Goodbye America-The MX Missle,Rumsfeld,Russia,and China. What Are We Doing?

In a move that promises to shift the US window of vulnerability to a Russian nuclear strike two years earlier, the Bush administration, led by Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfield, is offering to do what Bill Clinton could never get away with--dismantle our premiere nuclear missile system, the MX "Peacekeeper," next year, instead of by the end of 2003. The MX is a crucial factor in the balance of nuclear deterrence for several reasons and should not be dismantled. First, it is our only missile armed with 10 MIRVed warheads, each capable of hitting and destroying hardened Russian and Chinese targets. Second, it is our most modern and accurate missile. Third, even though only 50 MX missiles exists, with 10 warheads on each missile that’s a loss of 1500 potential targets--a huge loss in deterrence capability. Fourth, with PDD-60 (orders to our missileers NOT to launch on warning and absorb an enemy "first strike") still governing our military’s nuclear response, the loss of all 50 MX missiles frees up at least 250 Russian warheads to target other US facilities. This is because the Russians would have to blanket a hardened MX silo with at least 5 ground burst weapons in order to ensure a kill.

This unilateral move comes at a time when Russian strongman Vladimir Putin is not only NOT disarming but is building and deploying 3 of the new SS-27 (Topol-M) ICBMs per quarter. (There could be more being produced in underground factories.) Putin is openly threatening to place 3 warheads on this new 6th generation ICBM (rumored to possess ABM jamming capabilities and maneuvering warheads), even though the START II treaty only allows Russia one warhead per missile. In fact, Putin’s threat is disinformation for the media. Both he and US intelligence know that Russia has already begun mounting multiple warheads on the Topols as of last year. An SS-27 missile test with multiple warhead separation has even been recorded by space based sensors.

What is also little known is that President Clinton already offered Russia the 3-warhead option as part of his deal to gain Russia’s permission to build an ABM system--as if we needed Russia’s permission to defend ourselves. What was particularly egregious was Clinton’s reasoning. He said his offer was to assure Russia that they would have sufficient nuclear power to overwhelm the puny 100 missile interceptor system being planned at the time. Here is an American president supposedly building an Anti-Ballistic Missile system to protect the American people and then offering to make an agreement with our largest potential nuclear enemy to render the system ineffective! Thus, it was entirely predictable that Putin’s defense minister would openly deride the US ABM system by saying exactly that--that by mounting 3 warheads on Russia’s planned 500 SS-27s, Russia could overwhelm the US defense system. As if that weren’t enough, Russian defense ministry spokesmen announced, after a test launch of an SS-19 ICBM this week, that Russia may not dismantle the SS-19s after all, in spite of prior promises to do so. This is not surprising since Russia is and has been in violation of virtually every single disarmament agreement signed. Strangely, the US not only never protests these violations, but insists on abiding by the agreements itself unilaterally.

As I have said before in prior Briefs, our leaders aren’t simply stupid, naive, or even suicidal. These tactics of covering for Russian violations and war preparations indicate that US globalist leaders have some sort of ulterior motives not in accord with US sovereign interests. These motives are instead tied to global intentions of undermining US sovereignty and military might. What better way to do that than create the conditions of US vulnerability whereby Russia is induced to finally destroy the one obstacle in Communism’s long dream of world hegemony--the US military?

Ironically, as Russia and China build for a two-ocean war of supremacy against the US, Sec. of Defense Rumsfield recently announced to Congress that as a matter of US military policy and strategy, the US will no longer prepare to wage two major wars simultaneously. This is a tacit admission that the Bush campaign pledge to rebuild the American military does not involve a strategy for preparing against the greatest real threats--Russia and China. Rumsfield’s stated intention of allocating almost the entire $8 billion in defense budget increases towards pay and amenities for service men is indicative that the Bush administration’s spending will not be sufficient or timely enough to protect us during this hastening window of vulnerability. All ammunition and strategic missile stocks have yet to be replenished from the Serbia campaign. Worse, none of the major US defense systems nor advanced weapon systems are expected to reach deployment till the 2006-2010 time frame. Therefore, the US will be open for maximum exposure to attack from 2002 to 2006. I’m issuing a major warning to my subscribers to not delay any preparations for implementing a high security shelter within your home or retreat. If the Bush administration implements Rumsfield’s drastic proposal for the early elimination of the MX, our nation’s window of vulnerability will move forward two years and you must not delay making substantive preparations for future war.

Moscow has outfitted hundreds of fighter-bombers with additional fuel tanks and in-flight refueling capability, augmenting Russia's intercontinental strike capability.

Russia has been constructing large numbers of military transport aircraft for foreign customers who do not exist.

Russia has been building and accumulating dry docks even though, at the moment, no foreign customers for them exist.

Russia has recently fielded a new battle tank; a new state-of-the-art fighter; super-quiet submarines which can engage sea, land and air targets simultaneously; a new attack helicopter and sniper rifle.

Russia has developed a revolutionary new rifle-fired infantry weapon, the so-called vacuum grenade, which can give a single Russian soldier the firepower of a 155mm howitzer. Russia has begun joint production of this weapon with the Chinese.

Russia now emphasizes the production of mobile ICBMs like the Topol-M, which are designed to evade satellite detection, permitting the Russians to cheat on arms control agreements.

Russia continues to develop biological and chemical weapons, sometimes with the use of U.S. funds. According to recent defectors, Russia is now working on a super-plague weapon.

Russian diplomacy is clearly attempting to build an anti-American alliance which includes countries like China, North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Iran and India.

Russian Spetsnaz commandos continue to train with suitcase nukes against U.S. targets.

Russia is hoarding strategic metals which are vital for keeping up war production through the first months of a nuclear world war.

Russia is importing more food than needed for domestic consumption. At the same time, Russia has constructed huge underground nuclear-proof food storage facilities.

Russia has developed an impressive engineering rescue capability, organized into special military formations positioned outside large cities, for rescuing citizens trapped beneath rubble in the event of a nuclear attack.

Recent Russian movies and pop songs depict Americans as stupid animals who deserve to die. In keeping with this theme, NATO is depicted as an aggressive alliance, sometimes likened to Hitler's Third Reich.

Russia is building huge underground cities, like the one at Yamantau Mountain in the Urals. These cities are built more than a thousand feet into the earth and are able to withstand direct nuclear attack.

Russia has erected a system of national missile defense far beyond that allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. Deploying approximately 10,000 dual-purpose mobile SAM/ABMs, Russia has used a loophole in the treaty to provide a powerful missile shield. Using a common-sense approach to ABM defense, Russia's interceptor missiles employ special nuclear warheads that can destroy incoming warheads without having to score a direct head-on hit.

Russia is also ahead of the United States in directed energy weapons that could be used to blind or destroy U.S. early warning satellites.

Many of Russia's mafia organizations operate in collaboration with, or under the supervision of, military intelligence and the state security services. Organized crime is used to penetrate Western banks, technology companies, law enforcement and government. Routes used for smuggling drugs and other contraband are reserved in wartime for bringing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons into the U.S.

Chinese military commanders have been told that nuclear war with America could begin at any time.

China has been developing and deploying new road-mobile long range missiles like the DF-31 and DF-41.

China is modernizing its navy, purchasing advanced Russian warships and missiles capable of sinking U.S. carriers.

China has positioned bases to block the main western entry point into the Pacific, and has acquired indirect control of the Panama Canal through front companies.

China has also penetrated Sudan, and is spreading missile and nuclear technology to rogue states in Africa and the Middle East.

China has engaged in war exercises during which U.S. forces in the Pacific were targeted by Chinese forces.

The U.S. pays Russia billions of dollars to encourage disarmament measures, but these billions are diverted to Russian war preparations.

The U.S. Army is short of recruits and officers, and has only 10 divisions, with 8 of them unfit for combat.

The U.S. Air Force is facing pilot shortages, and many aircraft remain grounded for lack of spare parts.

Only 18 ballistic missile submarines remain in the U.S. Navy, with only 9 at sea on any given day.

America's ballistic missile submarine commanders no longer have the launch codes to fire their nuclear weapons, but must rely on the president to send them the launch codes in the event of a war emergency.

For the last thirty years the West--and the US in particular--has engaged in de facto unilateral disarmament vis-à-vis the twin Communist threats of Russia and China. Ostensibly, the original official policy was conditioned upon a series of multilateral and verifiable disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states--but these agreements have, in fact, been neither. Instead, the West has acted unilaterally to disarm while China and the Soviet Union (and its successor, the Commonwealth of Independent States) have either refused to signs such agreements or have violated them repeatedly.

In response to these violations, the US has engaged in a policy of denial that Russia and China are strategic threats, choosing instead to focus on the much smaller threats from minor rogue nations--all of which are client states of the "Big Two" Communist powers. In addition, both Republican and Democratic administrations in the US have engaged in a systematic covering operation for Russian and Chinese hostile intentions by:

a) minimizing the perception of Chinese and Russian aggression against other nations (Korea, Laos, Vietnam, Tibet, Chechnya),

b) downplaying or hiding from public disclosure Chinese and Russian violations of arms agreements,

c) amending arms treaties or making secret side agreements formalizing the legitimacy of violations,

d) facilitating military technology transfers to both China and Russia as if they were allies or "strategic partners,"

e) encouraging or allowing the Russians to build compensatory modernized missile systems, presumably so they won’t feel insecure about proposed US missile defense systems.

One of the most egregious deceptions perpetrated upon the public today is that Russian military might has collapsed. Actually, Russia still presents a very real threat, with a military that is continually being updated and strengthened. However, to perpetrate the theory of their own military weakness, Russia has removed from public view the major portions of ongoing weapons modernization programs and allowed Western arms control inspectors to see only old, outdated weapons systems that Russia needs to replace anyway. Then, feigning poverty, they have induced the West to pay for the modernization. Never mind that Russia always seems to have the funds to develop new and expensive high tech weapons for sale to client rogue nations.

Western inspectors have never been allowed into any of the major underground storage and manufacturing depots scattered around the CIS--only the old ones built early in the Cold War which are hardly serviceable. Instead of making realistic approximations of Russian military assets based upon a clear pattern of obscuration and cheating, virtually every official US and British source of intelligence lists Russian and CIS military assets today as if they were abiding by arms control treaties. In other words, the numbers of nuclear warheads and missiles in official records are listed to match what they are supposed to be, according to treaty--not what they really are (which no one knows for certain).

Russia is in the completion stage of two huge underground military-industrial complexes and numerous other interconnected bunker developments throughout Russia (e.g.: the Sherapovo bunker site, south of Moscow). The Yamantau Mountain underground complex in the Beloretsk area of the southern Ural mountains is estimated to be the size of the Washington DC metro area, and the Yavinsky Mountain complex is slightly smaller. Although Russia claims both these sites to be mining projects, the multiple standard sized rail lines entering hardened entrances at each complex suggest otherwise. Why would Russia refuse to let US inspectors inside if they were only mining operations? When the New York Times ran a front page article in 1996 on these facilities, the CIA responded by excusing them as "defensive," even though they admittedly have never been inside. Clearly this is another example of US agencies being directed by higher authority to downplay any evidence that Russia is still a threat. Private military analysts, myself included, suspect that these huge underground complexes are housing complete nuclear, biological and chemical warfare factories capable of surviving nuclear retaliation and maintaining Russia’s production capacity during a nuclear war. Russia clearly intends to start and win a nuclear conflict, despite all the wishful thinking by disarmament experts to the contrary.

While Russia feigns poverty and purposefully keeps major sectors of the economy in shambles, huge amounts of Western loans and aid are secretly being funneled into growing weapons programs. According to Pentagon analyst Frank C. Spinney, "Since 1991, Congress has authorized nearly $2 billion to assist Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with the safe and secure storage, transportation, and dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons (The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement). The United States also arranged to purchase 500 metric tons of enriched uranium from dismantled warheads to keep it out of circulation. The warhead materials are to be blended down and made into reactor fuel. The deal, however, has run into difficulties due to haggling over the price the United States would pay for the uranium and due to financial pressures stemming from the privatization of the government corporation charged with implementing the deal, the United States Enrichment Corporation. Critics say the US aid is freeing up money for Moscow to continue its strategic nuclear buildup, which includes two new long-range missile systems and a new class of missile submarines." Notice that when it comes to Russian compliance some snag always emerges that keeps them from complying--and yet the money keeps flowing.

Here is a recent assessment of the disarmament boondoggle by J. R. Nyquist, author of Origins of the Fourth World War: "Recently, it was pointed out by Colin McMahon, of the Chicago Tribune, that the United States is probably paying for the modernization of Russia's nuclear weapons industry. Meanwhile, our own nuclear-weapons production capability is – according to Senator Fred Thompson – beginning to crumble. At a secret ‘nuclear city’ in Russia there is a $640 million structure built for housing plutonium from dismantled Russian nukes. American tax dollars paid for this structure. According to McMahon, some experts contend the US has been ‘hoodwinked into financing an upgrade of Russia's weapons complex.’ As it turns out, US observers are not allowed to see what is going on at the Russian facility where the $640 million was spent. This would not be the first instance of America unwittingly financing Russian weapons programs. American dollars sent to Russia have been diverted, and many of these diversions have probably benefited Russian military programs. In recent years, the United States has spent nearly $5 billion in Russia."

What is particularly disturbing is that the US is responsible for its own arms race. The US gave the secrets of the atom bomb to Russia during the Lend-Lease period of WWII as documented in the diaries of Major George Jordan, the Lend-Lease officer who objected and was overruled by the FDR White House. The US also provided the nuclear material for Russia’s first bomb. In the 1970s, the US facilitated the transfer of sensitive military technology to improve the range and accuracy of Soviet missiles. Sadly, the American people never realized why we had to build anti-missile systems against these weapons--or how our enemies got them.

The excuse used at the time for American complicity regarding these transfers was that Russia was too weak to be a threat. When it became strong due to Western assistance--and very dangerous--we were then told we must appease the Russians because they are a nuclear threat. Brilliant deduction! The same rationale is being repeated with China. Within 10 years or less, China will be a predatory power that both the West and Russia will come to the same brilliant conclusion after it’s too late. It is no secret among Pentagon experts that both Russia and China still adhere to the military doctrine of using a massive nuclear pre-emptive strike on the West as the opening salvo in the next war. Russia begins each military exercise with such a simulated nuclear strike, according to reliable Russian military defectors.

Interestingly enough, if the US believes that Russia is no longer a threat, then why does the Pentagon’s Monterey Language School still continue to train more Russian language specialists than any other language by far? Why, if the US really believes that only rogue nations are a threat did the US install the newest Globus-2 tracking system in Norway--a site suitable only for tracking Russian missiles? Obviously, while the US government is assuring the world of Russia’s peaceful intentions and specifically excluding a Russian strike from its defensive assumptions, they are planning for something much more ominous.

Americans are pacified about the US disarmament policy by their own government’s falsification of estimates regarding Russian nuclear and conventional forces. I’ve already mentioned the fact that Russia’s true numbers of nuclear weapons and warheads is beyond knowing, so US policy makers are told to assume that Russia is in compliance (a fool’s paradise). Putin, in a recent interview taken a week after his meeting with President Bush, made these candid remarks about the futility of an ABM system: "We will be unable to monitor one another and see how many missiles we have decommissioned . . and when we have unscrewed a warhead, see whether we have placed it nearby or destroyed it...there will be no control. What we unscrew today, we can install tomorrow." Absolutely true, and every starry-eyed arms controller knows this but refuses to talk about it, so strong is the ideological tenacity to which they adhere to the cause.

Disarmament of conventional forces has also been downplayed unrealistically. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) required that the Soviets would reduce their ground forces west of the Urals (an important loophole) to one-third of their mid-1988 levels by the end of 1994. Their armored forces would be reduced from 40,400 tanks and 138 reserve motor rifle divisions to 13,000 tanks and 50 divisions. There were also reciprocal "flank" provisions in which Russia and NATO agreed not to permit concentrations of their own armed forces on their flanks to the north and south.

Before the implementation of the CFE treaty, the Russians were allowed (and encouraged) to withdraw 70,000 pieces of heavy armor and artillery beyond the Ural mountains so they would not be calculated in the CFE provisions. So, with all the equalizing of numbers supposedly mandated by the CFE, keep in mind that Russia has stockpiled a huge number of modern tanks and mobile artillery in depots east of the Ural mountains which can be brought back into operation quickly during war.

Even with these loopholes and concessions granted, the Russians have never fully implemented their side of the CFE. For example, in 1996 Latvia protested the US approval of Moscow’s plan to increase the number of armored personnel carriers in the flank region of Latvia from 400 to 600, when Latvia only had 15 such vehicles. The Latvian protest went unheeded by the US. Last year, Poland protested the buildup of tactical nuclear stockpiles in the Kaliningrad Oblast--another violation of the flank agreement. The Clinton administration refused to pressure Russia to back down and instead entered into a side agreement making the violation acceptable.

As the Center for Security Policy reported in 1995, "Russia will formally violate the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. That it would do so comes as no surprise; Moscow has failed fully to draw down the thousands of battle tanks, armored vehicles and heavy artillery pieces it is obliged to remove from the northern and southern flank regions and has telegraphed its intention not to do so for months. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev did so again quite pointedly yesterday, announcing that ‘compliance [with the CFE accord] will fully violate our country's system of security both in the south and in the north.’ Evidently, the Kremlin believes it must retain 1,100 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles and 2,100 artillery pieces in its Western region in order to intimidate -- and, if necessary, to fight -- adversaries at home (e.g., the Chechens) and abroad (e.g., the Baltic States, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey).

"The Clinton Administration has responded to this strategically portentous and politically sensitive Russian recalcitrance by essentially capitulating. It has agreed to support an adjustment to the CFE Treaty that would enable Moscow to keep the tanks and artillery pieces it wants along the flanks. Washington has, to date, agreed nearly to double the number of armored vehicles the Russians are allowed to have in the region (i.e., 1,000 armored personnel carriers, etc. versus the 580 it is permitted to have and in contrast to the 3,000 the Kremlin currently seeks). When the CFE Treaty was signed on November 19 [1994] the Soviets had 20,700 tanks remaining in the Atlantic-to-Urals region. That leaves 7,550 Soviet tanks to be destroyed under the treaty's requirements." Still, these numbers do not include the 70,000 pieces Russia has stockpiled east of the Urals. To date, the Russians have only destroyed a few hundred of the oldest tanks. Other armored vehicles have been sold to neighboring client states, and thus are still available to enforce Russian foreign policy.

Another chronic disinformation ploy is to claim the Russian air force lacks sufficient fuel to maintain pilot readiness. A typical quote from the Pentagon proclaims, "The most acute problem in the Russian Air Force is lack of training resources, specifically lack of fuel. Flying hours have been kept to the minimum for years, which erodes besides the pilot skills also the readiness of the whole system." This is ludicrous. Russia is awash in oil resources and doesn’t lack for refineries. The country is a huge exporter of oil and fuel products. If Russian officials are limiting the fuel available for flying time, it is because they have chosen to do so, for reasons of promulgating an image of weakness.

As of late 1990 (prior to the CFE) here is a typical view of NATO vs. Soviet conventional forces according to Soviet Military Power. Note that there was an approximate 2:1 Soviet advantage in quantity of land based weapons:

Here is a current view of the West vs. East comparison after CFE including Russian Ural stockpiles, normally omitted from conventional assessments for political reasons. There still is a 2:1 Russian bloc advantage in conventional land-based weaponry. The two sides are at least comparable in nuclear forces.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 550, (MX out in 2002) * 756 known, and growing

One cannot simply tally up total forces and come to a predictable outcome based upon quantity. Quantity does matter, but it is only one of several factors to consider. Quality of weapons systems are a factor. Some high tech weapons are worth 10 conventional types. But quality is overplayed by the Americans. Smart weapons are ten to twenty times more costly than conventional weapons and thus are deployed in vastly smaller quantities. None of the Western nations has the unlimited budget to field both quality and massive quantity. In addition, high tech weapons have never been tested against a determined enemy possessing both quality weapons and overwhelming numbers. The recent US experiments in clean, surgical stand-off warfare against Iraq and Serbia were not good real-world examples of military prowess. Neither Iraq nor Serbia had the will or capability to fight back in a meaningful manner. Yet even so, in both mini-wars, US stockpiles of smart weapons were drawn down to dangerously low levels. In many cases the stockpiles have not been rebuilt. Up against a Russian attack, with an adversary capable of throwing tens of thousands of armored weapons into the conflict, the US and NATO simply don’t have enough smart weapons to disable even one-third of the potential threat.

Tactics are another major factor. The US and NATO have ceded the advantage in tactical NBC weapons to the Russians. The US developed and then declined to deploy the neutron bomb, capable of killing large numbers of people without destroying cities--a major battlefield advantage if faced with overwhelming numbers of enemy troops. The US has also decommissioned and is destroying almost all its biological, chemical and tactical nuclear stockpiles. Meanwhile, the Russians have deployed the neutron bomb, are maintaining huge stockpiles of other tactical nuclear weapons, and continue to build (in violation of all treaties) stockpiles of modern chemical and biological weapons. Even though treaties have been signed agreeing to reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, these treaties required the Russians only to warehouse their stockpiles.

In terms of morale and combat readiness, both East and West have serious shortcomings. The Russians are purposefully allowing their troop levels to drop while maintaining unusually high levels of NCOs and officers. Some analysts believe this is indicative of feigning weakness while holding on to the leadership capability to rapidly assimilate new recruits in a war. In the West, NATO would be hard-pressed to field 4 divisions within a reasonable time. US forces are overplayed and understaffed as well. Morale is at rock bottom in US units. The US has been enforcing tenuous and unpopular peacekeeping operations abroad that have little bearing on American security interests and have been unpopular with US troops. Politicians, knowing the fragility of American tolerance for these foreign entanglements, have skewed military tactics to avoid (and sometimes cover up) getting Americans killed, leaving the false impression that military operations can be done with little risk of bloodshed--another fool’s paradise. Meanwhile, political correctness has invaded all aspects of American military training. Irritating sensitivity training has caused racial sensitivities to heighten rather than lessen. Preferential treatment for women in the military--forcing the use of double standards in training--also saps the morale out of mixed forces. Pay and benefits have now become the sole motivators in recruitment efforts, and it isn’t working. The quality of retention is suffering along with quantity. When politicians destroy the moral and patriotic basis for military service, good people leave and unprincipled mercenaries fill in the vacuum.

The one factor that can unbalance all others is the nuclear factor. Nuclear considerations dominate because only nuclear weapons have the potential to change the balance of power so quickly. Of course, the mere possession of nuclear weapons does not equate to deterrence if it is apparent that a nation lacks the political will to use them. Communist leaders do not lack the ruthlessness to do so. The Russians are so sure of the inevitability of a nuclear war that they have made substantial preparations to survive such a circumstance, including a huge underground hardened military support system and civilian shelter system.

In contrast, US and NATO allies are particularly unprotected and left vulnerable to nuclear attack. In addition, the US has engaged in several unwise policies that actually encourage a Russian pre-emptive nuclear strike:

1) There are no longer any nuclear bombers on alert that can get airborne in time to escape a nuclear first strike.

2) Driven by naive notions of Russian disarmament and an inordinate fear of accidental launch, the US military today lives under the ominous and suicidal restrictions of a top secret Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-60) mandating that the US military absorb a nuclear first strike and not launch on warning. This has not been rescinded by President Bush.

3) The US has agreed to keep half of its ballistic missile submarine fleet (SSBN) in port at any time, ensuring the Russians’ ability to eliminate half our capacity in a single blow. These two ports at Bangor (Seattle), Washington and King’s Bay, Georgia are guaranteed first strike targets. Similarly the nation’s B-1 bomber force is being consolidated into 2 bases instead of the current 5.

4) There exist no nuclear fallout shelters in the US intended to protect the general population. The government has built numerous large scale underground shelters to protect military and high ranking civilians from attack--which is telling.

The Russians know all of this, and wonder privately how or if the US could be so naive, especially regarding PDD-60. This order to absorb a nuclear first strike is like telling the Russians, "Look, you’re going to have a free shot, so you’d better give us all you have on the first try, before we retaliate." Retaliate with what? If an enemy knew they could strike without the fear of launch on warning--a powerful deterrent--they would make sure to hit the US with everything necessary to ensure that any retaliation would be limited. Russian forces can easily handle a limited retaliation, given their level of sheltering. Launch on warning is a powerful deterrent specifically because of the time delay it takes missiles to arrive on target. The US could launch its own silo-based missiles before the Russian missiles arrive on target. With a knowledge of which Russian facilities had already launched weapons, US missiles could be retargeted to attack those Russian missiles or facilities that are still vulnerable. When the Russian missiles finally arrived, many of their targets would be empty. Thus, launch on warning actually gives an advantage to the side that launches second--not first.

Without a policy to launch on warning, two and a half legs of the US strategic triad (nuclear missiles, bombers, half of SSBNs) would be taken out all at once in a first strike. The remaining SSBNs could easily be neutralized and cut off from command by a Russian EMP strike (multiple high altitude nuclear explosions producing electromagnetic pulses that destroy electrical connections below) combined with anti-satellite attacks. EMP could destroy ELF low frequency communications and satellite systems used to direct submarine operations. Without communications and authorization to launch missiles, our SSBNs would become isolated and ineffective.

The US has a massive superiority in aircraft carrier task forces. But with today’s high tech satellite surveillance systems, it is nearly impossible to hide these forces even on the open seas in bad weather. One nuclear salvo could take out these forces in minutes. The US navy currently has no effective ABM system to counter a nuclear strike on its carriers. The Aegis system could potentially be modified to that purpose, but changes to the speed and range of the Aegis missiles would be substantial and costly.

The US strategy has left the nation blatantly vulnerable to a Russian pre-emptive strike during the 2002 to 2006 time frame--what is fast becoming a large window of vulnerability.

The US is accelerating its unilateral disarmament by decommissioning the powerful MX ICBM in 2002. The MX is a crucial factor in the balance of nuclear deterrence for several reasons.

1) It is our only missile armed with 10 MIRVed warheads, each capable of hitting and destroying hardened Russian and Chinese targets.

3) Even though only 50 MX missiles exists, with 10 warheads on each missile that’s a loss of 500 potential targets--a huge loss in deterrence capability.

4) With PDD-60 still governing our military’s nuclear response, the loss of all 50 MX missiles frees up at least 250 Russian warheads to target other US facilities. This is because the Russians would have to blanket a hardened MX silo with at least 5 ground burst weapons in order to ensure a kill.

This unilateral move comes at a time when Russia is not only NOT disarming but is building and deploying 3 new SS-27 (Topol-M) ICBMs per quarter--and there could be more in production in underground factories. Putin is openly threatening to place 3 warheads on this new 6th generation ICBM (rumored to possess ABM jamming capabilities and maneuvering warheads), even though the START II treaty only allows Russia one warhead per missile. In fact, Putin’s threat is disinformation for the media. Both he and US intelligence know that Russia has already begun mounting multiple warheads on the Topols as of last year. An SS-27 missile test with multiple warhead separation has even been recorded by space based sensors.

As if that weren’t enough, Russian defense ministry spokesmen announced, after a test launch of an SS-19 ICBM this week, that Russia may not dismantle the SS-19s after all, in spite of prior promises to do so. This is not surprising since Russia is and has been in violation of virtually every single disarmament agreement signed. Strangely, the US not only never protests these violations, but insists on abiding by the agreements itself unilaterally.

As I have said before in prior World Affairs Briefs, our leaders aren’t simply stupid, naive, or even suicidal. These tactics of covering for Russian violations and war preparations indicate that US globalist leaders have some sort of ulterior motives not in accord with US sovereign interests. These motives are instead tied, in my opinion, to global intentions of undermining US sovereignty and military might. What better way to do that than create the conditions of US vulnerability whereby Russia is induced to finally destroy the one obstacle in Communism’s long dream of world hegemony--the US military?

As Russia and China build for a two-ocean war of supremacy against the US, Sec. of Defense Rumsfield recently announced to Congress that as a matter of US military policy and strategy, the US will no longer prepare to wage two major wars simultaneously. This is a tacit admission that the Bush campaign pledge to rebuild the American military does not involve a strategy for preparing against the greatest known threats--Russia and China--which would require preparing for the inevitable larger war to come.

Rumsfield’s stated intention of allocating almost the entire $8 billion in defense budget increases towards pay and amenities for service men is indicative that the Bush administration’s increased spending will not be sufficient or timely enough to protect the US during this hastening window of vulnerability. Thus, currently deployed weapons systems will not be maintained or increased in quantity due to the high cost of fielding the next generation of high tech weapons beginning in 2006-2010. Ammunition and cruise missile stocks have yet to be replenished from the Serbia campaign.

With the continued downsizing of conventional forces and disarmament of strategic nuclear forces, the US has knowingly or unknowingly left itself dangerously exposed to Russia’s nuclear option from 2002 to 2006. Considering the quantities of conventional forces held in reserve by both Russia and China, the West would be hard–pressed even under existing favorable circumstances to field a sufficient quantity of smart munitions to fight a full scale, two ocean war during that period. If such a war were preceded by a nuclear pre-emptive strike against the West, the resulting diminution of Western military power would be almost fatal. I suspect strongly that the Russians intend to use the nuclear option on the US and Britain, and then attempt to blackmail Europe into submission. If Europe fails to succumb, Russia will procede with an attack on Europe with tactical nuclear weapons and a massive quantity of conventional forces once Europe’s compliment of the high tech weapons are eliminated or used up. China, currently in a mutually supportive role with Russia, will use their advantage (in quantity of armed forces) to occupy vast territories, while Russia supplements China’s limited naval transport capabilities.

the US is making a huge strategic mistake by downsizing and disarming strategic forces before new weapons systems are deployed to shore up the deterrence factor. It’s a mistake to disarm in any case, given the massive amount of Russian and Chinese violations of arm control agreements. Even relying on small numbers of high tech equipment, without sufficient ammunition stocks to field a much larger threat, is very unwise, but disarming in the face of Russia’s increased motivation to use the nuclear option is suicidal. Sadly, it appears as if the United State’s illusory days as the world’s only super power are numbered.

The window of US/NATO vulnerability will begin to open in 2002 after the MX missiles are destroyed. The intention of the US to leap forward in time and field a whole new generation of high tech weaponry after 2006, coupled with the threat of a vigorous multi-tiered ABM system before 2007, almost guarantees that the Russians will see the necessity to strike before that time frame. No single issue incites Russian or Chinese fears more than the specter of an ABM system that will potentially limit their planned first strike strategy. Their opposition to this purely defensive system is clear evidence of eventual hostile intentions--all other excuses about its potential for creating an arms race are pure propaganda. Russia is already in an arms race, building a new force of ICBMs, and the West is helping out with a steady flow of loans and joint venture military technology.

The picture I paint is grim and holds little hope at this late stage for reversal. As Serbian-American Petar Makara said recently, "false hope will keep the victim immobilized when action is the only real hope left." To a world accustomed to living in illusions of peace and hope, this projected Russian nuclear strike is unthinkable, therefore the public will continue to prefer paralysis to action.

Furthermore, the West naively thinks that everyone is rational like themselves and that no modern nation would knowingly plan to destroy our marvelous way of life, since it would affect the perpetrator himself. Sadly, these illusions of hope are reminiscent of the 1930s. Most fail to remember that real evil rises up from time to time as men’s consciences grow dull and they become resistant to the warning signs--and even anxious to disbelieve. It’s only been a little more than a half a century since the world succumbed to the same illusions of peace and prosperity that led to WWII. It is my warning to the world that we are entering a similar but even more deceptive period which will sweep us into WWIII, to be followed by a total restructuring of the New World Order--which will destroy in one final motion what remains of national sovereignty and individual liberty.

Naturally, the resulting form of government will still be called democracy and the "rule of law"--but the law will have become a vehicle of oppression and there will be no retreat allowed back to individual, family, or national sovereignty. The EU, NAFTA, and the WTO are administrative precursors to this control system, which should be actively resisted. But the real chains of international police power are only capable of being forged when people are suffering under the exigencies of war and cease to worry about rights and limited government in their quest for survival. That’s why, as Helmut Kohl cryptically hinted at his speech in Leuven, Belgium in 1996, "The only alternative to European integration is war." As an insider, Kohl knows that war--what the world considers unthinkable--may soon become a tragic reality.

Freedom From War

The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7277

Disarmament Series 5

Released September 1961

Office of Public Services

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

INTRODUCTION

The revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences has produced a crisis in human history. In order to overcome the danger of nuclear war now confronting mankind, the United States has introduced at the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations a Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.

This new program provides for the progressive reduction of the war-making capabilities of nations and the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions to settle disputes and maintain the peace. It sets forth a series of comprehensive measures which can and should be taken in order to bring about a world in which there will be freedom from war and security for all states. It is based on three principles deemed essential to the achievement of practical progress in the disarmament field:

First, there must be immediate disarmament action: A strenuous and uninterrupted effort must be made toward the goal of general and complete disarmament; at the same time, it is important that specific measures be put into effect as soon as possible.

Second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective international controls: The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions take place as agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process.

Third, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established: There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.

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There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The full text of the program is contained in an appendix to this pamphlet.

FREEDOM FROM WAR

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM

FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

SUMMARY

DISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

The over-all goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should direct their efforts:

The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force; The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order; The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;

The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATES

The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form part of the total program.

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:

As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes; Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;

Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;

Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and

Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.

DISARMAMENT STAGES

The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions.

FIRST STAGE

The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the capabilities of nations to wage aggressive war. Implementation of this stage would mean that:

The nuclear threat would be reduced:

All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons.

The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and quantities of such materials from past production would be converted to non-weapons uses.

States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.

States not owning nuclear weapons would not manufacture them or attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.

A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

Strategic delivery vehicles would be reduced:

Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.

Arms and armed forces would be reduced:

The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited.

An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

Peaceful use of outer space would be promoted:

The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction would be prohibited.

States would give advance notification of space vehicle and missile launchings.

U.N. peace-keeping powers would be strengthened:

Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

An International Disarmament Organization would be established for effective verification of the disarmament program:

Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.

It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.

It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.

States would be committed to other measures to reduce international tension and to protect against the chance of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack:

States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm; observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

SECOND STAGE

The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation of all measures in the second stage would mean:

Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments, and military establishments of states, including strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and countering weapons;

Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations; Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United Nations;

Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a halt in the production of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses; On the basis of the findings of an Experts Commission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons; The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organization to enable it to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to determine the transition to Stage III.

THIRD STAGE

During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:

States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force. The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning. The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world. Appendix

DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM

FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Nations of the world, Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences; Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Call on the negotiating states:

(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;

(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;

(c) Also to seek --- without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program --- agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.

Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

STAGE I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable c,f producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

G. To Keep the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force--including nuclear, conventional, or CBR--contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.

(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.

(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat: Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N Peace Force.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O 609147

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