If Lincoln truly believed that, he was hopelessly naïve in reading the situation given the bitter four-year struggle that followed his actions. I don't think Lincoln was naïve. He was cunning and smart.
Your link says that Congress' February action was "ineffectual", but Lincoln was offered by Congress to stay in session after March 28 and he declined, which strongly suggests the Federal finances were then not in as dire condition as sometimes claimed.
Got any documented proof of that?
There is another interpretations which you don't accept. That's fine. Believe what you want. If Lincoln were intent on provoking war, he would do exactly what he did regardless of the immediate financial strait the country was in. He told the Senate that he had nothing to tell before they closed the session, yet the same day he asked that the expedition plan be started. He waited until Congress adjourned sine die before putting into motion the Sumter expedition that would very probably provoke that war. Since under a sine die session closure, Congress couldn’t call itself back into session until the Constitutionally stated date in December or until Lincoln called them back under his powers in the Constitution.. After sine die he wouldn’t have to deal with Congress in doing what he wanted until July 4, the date he set for their reconvening..
Remember that April 5, 1861 Carl Schurz letter to Lincoln that I posted to you above? Schurz said Lincoln had earlier told him that he (Lincoln) didn't want to call an extra session of congress for fear of reopening the compromise agitation. I suspect based on Lincoln's actions that Lincoln thought war was a better option for him than trying to compromise with a South that was glad to be free of the anti-slavery agitation, the protective tariff and other sectional aggrandizements that benefitted the North at the expense of the South.
rustbucket: "While Lincoln's incentive to provoke respond to Confederate provocations of war was economic constitutional, his objective after the attack on Fort Sumter expedition was to cement that war in place defend the Constitution by invading the South restoring Federal properties and blockading their ports suppress the rebellion, all without with any necessary Congressional interference support.
That was his way of solving the two-tariff situation defeating rebellion that had the potential to ruin the Northern economy United States."
Sir, it takes a lot of work to correct your mistakes, but I think I got them all...
Ever hear of the logical fallacy of slothful induction? It means, "The proper conclusion of an inductive argument is denied despite the evidence to the contrary."
Here is some evidence to the contrary of your beliefs:
Point 1. General Scott and Major Anderson argued that a huge number of troops 25,000 in one case 20,000 in the other (from memory) to take and hold Fort Sumter. Lincoln sent a totally inadequate force if that was his objective.
In fact, even with large force of troops and ships, the Union never was able to take Fort Sumter during the war until 1865 despite shelling Charleston civilians for 18 months in expressed hopes that the Confederate Army would turn over the fort to the Union to stop the shelling of the townspeople. Geeze Louise.
Point 2. Lincoln said his objective was to supply the fort with food (despite General Scott saying the objective was to reinforce the fort). Why would Lincoln send such a provocative expedition and risk war when the Confederates were allowing Anderson to obtain fresh food supplies in Charleston until April 7 or 8 when the Confederates learned that an armed expedition was on the way from the North.
Point 3. If successful in delivering food, the North would have to go through the exercise again when the fort ran out of food again. Besides, a peaceful transfer of food wouldn't solve Lincoln's two-tariff problem that would ruin the Northern economy. He would have to blockade the Southern ports or have the fort bombard ships coming into Charleston.
Point 4. Besides, Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, reported in his Diary that at the first meeting of the cabinet, "there was a very general and very determined opinion expressed that Fort Sumter ought to be and should be reinforced." Wells also writes that "the President decided ... that an attempt should be made to convey supplies to Major Anderson, and that he would reinforce Sumter." [Source: "Lincoln Takes Command, How Lincoln Got The War He Wanted," by John Shipley Tilley, pages 207-208]. So, General Scott was right in saying that the object of the expedition was to reinforce Fort Sumter.
Point 5. Lincoln pulled the powerful ship, the Powhatan, away from the Sumter expedition at the last moment, lowering the chances that the expedition would be able to force its way into Sumter. My take is that he would be happy if all the expedition did was to get the Confederates to “fire on the flag” that he could use to stir up patriotic feelings in the North. To a large extent that worked.
Sure, Lincoln was smart enough, but in April 1861 also naïve and certainly was not prescient.
Lincoln's lack of prescience is clearly demonstrated by his inability to pick a winning Army commander for over two years.
Obviously, as you've posted on this thread, many Southerners expected war and were preparing for it.
Lincoln saw his duty as preserving peace while enforcing the laws until and unless Confederates started war.
rustbucket referring to Federal finances: "Got any documented proof of that?"
Sure, among the final actions of the old 36th Congress, in March 1861 was to authorize a $10 million loan.
So Lincoln began his administration with enough money to pay his bills, at least until July.
rustbucket: "After sine die he wouldn’t have to deal with Congress in doing what he wanted until July 4, the date he set for their reconvening.. "
Again you assume prescience on Lincoln's part.
I would say on April 15 he merely did not foresee a need for Congress before July.
And as it happened, he was correct in that.
rustbucket: "Remember that April 5, 1861 Carl Schurz letter to Lincoln that I posted to you above?
Schurz said Lincoln had earlier told him that he (Lincoln) didn't want to call an extra session of congress for fear of reopening the compromise agitation."
First of all, only the Senate, not the full Congress, was in special session until March 28, doubtless to confirm Lincoln's appointments.
When that work was done, Lincoln said they could go home.
Second, by "earlier" Schurz must mean March or before, when the overall situation was quite different.
Third, on Congressional "compromises" -- certainly Lincoln opposed unreasonable compromises and Republicans then, just as now, were too often weak-willed brown nosing natural born compromisers.
Further, no previous efforts at "compromise" had produce any positive responses from secessionists, so I'd guess that "compromise" proposals by congressional Republicans were nothing more than self-flagellation, in Lincoln's mind.
rustbucket: "I suspect based on Lincoln's actions that Lincoln thought war was a better option for him than trying to compromise with a South "
Many Congressional "compromises" had already been proposed, and none produced positive responses from secessionists.
So that route was already closed off, not by Lincoln but by Confederates themselves.
But on the question of war, from Day One Lincoln was totally clear: secessionists could not have a war unless they themselves started it.
Lincoln then set about completing the resupply missions President Buchanan had attempted and failed at in January.
Remember, according to your own posts, many Southerners had long declared war inevitable.
So Lincoln could not be terribly surprised, only determined that if/when war came, Confederates started it.
rustbucket: "Point 1. General Scott and Major Anderson argued that a huge number of troops 25,000 in one case 20,000 in the other (from memory) to take and hold Fort Sumter.
Lincoln sent a totally inadequate force if that was his objective."
Right, totally inadequate for war, only adequate for a peaceful resupply mission.
rustbucket: "Point 2. Lincoln said his objective was to supply the fort with food (despite General Scott saying the objective was to reinforce the fort).
Why would Lincoln send such a provocative expedition and risk war when the Confederates were allowing Anderson to obtain fresh food supplies in Charleston until April 7 or 8 when the Confederates learned that an armed expedition was on the way from the North."
First of all, whatever Anderson's actual situation may have been, he told Washington in early March that he, Anderson, had only six weeks of food & supplies left, so Lincoln believed he must do something by April 15.
Now we might speculate on whether Anderson lied about his supposedly dire straights, or are reports of Charleston supplying food to Sumter exaggerated?
Regardless, when Beauregard demanded Anderson surrender, Anderson's response was, in effect: "not now, but if you'll just wait a few more days, my supplies will be gone and then I must surrender or starve".
So I am inclined to discount reports which say Anderson was really fat & happy in Fort Sumter in early April, 1861.
The fact is that in early April, 1861 Lincoln must either resupply Fort Sumter or surrender it, and he was not going to surrender without first making the attempt to resupply.
And if Davis used that as his excuse to start Civil War, then so be it.
That's my best guess on Lincoln's state of mind at the time.
rustbucket: "Point 3. If successful in delivering food, the North would have to go through the exercise again when the fort ran out of food again."
If successful, it would certainly buy time for further events and would establish a precedent for future missions.
rustbucket: "Besides, a peaceful transfer of food wouldn't solve Lincoln's two-tariff problem that would ruin the Northern economy.
He would have to blockade the Southern ports or have the fort bombard ships coming into Charleston."
As we've pointed out now many times: your alleged "two-tariff problem" is a total figment of pro-Confederate imaginations.
In fact, Lincoln was committed to maintain the peace until or unless Confederates started war.
rustbucket: "Wells also writes that 'the President decided ... that an attempt should be made to convey supplies to Major Anderson, and that he would reinforce Sumter.' "
It's obvious that a distinction between "reinforce" versus "resupply" only became clear as the mission date grew closer.
But Lincoln's final orders to his commanders were clear: no reinforcement if the resupply mission went peacefully.
rustbucket: "So, General Scott was right in saying that the object of the expedition was to reinforce Fort Sumter."
Scott was a bit of a loose cannon, whom Lincoln had to dress down on occasion.
Lincoln's last orders are clear and overrode whatever Scott may have said earlier.
rustbucket: "My take is that he would be happy if all the expedition did was to get the Confederates to 'fire on the flag' that he could use to stir up patriotic feelings in the North.
To a large extent that worked."
My take is that in early April 1861, Lincoln had no choice except to send a resupply mission to Fort Sumter, in hopes it could do its job peacefully.
But if Lincoln's ships met with military hostility, then it would at least be clear who started the war.
I believe I have found some clarification on this point. It is worse than you describe. The order sent to all the ships of the expedition, (USS Thomas Freeborn, Uncle Ben, USS Yankee, USS Baltic, USS Pocahontas, USS Pawnee, USRC Harriet Lane, and the USS Powhatan) were:
From Gideon Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy. April 5, 1861.
“The United States [Navy] steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will compose a naval force under your command, to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston Harbor, for the purpose of. . . carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge (Scott is supplying the men and material and transports, Fox is to lead them.).The primary object. . . is to provision Fort Sumter. . . Should the authorities at Charleston refuse to permit, or attempt to prevent the vessels from entering. . .you will protect the transports or boats, open the way for their ingress, and [remove] all obstructions to entry. . . The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication. . .
You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse. . . there to await the arrival of the transports (with Fox on board). . . The Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will be ordered to join you. . . “
This clearly says to use force to open the way for their ingress, and [remove] all obstructions to entry
The Powhatan was the lead ship. It was the command ship. All the other ships were led to believe that it would be joining them off Charleston, and that they were to wait until it got there.
Had the Powhatan arrived as expected, the mission would have proceeded to force a landing at the Fort through the teeth of the Confederate guns. That would likely have killed most everyone on those ships.
These were the orders that were public knowledge among these sailors, outfitters, dock hands, and so forth, and it is unquestionable that the South was told of what those orders consisted.
The Powhatan was last to leave, and just before it left, David Porter shows up with a secret order from Lincoln authorizing him to take command of the Vessel and sail it to Pensacola. None of the other ships have knowledge of this, and their orders compel them to sit off the coast of Charleston waiting for the Powhatan, which is never going to come.
This warship flotilla is effectively paralyzed into inaction but it's leaked orders indicate it will attack when the Powhatan joins it. Again, the Powhatan was never going to join it. The Attack orders were intended to provoke the Confederates but were never truly intended to be carried out.
Lincoln cleverly used the Powhatan as the hidden key to stopping the attack, but neither the Confederates nor the other Union ships knew of this.
Lincoln could pretend to be "sending bread to Anderson" even though he his Secretary of the Navy had clearly issued belligerent orders that were conditional on the arrival of the Powhatan.
But those ships never were going to unload supplies for Anderson because the Powhatan never was going to show up to meet them. Lincoln clearly had no intentions that those ships should ever land any supplies at all. The only reason they were there was to scare the Confederates into believing they were about to be attacked.