Pardon? Someone else on the thread was disputing the common understanding of what it means to be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof". That is why clarification was provided. Being subject to the jurisdiction of the United States — in isolation — does not convey citizenship. Who here has argued that?
Are such children, created by an act of congress, "natural born citizen"? (Mario Bellei)
Given our inheritance from the whole of English law (as the common law is arguably more influential on our entire constitutional framework than Vattel); given that the England Parliament's own naturalization power conveyed "natural born subjectship" upon certain classes of persons (such as foreign-born children of fathers who were English subjects, which had not been the case at the beginning of the second millennium AFAIK); and given the uniform rule of naturalization granted to Congress; it would seem that the power to define "natural" citizenship (within limits) was conveyed to Congress. In other words, it is a carryover of the English practice of a fundamental common law definition being subject to modifications by statute (with future Constitutional amendments providing hard protections on certain classes of individuals; those who fall outside those protections are still subject to statutory modification).
So yes, I would maintain that such citizens by birth are indeed "natural-born" (because again, naturalization in the strict sense is only available for those who are already born; I do concede, however, that the naturalization powers of Congress has expanded the class of those who can be considered citizens by birth). There is no Constitutional provision that dictates otherwise, as far as I'm aware.
You say there is no distinction between one sort of citizen and another, but one sort has to meet "certain conditions" and the other sort doesn't. Isn't this a defacto difference between the two types? Which of the two do you think is the stronger form of citizenship?
Practically speaking? The one who actually has to meet conditions. Citizenship that is earned is far stronger (in the sense that it carries with it a sense of duty and responsibility) than citizenship attained by the mere accident of birth. But that's just me.
It is conditional citizenship. You have to meet the conditions described in it to keep your citizenship. I do not have to meet any conditions, and my children do not have to meet any conditions to retain their US Citizenship. This is the distinction between natural citizenship and artificial citizenship through the power of congress to naturalize.
Both classes have the same rights, privileges, powers, and immunities. There is nothing "artificial" about it; no more than the fact that our "natural citizenship" is a function of the fact that we were born within the artificial, manmade creation known as the United States of America. That I am apparently supposed to treat one class of citizen differently from another (regardless of their personal behavior, conduct, and character) purely because of the accidents of history known as their "place of birth" and their "parental lineage" is quite frankly repulsive.
American citizenship is "Analogous" to English Subjectude, but it has it's origins from a very different source than English common law. This is why English common law is almost unfamiliar with the term, because it was never part of English common law. "Citizen" comes from Switzerland, not England. Look it up on an etymology website.
The etymology of the word 'citizen' is irrelevant to my point that many of the rights and privileges of American citizens (as understood at the time of the Founders) were carryovers from those enjoyed by English subjects. That they used the term "citizen" instead of "subject" seems only natural, because there was no monarchal sovereign or liege lord to be the "subject" of.
What sort of system do we have, and were did we get the idea for our system? Here is a hint. All the nations in the world at that time were monarchies except for one specific place which was a Republic. Guess where that was! Only Republic in existence. You can hardly miss it. :)
It's interesting that you bring up the republics of ancient Greece (unless you're referring to the Roman Republic...which would be ironic, because Roman citizenship at birth was only granted if born from a married father who was also a Roman citizen), because their concept of "citizen" came with conditions! This can be seen from Aristotle's Politics.
Starting with the city (the polis), those who comprised it are the citizens; who are the citizens? Per Part I of Book III, Aristotle defines a citizen in such a way so as to exclude other denizens of the city that are slaves and resident aliens (and, as Part V of the same book shows, Aristotle likewise excluded laborers and artisans from this class): "the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices."
Further review of Aristotle's treatment of citizens is that they directly participate in the assemblies (and not through representatives) and partake in the upholding of justice; in Aristotle's conception, citizenship carried with it inherent duties and responsibilities. (This then dovetails in the discussion of what Aristotle considers a "good" citizen, and how it varies if at all from the "good" man; insofar as the "natural law" is considered, Aristotle considers that the polis is "natural" because it springs up from partnerships amongst families that arise due to natural impulses; however, the government of the polis can be of many forms. That Aristotle's conception of what it means to be a good citizen is heavily intertwined with his understanding of the natural law (insofar as virtue is concerned), I concede; however, I distinguish that being a citizen is not intrinsic to human nature, and is accidental based on the circumstances of one's place of birth and parentage; as such, insofar as American jurisprudence is concerned, questions of citizenship are per se separate from the natural law incumbent upon all men in the eyes of God.)
This is a far cry from the idea of a "natural citizen" you seem to have, which is enjoyed without conditions.
It should go without saying that in America, we do not discriminate against citizens who decline to share in political power, or who do not directly serve in assemblies, or who are laborers of low class, or who decline from voting altogether out of protest of lousy candidates.
(Aristotle likely wouldn't be cited for many other reasons nowadays, such as this bit from Part V of Book I: "But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature? There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule." And I say this as someone who actually agrees with the underlying sentiment to an extent: not all people are granted the graces needed to rule, and rule well at that.)
Or are they both correct because the Supreme Court cannot possibly make a mistake? Like Alice in Wonderland, are we required to believe two contradictory things before breakfast?
It should go without saying that historical developments between the time of Plessy and Brown showed that the notion of "separate but equal" facilities (as a reminder: in Plessy, the SCOTUS decision was rather deferential to the power of the state compared to the federal government, insofar as the Constitution was apparently silent on racial distinctions being made in an absolute sense) were hardly so; that such facilities were separate is conceded. But equal? No one pretends otherwise. There is no contradiction per se: Plessy's decision was conditioned on "separate but equal" being a legitimate possibility. By the time the matter came back up in Brown, history and human experience sufficed to show that "separate but equal" had not just become a legal fiction, but rather a means of actual exploitation on the part of those who wanted to reduce the power of racial minorities in their state. Had there been truly "separate but equal" facilities (equivalent schools, equivalent public services, equivalent privileges, etc), Brown might have gone differently.
Recall that laws are not static things; they are reasonable ordnances promulgated for the common good of the community by one with the authority to do so. At a time of great racial tension, one can reasonably see that the SCOTUS in Plessy was of the majority opinion that using federal power to enforce racial admixtures over the legislation of the state would have been contrary to the common good, especially if it were indeed possible for the races to enjoy equal rights and privileges in separate facilities. However, by the time of Brown, such equality had been effectively denied for decades in places where "separate but equal" had taken hold; as such, it is reasonable to see that for the common good, with "separate but equal" no longer being possible, the only available Constitutional possibility was integration. (And yet I find it quite ironic that, decades after integration was enforced, we seem to find various movements by racial minorities to segregate voluntarily. Funny how that works, isn't it?)
With all this being said: I do find your apparent insistence on making a distinction regarding a "natural citizen" to be fascinating, because there are many "natural-born citizens" serving in the halls of power right now (in Washington D.C. and elsewhere) who I wouldn't trust to protect my house over one of the local migrants that I occasionally see working on the roof of a neighbor's home.
In my ideal world, citizenship would be entirely conditional, because the power to affect the body politic is a heavy burden not to be wielded lightly. But that is not how the principles of citizenship have developed over the centuries, both in America and abroad; as it stands, citizenship (in the American sense) confers certain rights and privileges, but does not mandate any particular duties that one would consider particularly unique. In that sense, we are far beyond what John Adams noted in his 1798 letter to a Massachusetts militia: "Our constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other."
So with that in mind, quibbling over who is or who isn't a "natural-born citizen" seems like quite the waste; "natural-born citizens" are just as capable of evil as any foreigner, and are just as capable of having divided loyalties and allegiances (just look at our current President, one Joseph R. Biden, born in Pennsylvania of two American citizens).
Character and virtue are essential. One's parents, and one's place of birth, by comparison, are accidental.
I lose track after awhile, and at this point I don't want to go back and look, but that is exactly what I took someone to be arguing. That "Jurisdiction" simply means that we will apply our laws to you.
and given the uniform rule of naturalization granted to Congress; it would seem that the power to define "natural" citizenship (within limits) was conveyed to Congress.
Last year I saw a meme talking about the casting of a black woman as a Viking "King." The meme showed a man at a podium and he said "Haakon Sigurdsson is male." And then a woman asked "How do you know?" To which he replied, "It's in the name. "Sigurds'-SON."
"Natural" does not mean "artificial." It means created by nature. And for further clarification for the era in question, it is derived from "natural law." You can't re-define "natural." It's like calling a trannny a "woman."
The correct term for the power congress has is naturalization, which means to make "like natural."
It's *ADOPTION*. It is exactly *ADOPTION*. Congress can ADOPT. It cannot birth.
So yes, I would maintain that such citizens by birth are indeed "natural-born" (because again, naturalization in the strict sense is only available for those who are already born;
This idea is so directly contradicted by various court rulings over the years, I'm surprised you are still trying to go with that. If you write a law to "naturalize" at birth then it is still naturalization. That is exactly what the Wong court said in that bit I quoted you in my last message to you.
Practically speaking? The one who actually has to meet conditions. Citizenship that is earned is far stronger (in the sense that it carries with it a sense of duty and responsibility) than citizenship attained by the mere accident of birth.
In your very statement you point out that there is a difference between earned (which means you might not succeed at attaining citizenship) and "birth" citizenship.
How can the two be the same when even you point out a difference?
Both classes have the same rights, privileges, powers, and immunities.
Except for the ability to serve as president. But isn't that what we are arguing about? :)
There is nothing "artificial" about it; no more than the fact that our "natural citizenship" is a function of the fact that we were born within the artificial, manmade creation known as the United States of America.
What if we weren't? What if we were born in space, or in international waters? Which of us would still be citizens and which would suddenly become foreigners?
Place of birth is a silly criteria in deciding what you are. Children inherit what they are from their parents. That works in biology and it worked in law in every part of the world except England, and there is a story behind that that we may get to in the scope of this discussion. (Calvin's Case.)
The etymology of the word 'citizen' is irrelevant to my point that many of the rights and privileges of American citizens (as understood at the time of the Founders) were carryovers from those enjoyed by English subjects.
You are trying to argue that our supposed English law origins for citizenship are embodied in a Swiss word. Occam's razor suggests that the framers chose the Swiss word because they were following the ideas of the man who put the idea of forming the United States into their head.
From "Law of Nations"
"Finally, several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state. They will together constitute a federal republic: their joint deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfil engagements which he has voluntarily contracted.
I can assure you such an idea does not occur anywhere in English law because it would have been treasonous to write such a thing in England. As a matter of fact, every monarchy in Europe would have regarded such a statement as treasonous. So of course it was written in the Swiss Republic, and no where else.
The United States are based on the ideas of Vattel. *HE* put the idea into their heads.
That they used the term "citizen" instead of "subject" seems only natural, because there was no monarchal sovereign or liege lord to be the "subject" of.
But you are arguing that they carried everything over from English law which would make you into a SUBJECT and applied it to this concept of "Citizen", which was a concept that at the time, only existed in the Swiss Republic. You would have us believe that the framers intended us to be like monarchical subjects in all but name.
I think they chose "citizen" precisely to denote we were *NOT* subjects, and they borrowed this word from the same body of thought that suggested they form a confederated Republic of independent states. (Like Switzerland.)
It's interesting that you bring up the republics of ancient Greece (unless you're referring to the Roman Republic...which would be ironic, because Roman citizenship at birth was only granted if born from a married father who was also a Roman citizen), because their concept of "citizen" came with conditions!
You say "conditions", but I think you mean obligations. Yes, the idea that citizenship follows the father was universal until England pulled their little Calvin's Case stunt.
It should go without saying that historical developments between the time of Plessy and Brown showed that the notion of "separate but equal" facilities (as a reminder: in Plessy, the SCOTUS decision was rather deferential to the power of the state compared to the federal government, insofar as the Constitution was apparently silent on racial distinctions being made in an absolute sense) were hardly so; that such facilities were separate is conceded. But equal? No one pretends otherwise. There is no contradiction per se: Plessy's decision was conditioned on "separate but equal" being a legitimate possibility. By the time the matter came back up in Brown, history and human experience sufficed to show that "separate but equal" had not just become a legal fiction, but rather a means of actual exploitation on the part of those who wanted to reduce the power of racial minorities in their state. Had there been truly "separate but equal" facilities (equivalent schools, equivalent public services, equivalent privileges, etc), Brown might have gone differently.
You didn't really clarify whether the Supreme Court was *WRONG*, or whether we should believe two contradictory rulings from it are both correct simultaneously.
For the sake of simplicity, i'm just gonna say they were *WRONG*, which proves they can be wrong, which is why I don't put a lot of stock in people citing court cases to "prove" something.
You can "prove" what the guys with guns will enforce because the Judges say so, but this is a very different thing from proving something is factually true.
With all this being said: I do find your apparent insistence on making a distinction regarding a "natural citizen" to be fascinating, because there are many "natural-born citizens" serving in the halls of power right now (in Washington D.C. and elsewhere) who I wouldn't trust to protect my house over one of the local migrants that I occasionally see working on the roof of a neighbor's home.
Well absolutely, but I didn't write the requirements for the presidency, I am merely pointing out the technicality of what they actually mean. I agree that we could probably have a lot of good presidents that are not natural born citizens. I liked Ted Cruz and I think he would make a good president. (Trump is a *GREAT* president.)
I would overlook his inability to meet the criteria because we already let that lousy bastard in, so as far as i'm concerned, the precedent has been made.
But this is a very different thing from accepting the claim that the framers intended for anyone with 14th amendment citizenship or naturalized at birth by the power of congress to be a "natural born citizen" as John Jay wrote in his letter.
This argument is academic, but I like arguing, so there is that. :)
So with that in mind, quibbling over who is or who isn't a "natural-born citizen" seems like quite the waste;
I don't think an accurate understanding of things is a waste.
"natural-born citizens" are just as capable of evil as any foreigner, and are just as capable of having divided loyalties and allegiances (just look at our current President, one Joseph R. Biden, born in Pennsylvania of two American citizens).
No doubt, but in the framers time, allegiance to another sovereignty was a serious problem in Europe, and the intent of the framers was to specifically *AVOID* all that nonsense right from the start.
They could exclude what they saw as a serious danger of foreign influence, but there is not much they could have done to prevent absolute crooks and @$$holes from getting into power. They left that to the people.