Posted on 08/21/2016 12:53:04 PM PDT by artichokegrower
In August 2001 the Bulk Carrier Windoc was lined up on the Welland Canal’s Bridge 11 in Ontario Canada. After receiving the flashing amber approach light indicating that the bridge operator was aware of the vessel, the captain lined up on the centerline and maintained a speed of 5 knots. Minutes later while the vessel was half way through the bridge started descending.
(Excerpt) Read more at gcaptain.com ...
I am the monarch of the sea....
What was the cause? Article does not say.
stick close to your desk, and NEVER go to sea!
On the video, it looked like the bridge was already completely down as the ship passed under it.
1.4.2 Bridge Operator
On 11 August 2001, the operator was on his scheduled day off and had completed two 12-hour day shifts during the previous two days. The operator took two Darvon-N tablets at approximately 0800 that morning to relieve back pain and had consumed between two and four glasses of wine around lunch time. Between 1300 and 1400, he received a telephone call from an SLSMC team leader, who asked if the operator would agree to work an overtime shift that evening on Bridge 11. The bridge operator agreed. No information concerning his fitness for work was exchanged at the time of the request, nor was it common practice to do so. SLSMC’s policy is that no employee shall report to duty with their ability impaired. After the telephone call, the operator relaxed, ate, and tried to get some sleep but did not sleep. Reportedly, he did not consume any additional alcohol or take any medication after accepting to work the overtime shift.
At about 1745, the bridge operator left his home and drove his vehicle to Bridge 11. At about 1820, the operator arrived at the bridge and made his way onto the lift span. He was met by the bridge operator of the previous shift, who reported he should expect a busy shift that night. No other information was exchanged during the shift change. The operator then climbed up the access ladder and entered the bridge operator’s control room to begin his shift.
By 1857, the bridge operator had raised the lift span for the first time during his shift and informed the TCC controller by telephone that the vessel Algocape was under Bridge 11. At that time, the operator had a brief conversation with the controller, who informed him that the next vessels he would encounter would be the downbound John B. Aird and two upbound yachts. The operator then lowered the lift span to allow vehicle traffic use of the bridge and later raised the lift span for the three vessels. At 1941, during the last telephone conversation between these two parties, the operator informed the TCC controller that the two yachts and the John B. Aird were under Bridge 11.
At 2050, the bridge operator called TCC by telephone and reported, in an unintelligible manner, that the Windoc was “coming under [Bridge] 11”. The controller, listening to the bridge operator on a speaker, did not understand what was said and asked the operator to repeat his message. Immediately after that telephone call, the bridge operator called the TCC again. When the controller answered this call, the bridge operator sounded confused because he asked if he was calling Lock 7. The TCC controller told the bridge operator he would relay the operator’s message to Lock 7 as that station was having trouble with its telephones.
After the 2050 telephone call, the bridge operator began lowering the lift span. The operator reportedly lowered the span after he saw the stern of the vessel clear the bridge. The operator did not immediately report the striking of the vessel to the TCC.
At 2054, after hearing the radiotelephone call on VHF channel 14 about the lowering of a bridge on a vessel and seeing the picture on the monitor from the fixed camera mounted on top of Bridge 11 shaking, the TCC controller called the bridge operator by telephone. The controller asked the bridge operator if he had lowered the bridge onto the vessel. The bridge operator told the controller that the vessel had hit the bridge. The controller told the bridge operator to raise the bridge.
At 2056, TCC controllers received calls about an accident and fire at Bridge 11. The controllers called the bridge operator several times but there was no response. It was not until 2106, when the controller called and spoke with the bridge operator that the operator expressed surprise that emergency services were on the way, questioning why emergency services personnel had a need to see him. When specifically asked by the controller about the fire on board the vessel, the operator reported that there was a small fire.
At 2106, a police officer arrived at Bridge 11. The lift span of the bridge was in the lowered but not fully-seated position, and the officer proceeded to the bridge control room to meet with the bridge operator. At 2110, an SLSMC supervisor arrived at Bridge 11 and went up to the bridge control room to meet with the bridge operator. Shortly afterwards, other SLSMC personnel and emergency services arrived on scene. The police officer and the SLSMC area coordinator indicated that they found the operator sitting in the dark and described his condition as shaken up or in shock.
An examination of the bridge operator’s vital signs was conducted by a paramedic. The operator was asked by the paramedic to go to the hospital for further examination, but the operator declined his request. At approximately 2230, the bridge operator, accompanied by another person, left the bridge to return home.
Following the occurrence, the operator did not recall any event between the time the decision was taken to lower the bridge and the time SLSMC personnel arrived at the bridge following the occurrence, a period of about 25 minutes.
“The helmsman remained at his station in the wheelhouse and lay down on the deck as the bridge span passed overhead. He freed himself from the debris and descended by the deckhouse stairwell alive.”
Shiver me timbers...
Drugged, sleeping bridge operator. I presume he was blamed for the accident? (Still not clear in the linked material.)
The article gives links to the TSB findings. I’ll take a wild guess from the table of contents: 1.5 The effects of Darvon-N.
I thought this was going to be a computer thread. Windoc v Macdoc.
Amazing no one died.
The article itself links to the TSB report from which that is extracted.
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/2001/m01c0054/m01c0054.asp
If you are going to post an article and come to a conclusion you should first know the facts ....
THE SHIP HAD A GREEN LIGHT!
“On the video, it looked like the bridge was already completely down as the ship passed under it.”
On the video, you can see the bridge moving down and then moving up.
LOL!
Reminds me of that joke with the various ships giving way to others, and finally
“I’m the Admiral - give way!”
“I’m the Jr. Seaman at Lighthouse Zebra Point - you give way!”
Lighthouse and naval vessel urban legend
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lighthouse_and_naval_vessel_urban_legend
Since this is a boat thread might as well advertise International Talk Like A Pirate Day that is coming up 19SEP2016!
http://www.talklikeapirate.com/piratehome.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Talk_Like_a_Pirate_Day
The US states of Michigan[16] and California[citation needed] have officially recognized the occasion.
Krispy Kreme gives out free doughnuts to people who talk and/or dress like pirates on September 19.[17] Long John Silver’s has a similar promotion.
Here are some pirate jokes for ya.
http://www.piratejokes.net/jokes/top20?pg=1
:-)
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