Yes, the idea that we will punish people for breaking our laws has nothing to do with citizenship. *That* is a non sequitur.
The Cable Act restored citizenship to women whose citizenship had been taken away by a prior act of Congress (Expatriation Act of 1907), which in itself was related to a prior act regarding expatriation (namely, the renouncing of one's citizenship).
My recollection is that it allowed women to convey their citizenship to their children born in foreign countries. It's been awhile since I read it, but I distinctly remember that is the significant point for the purpose of this discussion.
Are such children, created by an act of congress, "natural born citizen"? (Mario Bellei)
This falls outside the bounds of the 14th Amendment, so it's a non sequitur.
It falls within the bounds of citizenship at birth created by law, which makes it relevant.
The Women's Citizenship Act of 1934 (as part of the Equal Nationality Act of 1934), from my understanding, extended citizenship to children born outside of America's jurisdiction if their mother happened to be an American citizen (likewise if the child is born of alien parents outside of the United States, if said parents and child meet certain conditions related to naturalization and residency).
You say there is no distinction between one sort of citizen and another, but one sort has to meet "certain conditions" and the other sort doesn't. Isn't this a defacto difference between the two types? Which of the two do you think is the stronger form of citizenship?
This likewise falls outside the 14th Amendment, and is thus again a non sequitur.
This is still an example of citizenship created by law and and with clear distinctions between it and citizenship not created by man made law.
I'm not sure exactly why you're bringing it up, to be honest.
It is conditional citizenship. You have to meet the conditions described in it to keep your citizenship. I do not have to meet any conditions, and my children do not have to meet any conditions to retain their US Citizenship. This is the distinction between natural citizenship and artificial citizenship through the power of congress to naturalize.
What are you talking about? Any citizen of a country is capable of losing citizenship of their own volition.
By doing nothing? How does a natural born American citizen lose his citizenship by doing nothing? What conditions are required of natural citizens to keep their citizenship? My understanding is that there are none. Not so with all these naturalized at birth citizens. If they don't meet the guidelines laid out in the statute governing their birth, they *LOSE* their citizenship... by doing nothing.
Mario Bellie (Rogers v Bellei) lost his citizenship for failing to meet the requirements of the statute that granted him (gave to him) citizenship at birth.
Non sequitur; many of the functional and civic treatments, rights, and privileges of English subjects translated directly to those of American citizens.
American citizenship is "Analogous" to English Subjectude, but it has it's origins from a very different source than English common law. This is why English common law is almost unfamiliar with the term, because it was never part of English common law. "Citizen" comes from Switzerland, not England. Look it up on an etymology website.
That we did not retain the "subject" nomenclature, I argue, is because we do not have a monarchy or a feudal system.
What sort of system do we have, and were did we get the idea for our system? Here is a hint. All the nations in the world at that time were monarchies except for one specific place which was a Republic. Guess where that was! Only Republic in existence. You can hardly miss it. :)
You're going to have to be a bit more specific for such a broad subject. What are you claiming about natural law that is fundamentally tied to citizenship of a given country (or, as Aristotle would say, a city-state)?
I'm pointing out that this concept of natural law and citizenship is so old that we can go back to Aristotle. I will give you a link to Aristotle's commentary (if you want it) when I get back to my other computer where I can find the links.
I suppose this is merely a matter of semantics then, because asserting that an act of Congress can naturalize someone who does not yet exist is patently absurd.
I'm not sure why you find that so hard to understand. Wong Kim Ark specifically refers to this.
...Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory, or by authority of congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by n abling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts."
Different cases involving different subjects.
One kind of citizen versus another kind of citizen. Sounds like they are making a distinction to me. Both groups are citizens, and they are equal. But separate. But equal.
Like "natural born" and "naturalized." Different, but equal. :)
but was instead assessing a law that differentiating between citizens of different races.
Yes, that's very different from drawing distinctions between one sort of citizen and another.
Because I think that "natural-born citizen" and "citizen by birth" are functionally equivalent.
"Functionally equivalent" is the holding in Plessy too.
So did the Court make a mistake in Plessy, or did they make a mistake in Brown?
Or are they both correct because the Supreme Court cannot possibly make a mistake? Like Alice in Wonderland, are we required to believe two contradictory things before breakfast?
Pardon? Someone else on the thread was disputing the common understanding of what it means to be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof". That is why clarification was provided. Being subject to the jurisdiction of the United States — in isolation — does not convey citizenship. Who here has argued that?
Are such children, created by an act of congress, "natural born citizen"? (Mario Bellei)
Given our inheritance from the whole of English law (as the common law is arguably more influential on our entire constitutional framework than Vattel); given that the England Parliament's own naturalization power conveyed "natural born subjectship" upon certain classes of persons (such as foreign-born children of fathers who were English subjects, which had not been the case at the beginning of the second millennium AFAIK); and given the uniform rule of naturalization granted to Congress; it would seem that the power to define "natural" citizenship (within limits) was conveyed to Congress. In other words, it is a carryover of the English practice of a fundamental common law definition being subject to modifications by statute (with future Constitutional amendments providing hard protections on certain classes of individuals; those who fall outside those protections are still subject to statutory modification).
So yes, I would maintain that such citizens by birth are indeed "natural-born" (because again, naturalization in the strict sense is only available for those who are already born; I do concede, however, that the naturalization powers of Congress has expanded the class of those who can be considered citizens by birth). There is no Constitutional provision that dictates otherwise, as far as I'm aware.
You say there is no distinction between one sort of citizen and another, but one sort has to meet "certain conditions" and the other sort doesn't. Isn't this a defacto difference between the two types? Which of the two do you think is the stronger form of citizenship?
Practically speaking? The one who actually has to meet conditions. Citizenship that is earned is far stronger (in the sense that it carries with it a sense of duty and responsibility) than citizenship attained by the mere accident of birth. But that's just me.
It is conditional citizenship. You have to meet the conditions described in it to keep your citizenship. I do not have to meet any conditions, and my children do not have to meet any conditions to retain their US Citizenship. This is the distinction between natural citizenship and artificial citizenship through the power of congress to naturalize.
Both classes have the same rights, privileges, powers, and immunities. There is nothing "artificial" about it; no more than the fact that our "natural citizenship" is a function of the fact that we were born within the artificial, manmade creation known as the United States of America. That I am apparently supposed to treat one class of citizen differently from another (regardless of their personal behavior, conduct, and character) purely because of the accidents of history known as their "place of birth" and their "parental lineage" is quite frankly repulsive.
American citizenship is "Analogous" to English Subjectude, but it has it's origins from a very different source than English common law. This is why English common law is almost unfamiliar with the term, because it was never part of English common law. "Citizen" comes from Switzerland, not England. Look it up on an etymology website.
The etymology of the word 'citizen' is irrelevant to my point that many of the rights and privileges of American citizens (as understood at the time of the Founders) were carryovers from those enjoyed by English subjects. That they used the term "citizen" instead of "subject" seems only natural, because there was no monarchal sovereign or liege lord to be the "subject" of.
What sort of system do we have, and were did we get the idea for our system? Here is a hint. All the nations in the world at that time were monarchies except for one specific place which was a Republic. Guess where that was! Only Republic in existence. You can hardly miss it. :)
It's interesting that you bring up the republics of ancient Greece (unless you're referring to the Roman Republic...which would be ironic, because Roman citizenship at birth was only granted if born from a married father who was also a Roman citizen), because their concept of "citizen" came with conditions! This can be seen from Aristotle's Politics.
Starting with the city (the polis), those who comprised it are the citizens; who are the citizens? Per Part I of Book III, Aristotle defines a citizen in such a way so as to exclude other denizens of the city that are slaves and resident aliens (and, as Part V of the same book shows, Aristotle likewise excluded laborers and artisans from this class): "the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices."
Further review of Aristotle's treatment of citizens is that they directly participate in the assemblies (and not through representatives) and partake in the upholding of justice; in Aristotle's conception, citizenship carried with it inherent duties and responsibilities. (This then dovetails in the discussion of what Aristotle considers a "good" citizen, and how it varies if at all from the "good" man; insofar as the "natural law" is considered, Aristotle considers that the polis is "natural" because it springs up from partnerships amongst families that arise due to natural impulses; however, the government of the polis can be of many forms. That Aristotle's conception of what it means to be a good citizen is heavily intertwined with his understanding of the natural law (insofar as virtue is concerned), I concede; however, I distinguish that being a citizen is not intrinsic to human nature, and is accidental based on the circumstances of one's place of birth and parentage; as such, insofar as American jurisprudence is concerned, questions of citizenship are per se separate from the natural law incumbent upon all men in the eyes of God.)
This is a far cry from the idea of a "natural citizen" you seem to have, which is enjoyed without conditions.
It should go without saying that in America, we do not discriminate against citizens who decline to share in political power, or who do not directly serve in assemblies, or who are laborers of low class, or who decline from voting altogether out of protest of lousy candidates.
(Aristotle likely wouldn't be cited for many other reasons nowadays, such as this bit from Part V of Book I: "But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature? There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule." And I say this as someone who actually agrees with the underlying sentiment to an extent: not all people are granted the graces needed to rule, and rule well at that.)
Or are they both correct because the Supreme Court cannot possibly make a mistake? Like Alice in Wonderland, are we required to believe two contradictory things before breakfast?
It should go without saying that historical developments between the time of Plessy and Brown showed that the notion of "separate but equal" facilities (as a reminder: in Plessy, the SCOTUS decision was rather deferential to the power of the state compared to the federal government, insofar as the Constitution was apparently silent on racial distinctions being made in an absolute sense) were hardly so; that such facilities were separate is conceded. But equal? No one pretends otherwise. There is no contradiction per se: Plessy's decision was conditioned on "separate but equal" being a legitimate possibility. By the time the matter came back up in Brown, history and human experience sufficed to show that "separate but equal" had not just become a legal fiction, but rather a means of actual exploitation on the part of those who wanted to reduce the power of racial minorities in their state. Had there been truly "separate but equal" facilities (equivalent schools, equivalent public services, equivalent privileges, etc), Brown might have gone differently.
Recall that laws are not static things; they are reasonable ordnances promulgated for the common good of the community by one with the authority to do so. At a time of great racial tension, one can reasonably see that the SCOTUS in Plessy was of the majority opinion that using federal power to enforce racial admixtures over the legislation of the state would have been contrary to the common good, especially if it were indeed possible for the races to enjoy equal rights and privileges in separate facilities. However, by the time of Brown, such equality had been effectively denied for decades in places where "separate but equal" had taken hold; as such, it is reasonable to see that for the common good, with "separate but equal" no longer being possible, the only available Constitutional possibility was integration. (And yet I find it quite ironic that, decades after integration was enforced, we seem to find various movements by racial minorities to segregate voluntarily. Funny how that works, isn't it?)
With all this being said: I do find your apparent insistence on making a distinction regarding a "natural citizen" to be fascinating, because there are many "natural-born citizens" serving in the halls of power right now (in Washington D.C. and elsewhere) who I wouldn't trust to protect my house over one of the local migrants that I occasionally see working on the roof of a neighbor's home.
In my ideal world, citizenship would be entirely conditional, because the power to affect the body politic is a heavy burden not to be wielded lightly. But that is not how the principles of citizenship have developed over the centuries, both in America and abroad; as it stands, citizenship (in the American sense) confers certain rights and privileges, but does not mandate any particular duties that one would consider particularly unique. In that sense, we are far beyond what John Adams noted in his 1798 letter to a Massachusetts militia: "Our constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other."
So with that in mind, quibbling over who is or who isn't a "natural-born citizen" seems like quite the waste; "natural-born citizens" are just as capable of evil as any foreigner, and are just as capable of having divided loyalties and allegiances (just look at our current President, one Joseph R. Biden, born in Pennsylvania of two American citizens).
Character and virtue are essential. One's parents, and one's place of birth, by comparison, are accidental.