A Critique of “On the Meaning of ‘Natural Born Citizen,’” Part III

I do not accept all of your premises no matter how you wish to cite things.

So, the Preamble does not express the mindset of the Framers, but of the Committee on Style regarding what the Framers did.

If the Congress voted for it, then the entire body accepted it. That's what representative government looks like, even within committees within Congress.

There is no such thing as "half a foreigner" which implies the existence of "half a citizen."

No, it implies a dual citizen, one with split loyalties.

Being "half a foreigner" is akin to being half pregnant.

That's a false equivalency. I suppose you abhor hyphenated Americans, too?

The Preamble does not even pretend to say a mumbling word about citizenship or two citizen parents, or natural born citizens, or naturalized citizens, or half-foreign citizens.

It says "We the People of the United States." Who is that? Are you arguing that "We the People" contains non-citizens? Did non-citizens ordain and establish the Constitution for the citizens?

We the People wanted to "create a more perfect Union." Is that something that foreigners were doing, or citizens?

The whole phrase oozes citizenship. It can't mean anything other than citizenship in the context of the Preamble.

The Preamble says "We the People of the United States," it says "ourselves," and it says "our Posterity." It's clear to anyone who wishes to see that the Continental Congress of the United States meant "We the People" to be the citizens of the United States, they wanted to form a more perfect Union for "ourselves" (meaning the citizens of the United States that the Continental Congress was representing, and "our Posterity" meaning the next generations of citizens (the children of citizens).

The built a pathway for foreigners to become citizens (become We the People), and then their Posterity would also be citizens.

-PJ

Yes. American citizenship… but not natural-born citizenship. And… YOU WILL BE PROVEN WRONG ULTIMATELY AND BE REVEALED AS A FIFTH COLUMNIST.

So, the Preamble does not express the mindset of the Framers, but of the Committee on Style regarding what the Framers did.
If the Congress voted for it, then the entire body accepted it. That's what representative government looks like, even within committees within Congress.

If the Congress voted for it, it was a miracle. The Congress does not even vote on Amendments. The Congress created by the Constitution did not exist to vote themselves into existence. The Constitution was ratified by states. Debates on ratification took places in the various State legislatures. The Congress that did not exist neither debated nor voted.

There is no such thing as "half a foreigner" which implies the existence of "half a citizen."
No, it implies a dual citizen, one with split loyalties.

Dual citizenship has no effect whatsoever on United States citizenship. The United States does not consider any of its citizens to be half-loyal.

If a child is born in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, the child is a natural bornAmerican citizen. If one or both parents are aliens, and the nation bestows citizenship upon the child, the United States government does not care. Should the Israeli government choose to bestow Israeli citizenship on all non-Jews born in America, would that leave only Jews eligible to the Presidency? An African nation could bestow citizenship to all non-blacks, and all non-blacks would be ineligible to be President. Keep working on that theory.

Not all the states agreed to send a representative to the Constitutional Convention. Early in the proceedings, two-thirds of the New York delegation walked out leaving Alexander Hamilton powerless to cast any votes at the Convention. Washington was elected with the votes of ten of the eleven states in the Constitutional union. New York was arguing amongst themselves and did not elect any delegates to the Electoral College. North Carolina and Rhode Island did not ratify until well after Washington was inaugurated.

The Congressional Register, Vol I, II, and III made it exquisitely clear.

The Congressional Register;
or,
History
of the
Proceedings and Debates
of the First
House of Representatives
of the
United States of America:
Namely,
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
South-Carolina and Georgia.
Being the Eleven States that have Ratified the Con-
stitution of the Government of the United States.
Containing an Impartial Account of
The Most interesting Speeches and Motions; and accurate Copies of remarkable
Papers laid before and offered to the House.
Taken in short hand,
By Thomas Lloyd
Volume I
New York:
Printed for the Editor, by Harrisson and Purdy
M,DCC,LXXXIX.

The United States of America, the ELEVEN states that had ratified the Constitution.

Congressional Register, Volume I, 1789,

Page 412, Mr. SHERMAN, June 5, 1789:

But all we are now to consider, I believe, is, that we invite the state of Rhode Island to join our confederacy, what will be the effect of such a measure we cannot tell till we try it.

Page 413, Mr. MADISON, June 5, 1789:

My idea on the subject now before the House is, that it would be improper in this body to expose themselves to have such a proposition rejected by the legislature of the state of Rhode Island

Page 413, Mr. AMES, June 5, 1789:

I should be glad to know if any gentleman contemplates the state of Rhode Island, dissevered from the union; a maritime state, situated in the most convenient manner for the purpose of smuggling and defrauding our revenue. Surely a moment's reflection will induce the house to take measures to secure this object. Do gentlemen imagine that state will join the union? ... If a wish of congress will bring them into the union, why shall we decline to express such a wish?

Page 424, Mr. MADISON, June 8, 1789:

It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house that, notwithstanding the ratification of this system of government by eleven of the thirteen United States, in some cases unanimously, in others by large majorities; yet still there is a great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it....

Page 438, Mr. JACKSON, June 8, 1789:

I hold, Mr. Speaker, that the present is not a proper time for considering of amendments. The States of Rhode-Island and North-Carolina are not in the Union. As to the latter, we have every presumption that they will come in. But in Rhode-Island I think the antifederal interest yet prevails. ...
But to return to my argument. It being the case that those states are not yet come into the Union, when they join us we shall have another list of amendments to consider, and another bill of rights to frame.

Page 441, Mr. GERRY, June 8, 1789:

There are two states not in the union; it would be a very desirable circumstance to gain them. I should therefore be in favor of such amendments as might tend to invite them and gain their confidence; good policy will dictate to use to expedite that event. Gentlemen say, that we shall not obtain the consent of two-thirds of both houses to amendments. Are gentlemen willing then to throw Rhode-Island and North-Carolina into the situation of foreign nations. They have told you, that they cannot accede to the union unless certain amendments are made to the constitution; if you deny a compliance with their request in this particular, you refuse an accomodation to bring about that desirable event, and leave them detached from the union.

While you may interpret that dual-nationality indicates split loyalties, the government never has. Ted Cruz was ruled eligible to be on the ballot by a U.S. court. What precedent for you position do you have?

At no time have two citizen parents been required. The words speak only of the status of the candidate, not his or her parents.

George Washington
John Adams
Thomas Jefferson
James Madison
James Monroe
John Quincy Adams
Andrew Jackson
Chester Alan Arthur
Barack Hussein Obama II
Kamala Harris

There are seventeen terms as President or Vice President without two citizen parents. The grandfather clause did not mention parents. The qualifications clause did not mention parents. Such requirement is not in any of the statements or writings of the framers of the Constitution, or in the entire record of the ratification debates of the United States Constitution.

https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42097.html

Congressional Research Service
Informing the legislative debate since 1914
Qualifications for President and the "Natural Born" citizenship Eligibility Requirement
Jack Maskell
Legislative Attorney
January 11, 2016
CRS Report
Prepared for Members annd Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42097
[excerpt - footnotes coverted to endnotes]
[43]
Citizenship of Parents Concerning specifically the reading into the Constitution of a two-citizen-parent requirement for “natural born” citizenship status, it should be noted that there is, significantly, no historical nor controlling legal holding in American jurisprudence to support the argument that parental citizenship governs and controls the eligibility of a native born United States citizen to be President. As indicated in the discussion of the history of the constitutional provision, there is also no justification for this unique theory, which would exclude an entire class of native born U.S. citizens from eligibility for the Presidency, in any of the statements or writings of the framers of the Constitution, or in the entire record of the ratification debates of the United States Constitution.²⁰⁰
[44]
In 1825, in a significant and widely recognized work on the Constitution, William Rawle specifically noted that the term “natural born citizen” as used in the Constitution would include “every person born within the United States ... whether the parents are citizens or aliens....”²⁰¹ Similarly, in his treatise on Citizenship of the United States, Frederick Van Dyne, Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State, explained in 1904 that the rule governing citizenship is not one derived from “international law” or the so-called “law of nations,” but is rather municipal law which “[e]very nation determines for itself’ and, in the United States, derives from the common law principle of jus soli, dependent “on the place of birth,” as modified by statute incorporating the principles of jus sanguinis to include the children of citizens “born out of the jurisdiction of the United States.”²⁰² In reviewing Supreme Court decisional material, the author in this treatise noted that the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 civil rights act “reaffirm the fundamental principle of citizenship by birth” which “was generally held to be regulated by the common law, by which all persons born within the limits and allegiance of the United States were deemed to be natural born citizens thereof.”²⁰³
Although the Supreme Court has never had to address the issue of “natural born” citizenship directly in the context of a challenge to the eligibility of one to be President, the federal courts have discussed the concept on numerous occasions for more than 200 years and have, other than in the Dred Scott decision, consistently relied upon the place of birth, without regard or reference to the status of one’s parents, as the determining factor of natural born citizenship. A celebrated and frequently relied-upon state court ruling in 1844 provided a detailed explanation of the legal history of the citizenship laws and statutes in the United States, and provided the following conclusion with respect to natural born citizenship:
Upon principle, therefore, I can entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born citizen.²⁰⁴
That the place of birth was principally the rule governing “natural born” citizenship under American jurisprudence, regardless of the status of one’s parents (except for children of official diplomats or hostile armies), even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was explained by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, in 1898, which noted that the Fourteenth Amendment “affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children born here of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory ....”²⁰⁵ The Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark
[45]
cited with approval those previous judicial rulings which held that every child born on the soil of the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are “natural born” citizens of this country, without regard to the nationality or citizenship status of their parents.²⁰⁶ The Supreme Court, this time using the term “native born citizen” again explained in that case:
Passing by questions once earnestly controverted, but finally put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States.²⁰⁷
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court has used the term “native born” citizens (as expressly used in Wong Kim Ark to mean those born in the United States “whether children of citizens or foreigners”) as synonymous with, or at least included within the term “natural born,” in subsequent references to eligibility to the Presidency. In United States v. Schwimmer, for example, the Court stated: “Except for eligibility to the Presidency, naturalized citizens stand on the same footing as do native born citizens”²⁰⁸ Similarly, in Luria v. United States the Supreme Court stated: “Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency,”²⁰⁹ and noted in 1931 that other than the one instance in the Constitution which provides a difference, that is, the eligibility to the Presidency, “[t]he alien, when he becomes a naturalized citizen, acquires, with one exception, every right possessed under the Constitution by those citizens who are native born.”²¹⁰
With regard to the citizenship of children born in the United States to recent immigrants, it is significant to note that in this country in the late 1800’s, the public’s economic fears and hostility to foreigners led Congress to—in the words of one historian—“legitimize[ ] racism as national policy”²¹¹ by adopting legislation to prevent immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States, and to prohibit anyone of Chinese nationality to obtain U.S. citizenship through naturalization.²¹² Despite this law and its extensions, commonly known as the Chinese Exclusion Act, the federal courts consistently held that children born “in” the United States of Chinese parents were “natural
[46]
born” citizens of the United States, even if the parents may not have been United States citizens themselves and could not have “naturalized” under the Chinese Exclusion Act. In 1919, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit ruled that the appellee, Low Hong, based solely on the fact that he was born in San Francisco, without any reference to the nationality of his parents, “is a natural-born citizen of the United States.”²¹³
Similarly, in a case in 1920 concerning the identity of a petitioner, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that “[i]t is not disputed that if petitioner [Kwock Jan Fat] is the son” of two Chinese persons who were physically in the United States when petitioner was born, then the Court would accept the characterization of him as “a natural born American citizen ....”²¹⁴ The Supreme Court recognized that it had been alleged in earlier immigration proceedings that the father of Kwock Jan Fat had been born in the United States and, as averred by one witness, had voted in some election. The Supreme Court, however, made no finding, did not rely upon, nor did the Court even make a passing reference to the citizenship of the father of Kwock Jan Fat.²¹⁵ Furthermore, it is significant that there was no evidence, no argument, nor even any discussion in the decision of the Supreme Court, or in the reported lower court decision,²¹⁶ concerning the citizenship of the mother of Kwock Jan Fat. Neither the briefs for the petitioner, nor the brief for the respondent made any assertions or allegations concerning the citizenship of, or provided any argument or evidence concerning any naturalization of the mother of Kwock Jan Fat, but rather merely noted that she had been born in China and came to the United States as a child.²¹⁷ It is, of course, well known to those familiar with U.S. immigration laws that during the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act a woman who was a Chinese national, and not a citizen of the United States at birth, could not have been naturalized as a United States citizen even if she married someone who was a United States citizen.²¹⁸ However, the Supreme Court never discussed, referenced, or made any finding or conclusion concerning the citizenship of either the father, or the citizenship or naturalization of the mother of Kwock Jan Fat because the citizenship of one’s parents is not and was not relevant to the determination of “natural born” citizenship of one born in the United States. The relevant factor cited and determined by the Supreme Court of the United States was not the citizenship of both the father and mother, but rather—citing to the Wong Kim
[47]
Ark precedent—was the physical presence of the parents in the United States (that is, that the parents were “domiciled” here) at the time of Kwock’s birth in this country. Concerning the issue of balancing the considerations of fairness and justice in such identity cases of one born to Chinese parents in the United States, the Supreme Court, in an oft-quoted statement, expressly said:
It is better that many Chinese immigrants should be improperly admitted than that one natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently excluded from his country.²¹⁹
In a case that preceded the Supreme Court’s Wong Kim Ark decision, the United States Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner’s claim to be “a natural-born citizen of the United States” because of his place of birth, that is, within the United States, even though his parents were both “aliens” of Chinese nationality who were in the United States privately and “not here in any diplomatic or other official capacity under the emperor of China.”²²⁰ That federal court in 1884, relying on precedents including Assistant Vice-Chancellor Lewis Sandford’s opinion in Lynch v. Clarke, explained the concept in American jurisprudence that one is a “natural born” citizen when born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,²²¹ and that such was the state of American law even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (for other than those brought into the United States under slavery):
Independently of the constitutional provision, it has always been the doctrine of this country, except as applied to Africans brought here and sold as slaves, and their descendants, that birth within the dominions and jurisdiction of the United States of itself creates citizenship. This subject was elaborately considered by Assistant Vice-chancellor SANDFORD in Lynch v. Clarke, found in the first volume of his reports. [1 Sandf. 583.] In that case one Julia Lynch, born in New York in 1819, of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn in that city, returned with them the same year to their native country and always resided their afterwards. It was held that she was a citizen of the United States. After an exhaustive examination of the law the vice-chancellor said that he entertained no doubt that every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever the situation of his parents, was a natural-born citizen, and added that this was the general understanding of the legal profession, and the universal impression of the public mind.²²²
More recent federal cases expressly recognize the principle explained in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century cases that one born in the United States and under its jurisdiction, even when one or both parents were “aliens,” is considered a citizen of the United States by birth, and thus a “natural born” citizen of the United States. The court in Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, for example, accepted the findings of fact that “The relator was born in the City of Fall River, Massachusetts, on December 31, 1921. His father was a native and citizen of Portugal, and his mother was a native of Brazil,” and that, as found by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, “that the relator was a natural-born citizen....”²²³ In Loo Goon Hop v. Dulles, the court found that a person “having been
[48]
born in this country,” without any reference to, finding, or identification of the citizenship of that person’s parents, is a “natural born citizen of the United States.”²²⁴ In Yamauchi v. Rogers, the federal court in reciting “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” found that the plaintiff, born in California of a “Japanese national” who had married another “Japanese national,” “is a natural born citizen of the United States....”²²⁵ A federal court in 1974 similarly explained and held: “The plaintiff was a native of Biafra, now a part of the Republic of Nigeria. His wife and two older children are also natives of that country, but his third child, a daughter, is a natural-born citizen of the United States.”²²⁶ In Diaz-Salazar v. INS, the court there noted that children born in the United States, even to an “illegal” (or undocumented) alien father, “are natural-born citizens of the United States.”²²⁷ Similarly, in Mustata v. U.S. Department of Justice, the United States Court of Appeals, in reciting the facts of the case, noted: “Petitioners Marian and Lenuta Mustata are citizens of Romania. At the time of their petition, they resided in Michigan with their two minor children, who are natural born citizens of the United States.”²²⁸
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
198 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. at 329.
199 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. at 330.
200 As an historical matter it may be noted that Chester A. Arthur, 21st President of the United States, was apparently born in the United States (despite rumors being spread by opponents that he was born in Canada) in 1829 to a U.S. citizen-mother and a father who was not a U.S. citizen, but rather a citizen of Ireland and a British subject, although there have been assertions by some that this fact was not widely known at the time. See Thomas Reeves, GENTLEMAN BOSS: THE LIFE OF CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR, 202-203 (1975)). There was also a question raised concerning Charles Evans Hughes, Republican candidate for President who narrowly lost to Woodrow Wilson in 1916, and who was born in the United States to parents who were British subjects. Note Medina, The Presidential Qualifications Clause, supra at 267, n. 72, citing to Long, Is Mr. Charles Evans Hughes a “Natural Born Citizen” Within the Meaning of the Constitution? 49 CHIC. LEGAL NEWS 146 (1916). Although a question was raised by this individual at the time of Hughes’ candidacy, it did not appear to be an issue of any significance for Hughes or other presidential or vice-presidential candidates who were born in the U.S. of recent immigrants, as the “two-citizen-parent” argument with respect to native born U.S. citizens has not garnered serious legal consideration after Wong Kim Ark in 1898. The question did not appear to merit even a mention in the definitive, two-volume biography of Hughes. Merlo J. Pusey, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 316-366 (New York 1963).
201 William Rawle, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 80 (1825).
202 Frederick Van Dyne, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES, at 3-4 (New York 1904).
203 Id. at 4, 12. Emphasis added. Van Dyne explained in his treatise on citizenship that children born in the United States, even of alien parents (other than for the exceptions of diplomats and hostile troops) are natural born citizens of the United States, and distinguished as mere obiter dictum contrary comments on “jurisdiction” by the Court in The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36, 73 (1872) which, even by 1904, had been shown to be no longer controlling as to those points. Id. at 12-23.
204 Lynch v. Clarke, 3 N.Y. Leg. Ob. 236, 250 (1844). Emphasis added.
205 169 U.S. at 693.
206 169 U.S. at 662-663, citing United States v. Rhodes, 27 Fed. Case 785 (No. 16151) (C.C. Ky. 1866), and Lynch v. Clark.
207 169 U.S. at 674-675. Emphasis added. Note that the dissent in Wong Kim Ark stated that under the majority’s controlling decision, a child born to alien parents in the United States “whether of the Mongolian, Malay or other race, were eligible to the Presidency ....” 169 U.S. at 715 (Fuller, C.J. and Harlan, J. dissenting).
208 279 U.S. 644, 649 (1929).
209 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
210 United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. at 623-624. See also Baumgardner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673 (1944), and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1963). Furthermore, as discussed previously, noted constitutional scholars have also used the term “native born” citizen as a short-hand device to mean those born in the United States, without reference to lineage or ancestry, concerning those who are eligible to the presidency. Kent, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, supra at 273; Story, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at §271, p. 167; St. George Tucker, William Blackstone, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES AND REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Vol. I, App., at 323; 7 Gordon, Mailman, & Yale-Loehr, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, at §§91.02[4][a] and §91.02[4][c].
211 Andrew Gyory, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT, at 1-2, 16 (UNC Press 1998).
212 22 Stat. 58, May 6, 1882. The original restrictions were to run for 10 years, but were extended another 10 years by the so-called Geary Act in 1892 (27 Stat. 25, May 5 1892), and then made permanent in 1902. The Chinese exclusion acts were repealed in 1943 (57 Stat. 600, December 13, 1943).
213 U.S. v. Low Hong, 261 F. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1919).
214 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457 (1920): “It is not disputed that if petitioner is the son of Kwock Tuck Lee and his wife, Tom Ying Shee, he was born to them when they were permanently domiciled in the United States, is a citizen thereof, and is entitled to admission to the country. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649. But while it is conceded that he is certainly the same person who, upon full investigation was found, in March 1915, by the then Commissioner of Immigration, to be a natural born American citizen, the claim is that the Commissioner was deceived and that petitioner is really Lew Suey Chong ....”
215 Even if Kwock Jan Fat’s father—Kwock Tuck Lee—was born in the United States, a determination for citizenship purposes would have needed to have been made as to whether the father of Kwock Tuck Lee was in the United States in the official service of the government or emperor of China. Furthermore, depending on the specific election and the particular laws of a local, state, county, or water district jurisdiction, for example, voting is not necessarily conclusive of citizenship. U.S. v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1267-1268 (D.Utah 2003).
216 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 255 F. 323 (9th Cir. 1919).
217 Kwock Jan Fat and Tom Ying Shee v. White, Appellants’ Opening Brief, at 2 (March 13, 1920): referring to Kwock Jan Fat’s mother “Tom Ying Shee, a native of China, who arrived in the United States when eight years old.” See also Brief for Respondent (April 12, 1920), and Petition for a Writ of Certiori and Brief in Support Thereof, March 5, 1919. Any assertion or argument that Kwock’s parents were both citizens would assume facts not in evidence.
218 Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 346, 351(1925): “The excluded wives are alien Chinese ineligible to citizenship here. Rev. Stat. 2169 (Comp. St. 4358); Act May 6, 1882, c. 126, 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61 (Comp. St. 4359)[the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882]. Notwithstanding their marriage to citizens of the United States, they did not become citizens and remained incapable of naturalization.” This law would thus have prevented a Chinese native who married a United States citizen after May 6, 1882, from being naturalized as a U.S. citizen.
219 Kwock Jan Fat, 253 U.S. at 464.
220 In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905, 906 (Cal. Cir. 1884).
221 That is, when the laws and jurisdiction of the United States are applicable to such person: “They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered ….” 21 F. at 906.
222 21 F. at 909. Emphasis added.
223 68 F.Supp. 773, 774 (D.Mass. 1946). The court there found that even as a natural born citizen, an individual such as relator could expatriate himself under the operation of the existing federal law by performing acts indicating the “voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance,” such as voluntarily serving in a foreign army.
224 119 F.Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1954): “It is not denied that the person who it is claimed is the plaintiff’s father is a natural born citizen of the United States, having been born in the country.”
225 181 F. Supp. 934, 935-936 (D.D.C. 1960).
226 Nwankpa v. Kissinger, 376 F.Supp. 122, 123 (D.M.D. Ala. 1974).
227 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
228 179 F.3d 1017, 1019 (6th Cir. 1999). Emphasis added. See also United States v. Carlos Jesus Marguet-Pillado, 648 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011), agreeing with the underlying legal accuracy of proposed jury instruction defining “natural born citizen” as including one born in the United States, without reference to the citizenship of one’s parents.
229 Hollander v. McCain, 566 F.Supp.2d 63, 66 (D.N.H. 2008).

First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 1993 OK 96, 859 P.2d 502, paragraph 40, footnotes omitted:

“Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did.” “There is no room for a pure heart, empty head defense under Rule 11.”

Yes. American citizenship… but not natural-born citizenship. And… YOU WILL BE PROVEN WRONG ULTIMATELY AND BE REVEALED AS A FIFTH COLUMNIST.

YOU will be revealed as an empty-header birther clown.

https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42097.html

Congressional Research Service
Informing the legislative debate since 1914

Qualifications for President and the "Natural Born" citizenship Eligibility Requirement

Jack Maskell
Legislative Attorney

January 11, 2016

CRS Report
Prepared for Members annd Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service

7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42097

[excerpt]

[43]

Citizenship of Parents Concerning specifically the reading into the Constitution of a two-citizen-parent requirement for “natural born” citizenship status, it should be noted that there is, significantly, no historical nor controlling legal holding in American jurisprudence to support the argument that parental citizenship governs and controls the eligibility of a native born United States citizen to be President. As indicated in the discussion of the history of the constitutional provision, there is also no justification for this unique theory, which would exclude an entire class of native born U.S. citizens from eligibility for the Presidency, in any of the statements or writings of the framers of the Constitution, or in the entire record of the ratification debates of the United States Constitution.²⁰⁰

[44]

In 1825, in a significant and widely recognized work on the Constitution, William Rawle specifically noted that the term “natural born citizen” as used in the Constitution would include “every person born within the United States ... whether the parents are citizens or aliens....”²⁰¹ Similarly, in his treatise on Citizenship of the United States, Frederick Van Dyne, Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State, explained in 1904 that the rule governing citizenship is not one derived from “international law” or the so-called “law of nations,” but is rather municipal law which “[e]very nation determines for itself’ and, in the United States, derives from the common law principle of jus soli, dependent “on the place of birth,” as modified by statute incorporating the principles of jus sanguinis to include the children of citizens “born out of the jurisdiction of the United States.”²⁰² In reviewing Supreme Court decisional material, the author in this treatise noted that the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 civil rights act “reaffirm the fundamental principle of citizenship by birth” which “was generally held to be regulated by the common law, by which all persons born within the limits and allegiance of the United States were deemed to be natural born citizens thereof.”²⁰³

201 William Rawle, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 80 (1825).

202 Frederick Van Dyne, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES, at 3-4 (New York 1904).

203 Id. at 4, 12. Emphasis added. Van Dyne explained in his treatise on citizenship that children born in the United States, even of alien parents (other than for the exceptions of diplomats and hostile troops) are natural born citizens of the United States, and distinguished as mere obiter dictum contrary comments on “jurisdiction” by the Court in The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36, 73 (1872) which, even by 1904, had been shown to be no longer controlling as to those points. Id. at 12-23.

BIRTHER SCORECARD (last updated 2015)

https://tesibria.typepad.com/whats_your_evidence/birther%20case%20list.pdf

Original decisions, total cases: 226
Birther wins: 0
Total appellate court rulings: 120+
Birther wins: 0
Total supreme court rulings: 35
Birther wins: 0

Birther blather has been laughed out of court, going down 381 consecutive times and never winning. Wiliam Arthur was Vice President and then President. Barack Obama was President for two terms. Kamala Harris is Vice President.

At no time have two citizen parents been required. The words speak only of the status of the candidate, not his or her parents.

George Washington
John Adams
Thomas Jefferson
James Madison
James Monroe
John Quincy Adams
Andrew Jackson
Chester Alan Arthur
Barack Hussein Obama II
Kamala Harris

Every time I see that man’s name - Barack Hussein Obama II - I am reminded that we had a president who did not understand the difference between II and Junior. He didn’t know how to pronounce the word corpsman either.

CITIZENSHIP STATUS of the PRESIDENTS OF USA - Grandfathered, Eligible, or Natural Born Citizen Frauds: http://www.kerchner.com/protectourliberty/Presidents-Grandfathered-or-NBC-or-Frauds.pdf

Wrong on every count.

Chester Arthur’s Father’s Status (he hadn’t naturalized as a U.S. Citizen until 14 years after the birth of his son) was not known at the time Chester Arthur pulled off his scam. He kept this hidden from view and the public attention’s deflected(ring any bells?) focused on the place-of-birth controversy and off of jus sanguinis

Children born in the United States of NON-U.S. Citizen, Parents are NOT ‘BORN IN THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES’
“SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF MEANS NOT OWING ALLEGIANCE TO ANYONE ELSE.”

SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) U.S. Supreme Court ~ Quote: ‘’The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of...citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.’’

Supreme Court of the United States Elk v. Wilkins (1884) Quote: ‘’...children of aliens, ... must necessarily remain themselves subject to the same sovereignty as their parents , and cannot, in the nature of things, be, any more than their parents, completely subject to the jurisdiction of such other country.’’

SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) U.S. Supreme Court ~ Quote: ‘’The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of...citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.’’

Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872)

The first observation we have to make on this clause is that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, "subject to its jurisdiction" was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.

Try passing off a bastardized quote on somebody else.

The children of accredited diplomats and visiting royalty are born citizens of their parents foreign country. All others are born United States citizens.

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 698 (1898)

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, as originally framed by the House of Representatives, lacked the opening sentence. When it came before the Senate in May, 1866, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, moved to amend by prefixing the sentence in its present form (less the words "or naturalized"), and reading,
"All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State herein they reside."
Mr. Cowan objected upon the ground that the Mongolian race ought to be excluded, and said:
"Is the child of the Chinese immigrant in California a citizen? . . . I do not know how my honorable friend from California looks upon Chinese, but I do know how some of his fellow citizens regard them. I have no doubt that now they are useful, and I have no doubt that, within proper restraints, allowing that State and the other Pacific States to manage them as they may see fit, they may be useful; but I would not tie their hands by the Constitution of the United States so as to prevent them hereafter from dealing with them as in their wisdom they see fit."
Mr. Conness, of California, replied:
"The proposition before us relates simply, in that respect, to the children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed to declare that they shall be citizens. We have declared that by law; now it is proposed to incorporate the same provision in the fundamental instrument of the Nation. I am in favor of doing so. I voted for the proposition to declare that the children of all parentage whatever, born in California, should be regarded and treated as citizens of the United States, entitled to equal civil rights with other citizens of the United States. . . . We are entirely ready to accept the provision proposed in this Constitutional Amendment that the children born here of Mongolian parents shall be declared by the Constitution of [169 U. S. 699] the United States to be entitled to civil rights and to equal protection before the law with others."

169 U. S. 702.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,"
contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.

149 U.S. 704

VII. Upon the facts agreed in this case, the American citizenship which Wong Kim Ark acquired by birth within the United States has not been lost or taken away by anything happening since his birth.

Wong Kim Ark acquired citizenship by birth while being born to two Chinese aliens, neither of whom was eligible for naturalization.

Supreme Court of the United States Elk v. Wilkins (1884) Quote:
..children of aliens, ... must necessarily remain themselves subject to the same sovereignty as their parents , and cannot, in the nature of things, be, any more than their parents, completely subject to the jurisdiction of such other country.’’

In Look Tin Sing, the U.S. Federal Court examined the case of a child of two Chinese citizens, born in the United States. Regarding the child, the Federal Court found that “the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.”

The child with two foreign parents, neither of whom was even eligible for naturalization, when born in the U.S., is born under the jurisdiction of the U.S., exclusive of that of any other country.

The birther argument about jurisdiction has been losing in Federal court since 1886, ten years before Wong Kim Ark.

In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 Fed. 382 (1896)

71 Federal Reporter 383-384

An agreed statement of facts has been filed, which is as follows:
“(1) That the said Wong Kim Ark was born in the year 1873, at No. 751 Sacramento street, in the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, United States of America; and that his mother and father were persons of Chinese descent, and subjects of the emperor of China; and that said Wong Kim Ark was and is a laborer. (2) That at the time of his said birth his mother and father were domiciled residents of the United States, and had established and enjoyed a permanent domicile and residence therein at said city and county of San Francisco, state aforesaid. (3) That said mother and father of said Wong Kim Ark continued to reside and remain In the United States until the year 1890, when they departed for China. (4) That during all the time of their said residence in the United States, as domiciled residents therein, the said mother and father of said Wong Kim Ark were engaged in the prosecution of business, and were never engaged In any diplomatic or official capacity under the emperor of China. (5) That ever since the birth of said Wong Kim Ark at the time and place hereinbefore stated and stipulated, he has had but one residence, to wit, a residence in said state of California, in the United States of America, and that he has never changed or lost said residence or gained or acquired another residence, and there resided, claiming to be a citizen of the United States.

71 Fed. 384

The question to be determined is whether a person born within the United States, whose father and mother were both persons of Chinese descent, and subjects of the emperor of China, but at the time of the birth were both domiciled residents of the United States, is a citizen, within the meaning of that part of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution which provides that:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.”

71 Fed. 385

It is contended, further, that the common-law doctrine does not govern the determination of the question of citizenship, for the reason that there is no common law proper of the United States; citing Wheaton v. Peters 8 Pet. 658; Kendall V. U. S., 12 Pet. 524; Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean 568, Fed. Cas. No. 8,516; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodb. & M. 401, Fed. Cas. No. 15,867; People v. Folsom, 5 Cal. 373; In re Barry, 42 Fed. 113. Finally, it is maintained that the United States supreme court, in interpreting the first clause of the fourteenth amendment, now in question, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, adopted, to all intents and purposes, the rule of international law, when it said through Mr. Justice Miller:
“The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction,’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign states born within the United States.”

This failed birther argument is still being recycled in 2024 as if it had never been considered by the Federal courts and resoundingly and repeatedly rejected.

71 Fed. 386

But the supreme court has never squarely determined, either prior to or subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the political status of children born here of foreign parents. In the case of Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 168, the court expressly declined to pass upon that question.

As the Federal court clearly found, in Minor the Supreme Court mentioned the political status of children born in the U.S. to foreign parents and expressly declined to pass upon that question. This is cited endlessly by birthers as binding precedent regarding what the Court expressly declined to pass upon. Minor v. Happersett is an imaginary precedent.

71 Fed. 386

The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States must be controlling upon the question presented for decision in this matter, irrespective of what the common-law or international doctrine is. But the interpretation thereof is undoubtedly confused and complicated by the existence of these two doctrines, in view of the ambiguous and uncertain meaning of the qualifying phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” which renders it a debatable question as to which rule the provision was intended to declare. Whatever of doubt there may be is with respect to the interpretation of that phrase. Does it mean “subject to the laws of the United States,” comprehending, in this expression, the allegiance that aliens owe in a foreign country to obey its laws; or does it signify, “to be subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States,” in the sense that is contended for on the part of the government? This question was ably and thoroughly considered in Re Look Tin Sing, supra, where it was held that it meant subject to the laws of the United States.

The question is controlled by the U.S. Constitution, not by the Law of Nations, the body of law, nor by The Law of Nations, a book written in French by Emerich de Vattel while the states were still colonies.

71 Federal Reporter 390-391

The Slaughterhouse Cases were decided in 1873, and the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Miller. In the decision most of the provisions of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the constitution received clear, elaborate, and able interpretation and construction. …
But the question which is here directly involved did not arise in that case, nor did the interpretation of the court relate to such a state of facts as exists here. Obviously, therefore, what the court then said with reference to the status of children born here of foreign parents is but obiter dictum. …
… the observations referred to and relied upon, however persuasive they may appear to be, cannot be accepted as declaring the law in this circuit, at least as against the authority of In re Look Tin Sing, where the question was squarely met and decisively settled.

So much for the Slaughterhouse Cases as precedent.

71 Federal Reporter 391

Nor does the interpretation of the phrase in question in the case of Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 5 Sup. Ct. 41, dispose of the matter. There the question was whether an Indian, born within the United States, and who had severed his tribal relations, was a citizen of the United States, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.

There goes Elk as precedent.

71 Federal Reporter 392

Arriving at the conclusion, as I do, after careful investigation and much consideration, that the supreme court has as yet announced no doctrine at variance with that contained in the Look Tin Sing decision and the other cases alluded to, I am constrained to follow the authority and law enunciated in this circuit. Counsel for the United States have argued with considerable force against the common-law rule and its recognition, as being illogical, and likely to lead to perplexing, and perhaps serious, international conflicts, if followed in all cases. But these observations are, obviously, addressed to the policy of the rule, and not to its interpretation. The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents, and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory, but this consideration will not justify this court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial authority.

The Law of Nations was weighed, measured, and found wanting over a century ago, and ever since.

There are still those birther losers, such as yourself, who believe that United States citizenship determinations should be subject to international law rather than Unjited States law, and for them the ultimate arbiter of United States citizenship resides in sone international court in The Hague.

The United States insists that United States law is the ultimate authority on determinations of United States citizenship.

Were there anything in the Slaughter-House Cases, or in Elk, which conflicted with 14A or Wong Kim Ark, it would be held null and void.

Wrong on every count.

It's a tough decision. Believe a birther whose entire argument is "Wrong on every count," or believe the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, cited and quoted; a Congressional Resarch Service Report, linked, cited and quoted; or the United States State Department Foreign Affairs Manual, linked, cited and quoted.

Jus sanguinis and jus soli have both been the law of birth citizenship ever since the states were British colonies.

Jus soli, the law of soil, is the law for births within the territory of the United States.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 702 (1898)

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,"
contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.

Chester Arthur’s Father’s Status (he hadn’t naturalized as a U.S. Citizen until 14 years after the birth of his son) was not known at the time Chester Arthur pulled off his scam.

That is desperate make believe crap.

William Arthur emigrated from Ireland to Canada, not the United States. William Arthur migrated to the Province of Lower Canada on date uncertain, circa 1819-1820. Lower Canada would now be in the Province of Quebec. Chester Arthur's mother Malvina met his father while William Arthur was living in Canada.

Chester Arthur was born in 1829. His father, William Arthur, was naturalized 31 August 1843.

Chester Arthur became Vice President and then President in 1881.

Of course, the naturalization was public record since 1843. William Arthur's ctizenship was published in Russia in 1881, in Novoe Vremya, and translated and published in the New York Herald, the largest circulation daily in the United States. The essence of it was published in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle in 1881. "Gen. Arthur is an unnaturalized foreigner," was published in the New York Times, Dec. 22, 1880. And, of course, Arthur's citizenship was the subject of a book published in 1884 while Arthur was still in office, "How a British Subject Became President of the United States," by A.P. Hinman. Hinman published articles during the Arthur presidency. It was not that nobody knew. It was that nobody cared about your crackpot theory then any more than they do now.

It had to wait until the 21st century for the birthers to understand that William Arthur was a got-off-the-boat Irishman and preacher in a dozen churches.

Arthur P. Hinman was hired by the Democrat party to dig dirt on Arthur prior to his assuming office. Dig, dig, dig led to his book. As the book notes, "Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1884, by A. P. Hinman, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C."

As the 1884 Hinman biography of William Arthur shows, William Arthur did not emigrate from Ireland to the United States, but to Canada, and it was in Canada where he met Chester Arthur's mother. They married in Canada. As Chester Arthur's mother was a United States citizen, any challenge to the citizenship of Chester Arthur had to rely on his father not being a United States citizen at the time of birth.

Amazingly, after your thorough research and due diligence, you concluded, "Chester Arthur’s Father’s Status (he hadn’t naturalized as a U.S. Citizen until 14 years after the birth of his son) was not known at the time Chester Arthur pulled off his scam."

There was no scam.

That Chester Arthur's father was Irish was so well known that a St. Petersburg, Russia correspondent wrote about the alleged Irish citizenship of Chester Arthur in 1881.

(By cable to the Herald.)
London, December 12, 1881
Our St. Petersburg correspondent telegraphs under the date of the 9th:—To-day's Novoe Vremya contains the following article, which I translate literally, without softening or accentuating the opprobrious language of the article:—"Arthur's Message to Congress is surprisingly strange if the telegraphic version before us be accurate. It congratulates Americans on their growing prosperity, as if this was anything new to the honorable Yankees. Arthur takes upon himself his views on foreign politics. France and Germany receive friendly patronage, but with regard to the the much talked of friendship with England not a word is said; and how could it be expected from an Irishman? Arthur even refrains from making comments on English home affairs—the Irish rebellion, for instance, which is agitating millions of American citizens, who are also born Irishmen like the President. ...

Hinman was hired by the Democrat party and Senator Bayard was a democrat. Arthur became Vice President on March 4, 1881 and he became President on September 20, 1881. In January 1881, the author of the book was already flinging that citizenship crap.

New York, January 7th, 1881.
Hon. Thos. F. Bayard, U. S. Senator
Dear Sir:—What is the construction of Article II, § 1, Clause 5, of the Constitution of the United States—that "No person, except a natural-born citizen, etc, shall be eligible, etc." * * *
Yours respectfully
A. P. HINMAN

Hinman asked, Bayard answered.

Senate of the United States
City of Washington, January 10th, 1881
A. P. Hinman, Esq., New York
Dear Sir:—In response to your letter of the 7th instant—the term "natural born citizen," as used in the Constitution and Statutes of the U. S., is held to be as native of the U. S.
The naturalization by law of a father before his child attains the age of twenty-one, would be naturalization of such minor.
Yours respectfully,
T. F. BAYARD

- - - - - - - - -

He kept this hidden from view and the public attention’s deflected(ring any bells?) focused on the place-of-birth controversy and off of jus sanguinis

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 698 (1898)

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, as originally framed by the House of Representatives, lacked the opening sentence. When it came before the Senate in May, 1866, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, moved to amend by prefixing the sentence in its present form (less the words "or naturalized"), and reading,
"All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State herein they reside."
Mr. Cowan objected upon the ground that the Mongolian race ought to be excluded, and said:
"Is the child of the Chinese immigrant in California a citizen? . . . I do not know how my honorable friend from California looks upon Chinese, but I do know how some of his fellow citizens regard them. I have no doubt that now they are useful, and I have no doubt that, within proper restraints, allowing that State and the other Pacific States to manage them as they may see fit, they may be useful; but I would not tie their hands by the Constitution of the United States so as to prevent them hereafter from dealing with them as in their wisdom they see fit."
Mr. Conness, of California, replied:
"The proposition before us relates simply, in that respect, to the children begotten of Chinese parents in California, and it is proposed to declare that they shall be citizens. We have declared that by law; now it is proposed to incorporate the same provision in the fundamental instrument of the Nation. I am in favor of doing so. I voted for the proposition to declare that the children of all parentage whatever, born in California, should be regarded and treated as citizens of the United States, entitled to equal civil rights with other citizens of the United States. . . . We are entirely ready to accept the provision proposed in this Constitutional Amendment that the children born here of Mongolian parents shall be declared by the Constitution of [169 U. S. 699] the United States to be entitled to civil rights and to equal protection before the law with others."

169 U. S. 702.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,"
contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.

149 U.S. 704

VII. Upon the facts agreed in this case, the American citizenship which Wong Kim Ark acquired by birth within the United States has not been lost or taken away by anything happening since his birth.

Wong Kim Ark acquired citizenship by birth while being born to two Chinese aliens, neither of whom was eligible for naturalization.

There are two classes of citizen, and two only: natural born and naturalized. Naturalization applies only to aliens at a time after their birth. Wong Kim Ark was a citizen at birth, did not need naturalization, and as a citizen was not even eligible for naturalization. That leaves only the one other category possible, natural born citizen.

As shown by the introduction of the 14A citizenship clause by Mr. Howard, his intent of the clause was quite clear and specific.

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=11

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the amendments proposed by the Senator from Michigan, [Mr. Howard.]
Mr. HOWARD. The first amendment is to section one, declaring that "all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside." I do not propose to say anything on that subject except that the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to need any further elucidation, in my opinion. This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. This has long been a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country.

https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030101.html#M301_1_1

[State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual]

8 FAM 301.1-1 INTRODUCTION

c. Naturalization – Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship Subsequent to Birth: Naturalization is “the conferring of nationality of a State upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever” (INA 101(a)(23) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(23)) or conferring of citizenship upon a person (see INA 310, 8 U.S.C. 1421 and INA 311, 8 U.S.C. 1422). Naturalization can be granted automatically or pursuant to an application. (See 7 FAM 1140.)
d. “Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States”: All children born in and subject, at the time of birth, to the jurisdiction of the United States acquire U.S. citizenship at birth even if their parents were in the United States illegally at the time of birth:
(1) The U.S. Supreme Court examined at length the theories and legal precedents on which the U.S. citizenship laws are based in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In particular, the Court discussed the types of persons who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that a child born in the United States to Chinese parents acquired U.S. citizenship even though the parents were, at the time, racially ineligible for naturalization;
(2) The Court also concluded that: “The 14th Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.” Pursuant to this ruling:
(a) Acquisition of U.S. citizenship generally is not affected by the fact that the parents may be in the United States temporarily or illegally; and that; and
(b) A child born in an immigration detention center physically located in the United States is considered to have been born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. This is so even if the child’s parents have not been legally admitted to the United States and, for immigration purposes, may be viewed as not being in the United States.

Jus sanguinis or law of blood, is irrelevant to births within the United States. Such birth citizenship is controled by the U.S. Constitution, 14A-1. Births outside the territory of the United States are controled by Federal law. Chester Arthur was born in Vermont.