How Boeing and the FAA could think that a totally new fly by wire anti stall system should be controlled by non redundant sensors totally baffles me. That this system could not even be mentioned in the pilots’ flight manual when the 737 Max wa originally certified is absolutely incredible.
I’m sure that North American based airlines could operate the 737 Max safely, but there should be no excuses for the flawed design of the MCAS.
The MCAS system only uses one angle of attack sensor input, even though there are 2 on the plane.
The entire purpose was to avoid a new type-rating for the 737 Max. Boeing needed existing 737 pilots to be able to fly it far cheaper than if it was given a new type rating....which it deserves.
The larger engines sit higher and more forward than on standard 737s. This created some unique flight characteristics that are not shared with standard 737s.
MCAS was the shortcut.
While I can’t argue with what you posted, 200 hours experience with the lives of 200 people in his hands?
5 weeks?
Seriously?
All cultures are the same.
Agree.
Seems like this Angle of Attack sensor and respective stall avoidance system is at fault - erroneous data from a single sensor.
SMH.
All the Captain has to do is hit the trim switch on the yoke and the autopilot disconnects returning full control to the pilot. This is a basic procedure known by any properly trained pilot. Manual trim is available, electric trim is available and dinner with a flight attendant is probably also available at the evening layover point.
The sensors are redundant, but non-voting. They only have 2, IIRC, whereas 3 are required for a single bad sensor to not be able to cause catastrophic failure.
However, I am also astounded that this system and the AFM were approved as is.
Even the ancient variants had comparators for the auto pilot systems. I agree a hard trim input system should be based on two AOA guages.