No one is trying to make the claim that Saddam and Bin Laden were citizens, either. It's still a non sequitur.
Well I am glad you understand me. Yes, it is exactly akin to saying "I'm going to ignore all prior jurisprudence and legal commentary on the issue,"
At least you're honest.
Can you not think for yourself, or do you have to wait until a judge gives you your opinion?
My objection is that you're introducing an unnecessary term, because that only results in further confusion.
Not so. Those "citizens at birth", such as from the Cable Act, or the Women's citizenship act of 1934, or the Naturalization act of 1952, are all "naturalized" citizens, with the naturalization to occur "at birth."
The Cable Act restored citizenship to women whose citizenship had been taken away by a prior act of Congress (Expatriation Act of 1907), which in itself was related to a prior act regarding expatriation (namely, the renouncing of one's citizenship). This falls outside the bounds of the 14th Amendment, so it's a non sequitur.
The Women's Citizenship Act of 1934 (as part of the Equal Nationality Act of 1934), from my understanding, extended citizenship to children born outside of America's jurisdiction if their mother happened to be an American citizen (likewise if the child is born of alien parents outside of the United States, if said parents and child meet certain conditions related to naturalization and residency). This likewise falls outside the 14th Amendment, and is thus again a non sequitur.
The act from 1952 you reference restates the 14th Amendment provision in one aspect, then goes on to list as statute a bunch of provisions that fall beyond the boundaries of the 14th Amendment (insofar, for example, it falls within Congress's authority to declare that "a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States" is therefore to be considered a natural-born citizen. Congress provided statutes and guidelines on areas to remove ambiguity (especially in terms of areas that had been fraught with debate previously, such as on the matter of Indian tribes), and to clarify differences between citizens and nationals; none of which run contrary to the plain wording of the 14th Amendment. Naturalization is likewise restricted in the statute, as far as I'm aware, to those who are not already classified as citizens by birth.
I'm not sure exactly why you're bringing it up, to be honest.
Natural citizens do not require laws and do not have to abide by conditions to retain their citizenship.
What are you talking about? Any citizen of a country is capable of losing citizenship of their own volition. The simple condition of not renouncing one's citizenship is incumbent upon everyone, natural-born or naturalized.
Not true. Look up "Citizen" in Blackstone. I believe I found it five times when I did a search. Then look up "Subject." "Citizen" in English law means "dweller in a city." It does not mean someone who owes allegiance to a country. The 1770 understanding of the words are not even analogous.
Non sequitur; many of the functional and civic treatments, rights, and privileges of English subjects translated directly to those of American citizens. That we did not retain the "subject" nomenclature, I argue, is because we do not have a monarchy or a feudal system.
Inherent natural law. Look up what Aristotle (and so many others) had to say on the subject.
You're going to have to be a bit more specific for such a broad subject. What are you claiming about natural law that is fundamentally tied to citizenship of a given country (or, as Aristotle would say, a city-state)?
So yes, you can naturalize people by laws written before they are born.
I suppose this is merely a matter of semantics then, because asserting that an act of Congress can naturalize someone who does not yet exist is patently absurd.
By omitting the usage of the more certain term. Remember, this is the same court that gave us "Separate but Equal." Why is it so hard to believe that they would distinguish one citizen from another, when that is *EXACTLY WHAT THEY DID IN PLESSY V FERGUSON.*
Different cases involving different subjects. Plessy v. Ferguson, as far as I'm aware, wasn't even trying to determine anyone's status as citizens by birth, but was instead assessing a law that differentiating between citizens of different races. Still a non sequitur to the current discussion, as far as I can tell.
You complained about me leaving off the "born", why don't you complain about the Wong court leaving off the "natural-born"?
Because I think that "natural-born citizen" and "citizen by birth" are functionally equivalent. Why would I complain that the court used one term instead of another?
Yes, the idea that we will punish people for breaking our laws has nothing to do with citizenship. *That* is a non sequitur.
The Cable Act restored citizenship to women whose citizenship had been taken away by a prior act of Congress (Expatriation Act of 1907), which in itself was related to a prior act regarding expatriation (namely, the renouncing of one's citizenship).
My recollection is that it allowed women to convey their citizenship to their children born in foreign countries. It's been awhile since I read it, but I distinctly remember that is the significant point for the purpose of this discussion.
Are such children, created by an act of congress, "natural born citizen"? (Mario Bellei)
This falls outside the bounds of the 14th Amendment, so it's a non sequitur.
It falls within the bounds of citizenship at birth created by law, which makes it relevant.
The Women's Citizenship Act of 1934 (as part of the Equal Nationality Act of 1934), from my understanding, extended citizenship to children born outside of America's jurisdiction if their mother happened to be an American citizen (likewise if the child is born of alien parents outside of the United States, if said parents and child meet certain conditions related to naturalization and residency).
You say there is no distinction between one sort of citizen and another, but one sort has to meet "certain conditions" and the other sort doesn't. Isn't this a defacto difference between the two types? Which of the two do you think is the stronger form of citizenship?
This likewise falls outside the 14th Amendment, and is thus again a non sequitur.
This is still an example of citizenship created by law and and with clear distinctions between it and citizenship not created by man made law.
I'm not sure exactly why you're bringing it up, to be honest.
It is conditional citizenship. You have to meet the conditions described in it to keep your citizenship. I do not have to meet any conditions, and my children do not have to meet any conditions to retain their US Citizenship. This is the distinction between natural citizenship and artificial citizenship through the power of congress to naturalize.
What are you talking about? Any citizen of a country is capable of losing citizenship of their own volition.
By doing nothing? How does a natural born American citizen lose his citizenship by doing nothing? What conditions are required of natural citizens to keep their citizenship? My understanding is that there are none. Not so with all these naturalized at birth citizens. If they don't meet the guidelines laid out in the statute governing their birth, they *LOSE* their citizenship... by doing nothing.
Mario Bellie (Rogers v Bellei) lost his citizenship for failing to meet the requirements of the statute that granted him (gave to him) citizenship at birth.
Non sequitur; many of the functional and civic treatments, rights, and privileges of English subjects translated directly to those of American citizens.
American citizenship is "Analogous" to English Subjectude, but it has it's origins from a very different source than English common law. This is why English common law is almost unfamiliar with the term, because it was never part of English common law. "Citizen" comes from Switzerland, not England. Look it up on an etymology website.
That we did not retain the "subject" nomenclature, I argue, is because we do not have a monarchy or a feudal system.
What sort of system do we have, and were did we get the idea for our system? Here is a hint. All the nations in the world at that time were monarchies except for one specific place which was a Republic. Guess where that was! Only Republic in existence. You can hardly miss it. :)
You're going to have to be a bit more specific for such a broad subject. What are you claiming about natural law that is fundamentally tied to citizenship of a given country (or, as Aristotle would say, a city-state)?
I'm pointing out that this concept of natural law and citizenship is so old that we can go back to Aristotle. I will give you a link to Aristotle's commentary (if you want it) when I get back to my other computer where I can find the links.
I suppose this is merely a matter of semantics then, because asserting that an act of Congress can naturalize someone who does not yet exist is patently absurd.
I'm not sure why you find that so hard to understand. Wong Kim Ark specifically refers to this.
...Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory, or by authority of congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by n abling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts."
Different cases involving different subjects.
One kind of citizen versus another kind of citizen. Sounds like they are making a distinction to me. Both groups are citizens, and they are equal. But separate. But equal.
Like "natural born" and "naturalized." Different, but equal. :)
but was instead assessing a law that differentiating between citizens of different races.
Yes, that's very different from drawing distinctions between one sort of citizen and another.
Because I think that "natural-born citizen" and "citizen by birth" are functionally equivalent.
"Functionally equivalent" is the holding in Plessy too.
So did the Court make a mistake in Plessy, or did they make a mistake in Brown?
Or are they both correct because the Supreme Court cannot possibly make a mistake? Like Alice in Wonderland, are we required to believe two contradictory things before breakfast?