What you said was: "There is no judicial review of any impeachment proceeding. There is no judicial role whatsoever."That is incredibly overbroad and utterly unsupportable, as I clearly demonstrated. Feel free to continue to rant. It is what trolls do when they have no other argument. I have no interest in responding to you any further. It is like trying to argue with a fence post.
What I cited and quoted the unanimous Supreme Court and the preeminent scholar on impeachment from his authoritative book on the subject.
Ignorant fools argue that the unanimous Supreme Court and the preeminent scholar on a specific area of law are wrong and they, in their legal ignorance, are right. To claim you have "demonstrated" that your absurd legal notion is correct, you would have to show that sometime in the past 2+ centuries, the judicial branch has at least considered a challenge to an impeachment on the merits. You can neither cite such a case, nor can you cite a lawbook which agrees with your absurdity.
I previously cited and quoted the unanimous Supreme Court and Charles L. Black, and will do so again. As the preeminent impeachment scholar wrote of the notion of the Court assuming jurisdiction to overturn a Senate impeachment conviction of a President, "I don’t think I possess the resources of rhetoric adequate to characterizing the absurdity of that position."
In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993), the Supreme Court stated:
Petitioner also contends that the word "sole" should not bear on the question of justiciability because Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution grants the President pardon authority "except in Cases of Impeachment." He argues that such a limitation on the President's pardon power would not have been necessary if the Framers thought that the Senate alone had authority to deal with such questions. But the granting of a pardon is in no sense an overturning of a judgment of conviction by some other tribunal; it is "[a]n executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment for a crime." Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Authority in the Senate to determine procedures for trying an impeached official, unreviewable by the courts, is therefore not at all inconsistent with authority in the President to grant a pardon to the convicted official.
Charles L. Black, Impeachment, at at 48-49:
The Senate, after plenary trial and fullest argument of counsel, and after debate among senators on fact and law, votes by a two- thirds majority to convict and remove the president.The president now appeals to the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of that Court over the appeal is to say the least quite unclear, but it takes jurisdiction anyway. On the merits, the Court disagrees with the House and with the Senate on some point, let us say, as to the meaning of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” or on some procedural question of weight (perhaps dividing 5 to 4, perhaps filing nine opinions no five of which espouse the same reasoning). So it puts the impeached and convicted president back in for the rest of his term. And we all live happily ever after.
I don’t think I possess the resources of rhetoric adequate to characterizing the absurdity of that position. With what aura of legitimacy would a thus-reinstated chief magistrate be surrounded? Who would salute? When a respectably dressed Londoner approached the Duke of Wellington, saying “Mr. Smith, I believe,” the Duke replied, “If you believe that, you’ll believe anything.” I would say the same of anyone who can believe that there is hidden away somewhere, in the interstitial silences of a Constitution formed by men of practical wisdom, a command that could bring about such a preposterous result as the judicial reinstatement of a president solemnly convicted, pursuant to the constitutional forms, of “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” (I may say, parenthetically, that if you are one who believes that sound constitutional law cannot make nonsense, or generate absurdities, you can rest on that correct belief and skip the rest of this chapter.)
Id. at 54-55:
I have thought it worthwhile to argue this point fully because, while I cannot conceive that any court would so have lost the faculty of judgment as to try to undo a Senate sentence of removal on impeachment, I think it well that, so far as possible, the fundamental unconstitutionality of such action be publicly accepted, precisely because, as I have briefly pointed out above, the wide diffusion of this concept—that the courts have no role to fill—makes very plain to all the final responsibility of the Senate, on facts and on law. It would be most unfortunate if the notion got about that the Senates verdict were somehow tentative. The crucial senatorial vote should be taken, and should be known to be taken, with full knowledge that there is no appeal. No senator should be encouraged to think he can shift to any court responsibility for an unpalatable or unpopular decision.The dissemination of the “judicial review” idea could be most unfortunate in another way; if a removed president tried it, and had his case (as would almost surely happen) dismissed for want of jurisdiction, he might be able, though quite wrongly, to persuade a part of the people that he had been denied his rightful day in court.
I would conclude, then, with a paraphrase of the well-known saying of the country banker, when he was asked about cashing a check for a stranger. He said, “There are ten rules about cashing checks for strangers. The first rule is, ‘Never cash a check for a stranger.’ The other nine rules don’t matter.” There are ten rules about judicial review of the judgments of the Senate on impeachments. The first rule is that the courts have, in this, no part at all to play. The other nine rules don’t matter.
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/impeachment-a-handbook
Impeachment: A Handbook26 Nov 2018
Philip BobbittCharles Black’s Impeachment: A Handbook, first published in 1974 at the height of the Watergate crisis, has become the authoritative guide on the subject of presidential impeachment. In September, the Yale University Press published a new edition of the classic handbook, incorporating a new preface and new material by constitutional theorist Philip Bobbitt. Bobbitt’s contribution to the new edition appears in the Essay that follows.
Because Professor Black’s original text had no accompanying notes, the publisher decided to continue this format in the new print edition. In this re-publication, the Journal worked with Bobbitt to present his chapters with extensive notes in order to provide a resource for students, scholars, lawyers, journalists, and public officials.
