Posted on 07/27/2021 7:14:19 AM PDT by RomanSoldier19
To have any chance of conquering Taiwan, China might need to transport as many as two million troops across the rough 100 miles of the Taiwan Strait and land them under fire at the island’s 14 potential invasion beaches or 10 major ports.
That’s a lot of people—far, far more than the People’s Liberation Army Navy can haul in its 11 new amphibious ships. To transport the bulk of the invasion force, Beijing almost certainly would take up into naval service thousands of civilian ships.
To that end, the Chinese Communist Party has created a legal and bureaucratic framework for taking over control of commercial shipping. Meanwhile, naval engineers have begun modifying key vessels to make them better assault ships.
All that is to say, the vast flotilla that would be both the vehicle for China’s assault on Taiwan—and the biggest target of Taiwanese forces and their allies—is taking shape.
“If the PLA invasion force was a million or more men, then we might expect an armada of thousands or even tens of thousands of ships to deliver them, augmented by thousands of planes and helicopters,” Ian Easton, an analyst with the Project 2049 Institute in Virginia, wrote in a recent report.
The PLAN’s eight modern Type 071 landing docks and three Type 075 big-deck assault ships together can haul around 25,000 troops. A drop in the bucket. To transport the balance of the invasion force, the Chinese navy can take up around 2,000 large commercial vessels crewed by around 650,000 mariners.
(Excerpt) Read more at forbes.com ...
Well don’t forget it was made with Chinese steel it could just use a bit of help and it will fail
““If the PLA invasion force was a million or more men, then we might expect an armada of thousands or even tens of thousands of ships to deliver them, augmented by thousands of planes and helicopters,” Ian Easton, an analyst with the Project 2049 Institute in Virginia, wrote in a recent report. “
It’s certain to not be a surprise.
China would need absolute air dominance.
They’ll never have that.
Or, they will have to cow the world into not fighting.
The Japanese have stated that Taiwan is vital to their own national security. They will not abandon Taiwan, neither will the Aussies. The US on the other hand is in a state of free fall.
Anybody can underestimate one side and overestimate the other, there's no great talent in doing that.
But Sun Tsu said it all -- if our guys know both their own strengths & weaknesses, and the other side's, they need not fear for the outcome of any battle.
My guess is our guys know how to defend their carriers against the best the Chi-Coms can throw at them.
If nothing else, they know how much distance to keep.
If Taiwanese are strong in spirit, they can defeat a Chi-Com invasion, with or without Kamala Biden's support.
They would take out the dam to create a massive flood with the potential to kill millions of Chinese which live down stream, along with several industrial facilities. This could cause possibly the largest humanitarian disaster in the world and distract the PRA from any war fighting efforts.
Why would Forbes, now owned by China, allow this to be published if it did not have a useful purpose to them?
Maybe. But that carries with it the risk that if Taiwan is occupied the occupation could be extremely brutal in retribution. I think the top leadership is who really wants this so it may be better to focus on the leaders.
“Taiwan will be invaded before January 2025.”
Nonsense.
China is not capable.
Actually, the water side is like a ship, an explosive
is tamped by the water and all the force or more of it
is directed into the structure.
See British Bouncing Bomb.
Let me tell you how I would do it. Special shipping containers with ventilation shipped to Taiwan ports. These containers hold the troops. Containers Picked up and moved to secure remote locations on the island. Next transportation is rented or stolen to move troops on the 1st day of operation. One target for troops, secure ports of entry. Also release troops in containers at port. Next paratroopers arrive after the start of fighting, no heads up for Taiwan on Chinese troop movements. Then at same time navy ships move to Taiwan. Million troops could be shipped in 12 hours from China. Taiwan captured in one week.
Agreed.
And may God make sure that happens.
Your “guess” is... ????
We don’t have to guess. China has ICBM capability. They have thermal targetting cap ability [a 12 year old could write that code]. An aircraft Carrier is a gigantic nuke thermal target in the middle of a cold ocean.
Standoff distance for Taiwan would be San Francisco Bay. Wishful thinking isn’t going to close that gap.
America lacks the will to sustain casualties of 100k for an ally who never declared independence. China has an extra 20-30 MILLION men hanging around due to their 1-child policy. They could sustain 10 million casualties and not even blink.
America does not have the resolve it would take to mow down a million “civilians” and have it shown on the 6pm news.
The only missile that may reach the dam is the “Yun Feng LACM” with a range of 1,200-2,000 km. It is still in Development
“In other words, that action would trigger a full scale nuclear war and the US would lose 10s of millions of Americans”
The UD would not be helpless in such an attack:
Elements of the Current U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System
The following charts provides a brief look at some of the major missile defense programs maintained by the United States.
GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE
Program & Key Elements
Key element: Ground-based missile interceptor (GBI) consisting of a multistage booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV).
The EKV separates from the booster in space and seeks out its target through radar updates and use of its onboard visual and infrared sensors.
The EKV destroys its target by colliding with it. This process is referred to as “hit-to-kill” or “kinetic kill.”
Designed to Counter
Goal: Intercept strategic ballistic missile warheads in midcourse-stage.
Status
Initially fielded in 2004.
As of the end of 2018, the total cost of the GMD system is estimated to be over $67 billion.
MDA claims that the system has had 11 successful intercepts in 19 tests.
The first test of the GMD system against an ICBM-class target with simple countermeasures took place on May 30, 2017, and was deemed successful.
The first test which involved firing two interceptors against one ICBM target occurred in March 2019 and was deemed “successful.” In a real-world scenario, multiple interceptors would be fired at an incoming missile.
Capability / Schedule
As of April 2018, the Pentagon deploys 44 ground-based interceptors (GBIs)–40 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Twenty of the 40 interceptors deployed in Alaska are armed with an older CE-1 kill vehicle that has not had a successful flight intercept test since 2008. In 2017, the Trump administration announced its plan to deploy twenty more GBIs to be installed in a fourth missile field in Ft. Greely beginning in the FY 2021 timeframe. According to the Missile Defense Review, all 64 interceptors would be ready by 2023.
These interceptors will be armed with the new, under-development Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), which is intended to enhance the performance of the current EKV. But the RKV has been plagued by reliability and design problems, which led to the Pentagon stopping work on the program in May 2019 and, after a short review, terminating the program in August. The new timeline for expanding the GMD system to 64 interceptors is uncertain.
The interceptors are supported by land- and sea-based radars. Early Warning Radar units are being upgraded to support the system. As of June 2018, upgrades have been carried out at Beale Air Force Base, California and at Fylingdales, the United Kingdom, as well as Thule Air Force Base, Greenland and Clear, Alaska.
The less powerful, westward-facing COBRA Dane radar on Shemya Island, in the Aleutian archipelago, was also upgraded in February 2010.
Former MDA Director Adm. James Syring told a Senate panel in 2013 that the MDA tests the GMD system “in a controlled, scripted environment based on the amount of time and money each one of these tests costs.” This means there are limits to the realism of the test scenarios.
Following the May 30, 2017, test, the Pentagon’s testing office updated its assessment, which had described the GMD system as having only a “limited capability” to defend the U.S. homeland from a small number of simple long-range missiles launched from North Korea or Iran. In a June 6, 2017, memo, the office said that the system has “demonstrated capability” to defend against a small number of long-range missiles threats that employ “simple countermeasures.” However, researchers with the Union of Concerned Scientists noted in a 2017 report that the only test of the GMD system against an ICBM-class target was “simplified in important ways that enhanced the test’s chance of success instead of challenging the system to work in a realistic way.”
AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)
Program & Key Elements
Key elements include: the RIM-161 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), RIM-174 Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and the Aegis combat system.
The SM-3 is a hit-to-kill missile comprised of a three-stage booster with a kill vehicle. There are three variations of the SM-3 missile: Block IA, Block IB, and Block IIA. Each variation will be deployed in different phases.
The SM-6 is a hit-to-kill missile based on the SM-3 but offers extended range and firepower against cruise missile targets deep inland.
As the Navy’s component of the missile defense system, the Aegis system is central to the defense footprint in Asia and the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe. Aegis is a sea-based system, with missile launchers and radars mounted on cruisers and destroyers but is adaptable to land systems as well.
Designed to Counter
Geared toward defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase with an emphasis on the ascent stage.
Status
In 2005, the role of Aegis missile defense evolved from that of a forward sensor to include engagement capability.
As of April 2019, the SM-3 has a test record of 40 intercepts in 49 attempts, comprising both the SM-3 and SM-6 missiles.
Japan’s four KONGO Class Destroyers have been upgraded with BMD capabilities. Japan and the United States are co-developing the SM-3 block IIA.
Capability / Schedule
Under the fiscal year 2020 budget submission, by the end of fiscal year 2018, there are scheduled to be 39 Aegis BMD ships, and by the end of fiscal year 2024, there are scheduled to be 59 Aegis BMD ships.
As of October 2017, thirty-three ships are currently deployed. Of these, 17 are assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 16 to the Atlantic Fleet.
A land-based SM-3 block IB deployment occurred in Romania in 2016, and that same year, ground was broken in Poland on a site to house land-based SM-3 IIAs. The Polish site was originally scheduled to become operational in 2018 but has been delayed until 2020.
The first intercept test of the new SM-3 IIA interceptor occurred in February 2017 and was successful. However, the second and third intercept tests of the missile in June 2017 and January 2018 failed to destroy their targets. There were two more tests before the end of 2018 on Oct. 26 and Dec. 11, both successful, with the December test particularly notable for being the first successful intercept of an IRBM target and using the ability to “engage on remote” using a forward-based sensor.
The 2019 Missile Defense Review reaffirmed administration plans to test the SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor against an ICBM-class target by 2020.
TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD)
Program & Key Elements
Key elements include: 1) an interceptor missile comprising a single rocket booster with a separating kill-vehicle, 2) an advanced AN/TPY-2 radar unit to identify and discriminate between incoming missiles, and 3) an infrared seeker to home in on its target.
The THAAD kill vehicle relies on hit-to-kill kinetic interception.
THAAD batteries have four components: launcher, interceptors, radar, and fire control. Each battery can carry 48-72 interceptors (there are eight interceptors per launcher and typically each battery is believed to contain six to nine launch vehicles).
THAAD missiles are fired from a truck-mounted launcher.
Designed to Counter
THAAD’s mission is to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles at the end of their midcourse stage and in the terminal stage.
Intercepts could take place inside or outside the atmosphere.
Status
As of April 2019, THAAD has succeeded in completing 15 interceptions in 15 tests since 2006. Four other THAAD tests, as of April 2019, have been classed as “no-tests.” (Note: A “no-test” occurs when the target malfunctions after launch so the interceptor is not launched.)
On July 11, 2017, MDA executed a successful intercept test of the THAAD system against an air-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target. The test was the first against an IRBM-class target.
Capability / Schedule
The U.S. Army operates seven THAAD batteries, each with its own AN/TPY-2 radar. Three batteries, each comprising six launchers, are deployed in the Pacific: one in South Korea, one in Guam, and one in Hawaii.
Production of the first THAAD interceptors began in March 2011. The Army received its 200th operational interceptor in August 2018.
MDA is exploring development of an upgraded version of THAAD known as THAAD extended range, which is designed to counter ultrafast gliding weapons.
The U.S. and South Korea decided in July 2016 to deploy a THAAD battery in South Korea to counter North Korean threats despite strong objections from China. The battery began operating in April 2017.
A THAAD battery was deployed to Guam in 2013 to counter potential North Korea IRBM threats to the island and U.S. military assets there. The first test of the THAAD system against an IRBM target occurred in July 2017.
PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY-3 (PAC-3)
Program & Key Elements
Key elements include: a one-piece, hit-to-kill missile interceptor fired from a mobile launching station, which carries 16 PAC-3 missiles.
The missile is guided by an independent radar that sends its tracking data to the missile through a mobile engagement control station.
A blast fragmentation warhead kills the target.
Designed to Counter
PAC-3 is designed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal stage at lower altitudes than the THAAD system.
Status
PAC-3s destroyed two Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles during the 2003 conflict and shot down a U.S. fighter jet. Earlier Patriot models also deployed to the region shot down nine Iraqi missiles and a British combat aircraft.
Capability / Schedule
PAC-3 is now considered operational and has been deployed to several countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and the UAE.
The following is an overview of an early warning system to complement the missile defense systems listed above.
SPACE-BASED INFRARED SYSTEM-HIGH (SBIRS-HIGH)
Program Elements
Key Elements: 1) geosynchronous (GEO) satellites orbiting the earth; 2) sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical earth orbit (HEO).
Dates Operational
Primary objective is to provide early warning of theater and strategic missile launches.
Provides data for technical intelligence and battle space awareness.
Cost
Currently there are three SBIRS sensors mounted on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO-1, HEO-2, and HEO-3).
There are four SBIRS satellites in geosynchronous orbit. GEO-1 was launched in May 2011, GEO-2 in March 2013, GEO-3 in January 2017, and GEO-4 in January 2018.
As of March 2018, the program is projected to cost $19.6 billion for six satellites—four times greater than its initial estimated $5 billion for five satellites.
Major Issues
The first sensor in highly elliptical orbit—HEO-1—was certified for operations by U.S. Strategic Command in December 2008.
The most recent sensor, GEO-4, was launched aboard an Atlas V rocket on January 19, 2018.
Lockheed Martin is under contract to produce GEO-5 and GEO-6, which will be launched in 2021 and 2022, respectively.
SBIRS originally called for two additional sensors, GEO-7 and GEO-8, but these were scrapped in favor of pursuing an entirely new SBIRS follow-on program. The successor program has yet to be identified or developed. Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson (who resigned in May 2019) suggested the new system will be “simpler” and more survivable to enemy attacks.
Nope. Not possible. There is no scenario where any advantage is gained by pulling the nuclear trigger first. Someone has to shoot first so it is perpetual stand off even if conventional forces are duking it out. The only way to win is to not play.
So, you think the USN would stand aside if the Chinese blockaded?
You neglect Vietnam, Phillipines, Thailand,Burma, Laos and Cambodia.
That’s a lot of sand they put in their bin before we ever see a place to draw lines in the sand.
Its not about advantage or about winning, its about Face, as I said. The Chinese were advocating to be allowed to exterminate of all Japanese after WWII for murdering 20 million, what do you think they would do with the murder of 400 million? Sit back and do nothing? Send strongly worded letters?
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