The precedential holding in the Supreme Court case of Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869) is the law of the land until the Constitution is amended, or the Court issues a superseding opinion. That is not weak; that is the law of the land. Rightly or wrongly, it holds that secession is unconstitutional.It's more accurate to state that precedent from SCOTUS is only binding to the extent that SCOTUS says it is, AND enforces compliance with that precedent in the lower courts.
All other courts are lower courts. All SCOTUS precedents are binding on all lower courts.
And it is enforceable to strike down any repugnant legislation. For example, for the last fifty years, Roe has been invoked to strike down legislation infringing upon the constitutional right to abortion which emanates from a penumbra. Obergefell would strike down any law interfeing with your right to marry Don Lemon.
Texas v. White would render any attempt at secession legally null and void.
I am also aware the the "constitutional standard" for warrantless arrests set in Henry v. United States, which were limited to cases where a police officer witnessed a minor offense committed in his presence, or had "reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing" a felony, is routinely violated on a daily basis in the courts of the U.S., and the last time I checked, SCOTUS has never overruled that precedent.
Henry v. United States 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959)
The statutory authority of FBI officers and agents to make felony arrests without a warrant is restricted to offenses committed "in their presence" or to instances where they have "reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing" a felony. 18 U. S. C. ยง 3052. The statute states the constitutional standard, for it is the command of the Fourth Amendment that no warrants for either searches or arrests shall issue except "upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
FBI agents are Federal special agents. The statutory authority under which they may make an arrest without a warrant is set forth in the Federal statutes. Henry only applies to arrests by Federal authorities.
The statutory authority governing state or local authorities would be State statutes.
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep374023/
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-35 (1963).
The States are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement" in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain. See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960). Such a standard implies no derogation of uniformity in applying federal constitutional guarantees but is only a recognition that conditions and circumstances vary just as do investigative and enforcement techniques.[...]
Applying this federal constitutional standard we proceed to examine the entire record including the findings of California's courts to determine whether the evidence seized from petitioners was constitutionally admissible under the circumstances of this case.
II.
The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must be the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest, since the officers had no search warrant. The lawfulness of the arrest without warrant, in turn, must be based upon probable cause, which exists "where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175-176 (1949), quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925); accord, People v. Fischer, 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P. 2d 967 (1957); Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 178, 231 P. 2d 250 (1955). The information within the knowledge of the officers at the time they arrived at the Kers' apartment, as California's courts specifically found, clearly furnished grounds for a reasonable belief that petitioner George Ker had committed and was committing the offense of possession of marijuana.
And it is readily apparent that not all state and local police are required to have knowledge of a felony; just a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed is sufficient.
Are you aware of any other court opinions that you have not read carefully, if at all?