United Kingdom (UK) Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the People's Republic of China (PRC) “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.[18] Shapps stated that this evidence is a “significant development” as the PRC has previously presented itself as a “moderating influence” but did not provide further information about the supposed intelligence. Sullivan stated during a press conference that he has previously warned that the PRC may supply Russia with lethal military assistance but that the US has “not seen that to date.”[19] Sullivan stated that he will speak with his British counterparts to ensure that the US and UK have a “common operating picture” and to clarify Shapps’ comment.
Western officials warned that Russian intelligence services intend to increase sabotage activities and other hybrid operations against NATO member countries. Norway's Police Security Service (PST) and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) warned on May 22 that there is an increased threat of Russian sabotage against Norwegian arms supplies and other Norwegian organizations involved in the delivery of military materiel to Ukraine.[20] PST Counterintelligence Head Inger Haugland stated that the PST has warned Norwegian arms suppliers to be on high alert and previously warned that Russian actors were planning acts of sabotage in western Norway, where Norwegian naval bases and oil and gas infrastructure are located.[21] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned on May 20 that Polish authorities have recently arrested and charged nine suspects for engaging in acts of sabotage in Poland on behalf of Russian security services.[22] Haugland stated that Russian security services have used non-Russian nationals to conduct sabotage in Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom in order to have deniability.[23]
Tusk also warned on May 21 that Russian actors plan to illegally smuggle thousands of migrants from Africa to Europe and that more than 90 percent of those recently apprehended illegally entering Poland have had Russian visas in their passports.[24] Russian officials recently attempted to create an artificial migrant crisis on the Finnish border in late 2023 in an effort to destabilize NATO and the European Union (EU).[25] Russian security services are likely intensifying sabotage operations in European countries to disrupt the arrival of resumed US security assistance to Ukraine and will likely continue hybrid operations aimed at fomenting discord in Europe ahead of European Parliament elections scheduled for early June 2024.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024
Re Russian operations in NATO countries see
“Summer will be hot.” https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6329#6329
The West will most likely give the Kiev regime permission to use its weapons on Russian territories that it does not consider Ukraine (let us recall that now NATO weapons, in particular American ones, are shelling Crimea and new regions of our country). Such prospects seriously worry many in Moscow. “Masha Zakharova, you remember, shouted that we were ready to shoot at British military targets, including outside Ukraine.
In reality, everything is not so smooth. Many military personnel, including Gerasimov, are categorically against hitting any NATO military targets. Let me clarify and I won't hide it: we are preparing for such attacks. But the military says that Moscow is not yet ready for the large-scale shelling with which they can respond to us. And they believe that it is better not to start a conflict with NATO, let's say, at present. So there are fears that Western missiles will come to us from Ukraine. But it's difficult to answer right now,” a high-ranking source in the Kremlin admitted to us.
A general from Gerasimov’s entourage confirmed these fears and expressed the hope that “the escalation will not yet go beyond the boundaries of [the old borders of Ukraine].” He refused to talk about the war with NATO. But he noticed that the head of the General Staff, against the backdrop of all the threats, is concerned about the imbalance of the army in connection with the arrests of generals .
At the same time, against the background of the growing threat of an escalation of the conflict with NATO, talk about a possible temporary transfer of the capital from Moscow has become more frequent. Let us remember that such a transfer was discussed back in 2022. Then Sergei Shoigu proposed to strike Ukraine with nuclear weapons; a serious response from the West was possible.
Discussions about moving the capital began with renewed vigor in May of this year, when our relations with the British and other NATO countries worsened. And now concern about what will happen to Moscow is growing.
“I would move the capital. There are options, but I won't reveal them to you so that the enemies don't find out. I expressed all my thoughts on this matter to Vladimir Vladimirovich, he promised to think about it. By the way, I would move the Ministry of Defense to Sevastopol. Let them know how to work in war conditions. I also conveyed this position to the president,” a Kremlin source close to Vladimir Putin told us.
Let us note that new rumors about the possible transfer of the capital appeared among representatives of our elites several weeks ago. This fact was confirmed to us by several sources. Moreover, they name both plausible versions of the temporary capital (Kazan, Yaroslavl), and strange versions that we personally find difficult to believe. For example, that the capital of Russia will be moved to Vladivostok.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4143
Yes, move it to 符拉迪沃斯托克 / Vladivostok ;-)
The Kremlin is pursuing a concerted effort to remove senior Russian defense officials and has likely expanded this effort to senior officers commanding Russian combat operations in Ukraine. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on May 23 the arrests of Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of its Main Communications Directorate Lieutenant General Vadim Shamarin and Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Department for State Procurement, Vladimir Verteletsky.[1] Shamarin is accused of accepting a bribe of at least 36 million rubles (about $392,000), and two defendants in the Russian telecommunications industry have agreed to testify against him.[2] Verteletsky is accused of corruption and accepting a large bribe with total damages of 70 million rubles (about $763,000).[3] Five senior Russian MoD officials and former military commanders have been arrested on corruption charges since the arrest of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on April 24, and a Russian insider source previously claimed that six more MoD officials plan to resign following former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s removal from the MoD.[4] The Kremlin is likely using the guise of corruption charges as an excuse to hide the real reasons for ousting specific individuals from the MoD who have fallen from favor, as ISW has recently assessed.[5]
Official Kremlin statements and milblogger speculation about the arrests and command changes signal that more senior officers could face removal. Russian state newswire TASS cited Russian law enforcement on May 23 as saying there will be continued investigations in connection with Shamarin’s arrest.[9] Some Russian milbloggers and insider sources have alleged that some of the arrested officials have ties to Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov but have largely not gone so far as to claim that Gerasimov himself will be removed.[10] Peskov oddly stated on May 13 that “no changes are foreseen yet” when specifically asked about Gerasimov’s position, however, suggesting that Gerasimov’s tenure over the longer term is not assured.[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov notably denied on May 23 that there is a “campaign” against Russian MoD officials, instead asserting that the MoD arrests are part of a consistent fight against corruption.[12] Peskov has previously deflected reporters’ questions about the Russian MoD, and his decision to answer questions about the MoD’s command changes and arrests indicates that the Kremlin may want its support of these purges.[13] Peskov’s claim that the removals are part of a consistent effort are difficult to square with the sudden flurry of dismissals and arrests at an anomalous rate and with high publicity.
Russian milbloggers largely celebrated the arrests of Russian MoD officials they have claimed were inept and speculated about possible additional removals of senior commanders and officials. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers celebrated the arrests of Shamarin and Verteletsky and the alleged removal of Akhmedov and have offered criticisms of MoD officials and military officers more vocally than they had been doing before the start of the arrests in late April.[14] The milbloggers began speculating about which officials and commanders could be removed or charged next. Some named a deputy defense minister as likely next to face investigation and pointed to supposed connections between arrested or dismissed individuals and remaining MoD and military officials, presumably to indicate future possible targets.[15] Many milbloggers vaguely claimed that Russian authorities are not done with their investigations and detentions of these officials and celebrated the arrests as the start of an effort to bring corrupt officials to justice under new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.[16] The Kremlin is likely allowing these criticisms because they are specifically directed against individuals the MoD is targeting, thereby supporting Belousov’s image as the one who will solve issues within the MoD in a way that Shoigu has not. The Kremlin also benefits from allowing the milbloggers to emphasize that no Russian defense or military official is safe from the consequences of falling from Putin's favor. The Kremlin is likely attempting to secure the loyalty of the milbloggers who have long argued for significant changes in the Russian MoD and military command by allowing them to criticize the ousted individuals after months of active censorship and self-censorship as long as the criticism advances larger Kremlin objectives.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2024