Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2023
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated their intent on May 6 for Chechen “Akhmat” troops to replace Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut on May 10.
Prigozhin and Kadyrov likely aim to frame the Russian MoD and regular Russian troops as ineffective and set conditions to blame the MoD for any Russian setbacks in the Bakhmut area.
While the potential deployment of Akhmat troops to Bakhmut could increase Russian combat power to some degree, the claims made by Prigozhin and Kadyrov are greatly exaggerated.
The Russian MoD has yet to respond to Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s coordinated posturing about Bakhmut and may have been caught flatfooted by Prigozhin and Kadyrov’s statements.
At least one individual with claimed but unconfirmed affiliation to the Ukrainian government attempted to assassinate Russian “A Just Russia” State Duma party co-leader and prominent nationalist voice Zakhar Prilepin on May 6.
CNN reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming has limited the effectiveness of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes in recent months.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and in the Kreminna area.
Russian forces continued to make marginal gains within Bakhmut and Ukrainian forces likely conducted a successful limited counterattack southwest of Avdiivka.
Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Crimea with Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missiles.
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities are continuing various measures to forcibly mobilize residents of occupied areas of Ukraine.
Russian occupation officials continue to plan for mass forced evacuations in Zaporizhia Oblast.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2023
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov may have compelled the Russian theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Valery Gerasimov, to resume artillery ammunition distribution to Wagner forces in Bakhmut despite Gerasimov’s desired de-prioritization of that effort.
Kadyrov’s threats to transfer his forces to Bakhmut may have blackmailed the Russian military command into allocating ammunition to Wagner mercenaries.
Kadyrov likely supported Wagner's blackmail efforts against the Russian military command to reestablish his position within the circle of power of the Kremlin.
Gerasimov’s apparent need to negotiate with subordinate commanders and those commanders’ ability to force his hand suggests that chain of command problems are significantly impacting the Russian military's ability to conduct coherent theater-wide operations.
These events raise questions about Russia's ability to coordinate a coherent theater-wide defensive campaign.
Prigozhin’s and Kadyrov’s ability to significantly influence Russian military command decisions relies on Putin's willingness to appease them and his reliance on their forces – both of which will likely degrade after further blackmail efforts.
Prigozhin’s continued fight to complete the capture of Bakhmut contradicts his consistent narrative that capturing Bakhmut lacks strategic value.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna.
Russian forces made some territorial gains in Bakhmut as of May 7 and continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched up to 23 drones at Crimea on the night of May 6 to 7.
Russian federal subjects are continuing to recruit and form regional armed formations and volunteer battalions.
Russian occupation authorities continue to plan and carry out forced evacuations from Zaporizhia Oblast.
Read the interesting details:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2023