I disagree. Under Rodriguez, there were two issues at hand. The first being the entry to the apartment and the second being the finding of the controlled substance. In its opinion, the Court held that the police acted “reasonably” when they entered Rodriguez’s apartment based on the statement of a third party.
However, the Court also said that although the entry was legal, the drugs that were found subsequent to the entry could still be open to a motion to suppress at trial. In other words, the defendant still had Fourth Ammendment “trial rights”.
And here is where I think the problem is. Huma, (if she gave consent) agreed to give the computer to the police for the express purpose of them collecting evidence in reference to the sexting case.
She did not authorize the police to look at her or other emails. Her consent was limited to the case against her husband. Since there were other emails on the computer that may be part of another crime, the NYPD/FBI probably decided it was best to get a search warrant to make sure there is no possibility that other emails are tossed under a motion to suppress.
It is an interesting legal conundrum the investigators face, but obtaining a search warrant should be pretty much a matter of procedure.
As for your assertions about Rodriguez, I think you'd better reread the opinion, which states, inter alia:
But as we have discussed, what is at issue when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated.
The freedom from unreasonable searches is all the Exclusionary Rule protects, and that protection was not violated in Rodriguez.
Yes, obtaining a warrant should merely be pro forma but there is no reason to believe that anything seen in pursuing the vice case is not covered under either voluntary surrender or plain view, and NOTHING has been endangered by the actions of the NYPD or Bharara's office in this investigation.