The MCAS system only uses one angle of attack sensor input, even though there are 2 on the plane.
The entire purpose was to avoid a new type-rating for the 737 Max. Boeing needed existing 737 pilots to be able to fly it far cheaper than if it was given a new type rating....which it deserves.
The larger engines sit higher and more forward than on standard 737s. This created some unique flight characteristics that are not shared with standard 737s.
MCAS was the shortcut.
I have nothing against adding the MCAS system to make flying the new 737 Max more like flying the 737NG. What I object to is not informing pilots about it and not requiring simulator training. I’m agnostic about it requiring a whole new type rating. Had there been sensor redundancy and pilot preparation ahead of certification and flying for airlines I don’t think there would have been problems. Anyway I was discussing this with my brother who is a computer programmer and has a masters in artificial intelligence. He and I were thinking just 2 sensors is not enough. If one sensor malfunctions, how do the avionics or the pilots determine which sensor to believe? I think heads will roll at the FAA.
The MCAS system only uses one angle of attack sensor input, even though there are 2 on the plane.
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The Airbus A321 has three AOA sensors and they still had similar problems to the MCAS.
Yes, and I would add, the pressure on Boeing to make the MAX and legacy 737's the same type rating was driven by airlines' motivation to lower training costs, since crews would be unavailable for revenue trips while in training, and simulators would have to be built for the MAX type, and there would be an entirely different monthly bid for the flights in the MAX, a separate instructor cadre, flight manual, etc...
So Boeing went along with the airlines' demands to keep the customer (the airlines) satisfied. If they didn't, the airlines might have bought airplanes from Airbus.
Plenty of blame to go around for both airline management practices and Boeing.