politically motivated command staff lapdogs may indeed see this as a two-pronged war, one to eliminate terrorists and the second to create a political environment that will grant the US access to Afghan oil deposits.
The true warriors are the ones who suffer when local military leaders elect to turn tail and attempt to cover their cowardly backsides by demeaning the successes of our forces.
While Afghan miliary commanders are willing, even eager, to portray U.S. forces as inexperienced and their leadership as inept (we are, after all, foreigners as are al-Qaeda), there is more than a grain of reality in their view. As long as the terrorists have a sanctuary in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, they cannot be defeated by bombs and frontal assault in Afghanistan -- as the Russians learned. Afghans have a hunch that we will soon tire of tearing up the landscape and go somewhere else. I have a hunch they are right.
If we let the U.S. military move large land forces into Afghanistan and "fight the last war," we will greatly regret it. If we let the media establish the measures of success then act as referee in this conflict, we will greatly regret it. (One example: the media have already gone far in establishing that if U.S. forces suffer any casualties in any firefight, the terrorists win it.)
There are no big promotions for military bureaucrats in successful waging of war against determined, experienced guerillas. The rules are few but implacable. You cannot permit them to have a sanctuary for resting, regrouping, and resupplying. You cannot bring them to set-piece battle where our superior technology is overwhelming. You can use superior technology as it was used at the Whale's Back -- to make a regrouping force disperse. Frontal assault is a useful device in further encouraging the guerilla force to disperse, but the key elements are blocking and tracking by mobile small-unit tactical teams of special forces trained especially for this kind of warfare. This we failed to do in Gardez, where Afghan troops were the (porous) blocking force that permitted the guerillas to disperse into surrounding villages or flee into sanctuary in Pakistan's nearby Northwest Frontier Province. (You have to remember that our Afghan allies are interested in their own success and survival, not ours.) Thus, we expended a great deal of force for little visible result. Ergo, in the media's reporting, we lost the battle (further proof being that Americans were killed).
We will have other chances, that's for sure. The Afghans and al-Queda will be there just as long as we want to stay. Apart from utter genocide (killing everyone in Afghanistan), there is no way to bring this kind of conflict to a successful military conclusion </> with a permanent resolution. To succeed we must accomplish a temporary conclusion with a temporary resolution -- reduce Taliban and al-Qaeda effectiveness for the short-term to where they cannot dominate Afghanistan and cannot organize terror strikes against the U.S. on our soil. To succeed in the long-term we must succeed step-by-step in the short-term. The battle at the Whale's Back was not a step in the right direction.
Bottom line is that each day we are in Afganistan "cleaning up" I get the "mission creep" heebie jeebies.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.