Posted on 03/10/2016 5:18:01 AM PST by sukhoi-30mki
The US Air Force has begun studying future close air support (CAS) aircraft to succeed the Fairchild Republic A-10 as the Pentagon evaluates the weaponry it needs for “prolonged operations” of one year or more.
The flying branch is looking at tactical air support platform alternatives for low-intensity “permissive conflict” like counterterrorism and regional stability operations, similar to the types of missions being conducted Iraq and Afghanistan today, where air superiority has been achieved and coalition aircraft can roam relatively freely in support of ground troops.
USAF officials say a portion of a "combat air force study” is dedicated to considering alternative CAS aircraft: everything from the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine, Sierra Nevada/Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, and the Textron AirLand Scorpion on the “low end” of the capability spectrum to more sophisticated clean-sheet attack aircraft or AT-X derivatives of the planned T-X next-generation trainer.
The study comes as the air force “re-phases” its retirement of the hardy A-10 "Warthog" that currently serves in the role. It has pushed back the fleet’s divestiture from this fiscal year to “between 2018 and 2022” at cost imposition of $3.4 billion.
Service officials admit that despite being an ideal close air support platform in high-end conflict with Russia, the long-delayed A-10 replacement, the Lockheed Martin F-35, will be too expensive to operate in the Warthog’s day-to-day role.
“[F-35] will be particularly capable in contested environments, like Russian doctrine where you would bring your air defences with you, because there will be a limited number of airplanes that can operate in that role,” USAF deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and requirements Lt Gen James Holmes tells a Senate Armed Services subcommittee panel on 8 March. “It would certainly be an expensive way to go after a permissive environment mission and we hope to not have to do that, so we will look at other options.”
US Air Force
In written testimony to the AirLand Subcommittee, the four testifying air force officials explain that the study will support a decision process sometime in the next five-year defence spending plan, which covers fiscal years 2018 to 2022. “This will serve to ensure that other current platforms and future systems meet future close air support requirements,” the prepared statement says.
The A-10 was introduced in 1975 and upgraded to the more capable A-10C configuration in 2007. Its backers in Congress have consistently protected it from the air force’s budget axe.
Holmes told reporters after the hearing that the air force needs to figure out if it needs an entirely new attack platform or a more basic “off-the-shelf” option like the AT-6, A-29 or Scorpion before pushing forward with a new acquisition programme.
Textron AirLand
“There are some very low-end airplanes out there, like the A-29 that we’re partnering with for Afghanistan and training their crews in,” Holmes says. “The question is, is it enough? We know that an F-35 is too much, but is an A-29 enough for the mission set we need to do or do we need something in-between? Is there a derivative of our T-X platform that could do some range of lower-cost missions?”
Holmes cautions that the T-X Advanced Pilot Trainer programme hasn’t even entered development and still many years away from delivering the 350 training aircraft required to replace the Northrop T-38. An AT-X derivative would need to wait until the original trainer requirement is satisfied, and T-X initial operational capability isn’t due until 2024.
“I don’t want to add requirements to that, which would make it too expensive,” Holmes says, noting that the air force will likely need a new attack aircraft sooner.
“One of the hardest things to do in the [US Defense Department] budget process is to spend $1 this year to save $10 later because you can’t scrape up the $1 this year to do it because of other pressing needs,” he says. “You make that trade of paying more to fly an F-16 vice a lower capability airplane.”
The air force has been considering new ways to use F-15s and F-16s in the CAS role through upgrades and new tactics. DARPA has been experimenting with new tablet computer-based software that makes it easier for "JTAC" targeting specialists on the ground to call in air fire with greater accuracy and less collateral damage, under a Raytheon-led project called persistent close air support (PCAS). That programme demonstrated full functionality with an A-10C in May 2015.
Fuel and maintenance.
A-10’s are out of power - electrical that is.
Maintenance...I should’ve known.
I would love to see the footage of that one!
The AF budget has been slashed to the bone. They’re at their lowest manning levels since the inception of the AF in 1947. R&D has been slashed and they’re having trouble keeping the current jets in the air due to manning and budget shortfalls.
People who keep saying that the AF doesn’t want the A-10 are repeating misinformation. Some of the senior leadership flew them. The problem with the A-10 is that it’s a single mission aircraft. It does a limited mission very well. The budget cuts have forced the AF to go to a multi-role aircraft that’s a jack of all trades, but master of none.
The logistical support for the A-10 is very expensive when you consider the cost per plane. You need to have dedicated pilots, maintenance, ranges, bases, parts and munitions. The AF has cut most of the fat and now it’s going for meat.
I also think that there are politics at play here. A lot of the A-10 logistics support comes from States with powerful politicians. Every time the AF threatens to cut the A-10, Congress seems to find a little more money to keep it going.
I have searched and asked for it but no joy.
As a former F-111A maintenance troop from a looooong time ago, if we were to revive any F-111s from the boneyard, my very strong vote would be for the EF-111A, modernized, and brought up to EA-18G countermeasures standards.
The F-15E is more than an adequate replacement for the F-111 in the strike role, so in my view there would not be any advantage to bringing back the F-111F, which would be the only model worth bringing back at all.
The B-1B is very maneuverable for a bomber. I’ve heard pilots describe its agility as being almost fighter-like.
And supersonic fighter/attack aircraft aren't especialy useful at close air support of ground troops.
What a dilemma.
Very early production F-111As had faulty wing boxes (that carry the wing to the fuselage) that failed causing the wings to fall off. We lost a couple in Vietnam in 1968 because of it.
That was long since corrected, and lessons learned applied to the F-14 and B-1B.
As others have said, the main problem for the F-111 was maintenance. In the time I worked at Mtn. Home AFB from 1978-81, we had maybe one third of our aircraft mission capable at any one time. The rest were down due to parts shortages both for the airframe and the avionics.
Imagine getting parts for either one today. Ain't gonna happen.
As I said, the F-15E can do almost everything the F-111F did. I'd rather see money spent on new build F-15Es than used to bring back F-111s.
” Every time the AF threatens to cut the A-10, Congress seems to find a little more money to keep it going.”
The Michigan Air National Guard’s 127th Wing at Selfridge ANGB will continue its mission with the A-10s of the 107th Fighter Squadron for at least 6 more years. The A-10s at SANGB replaced the F-16 Fighting Falcon in January of 2009. Selfridge ANGB is the one remaining military base in ALL of Michigan with any significant firepower.
“I’d rather see money spent on new build F-15Es than used to bring back F-111s.”
After what seemed like some gentle arm-twisting there, I have to say that I agree with you. I have seen the light!
Here’s a look at how far back they’re looking:
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/combat-dragon-ii-demonstrates-ov-10g-bronco-capabilities/
“Yeah, weren’t the swing-wing actuator mechanisms in the F-111’s ballscrew and nut assemblies? The F-14s had them too but they didn’t have that problem or did they? I’ve never heard of any problems with the wings of the B-1B, the largest variable geometry-winged military aircraft ever produced.”
Not sure, I wasn’t a wrench bender. Suspect like most problems, they eventually got them figured out and built on that knowledge when the next generations came on line. But I also suspect that it would be about as useless as the F-4 when it came to CAS. Many of the FACs I knew wouldn’t use the F-4 in a TIC situation. ‘course the accuracy of current munitions is considerably better than what we had back when “Hit my smoke” meant “at least get it within 200 meters”.
A harsh reality post.
The AF is dominated by “tribes” who have come up in a single weapon system. Until Vietnam it was the “bomber tribe” since Vietnam it has been “the Fighter Mafia.” In both cases the legitimate national defense issues through out “the spectrum of conflict” were subordinate to what the ruling clique of general officers wanted. This dysfunctional leadership style starts at the Chief of Staff and goes all they down to the base/wing. “Its great to be King” sums it up.
This would be okay if you can win a war through air power alone. Unfortunately harsh history says you still need to occupy the enemy’s home territory to win. Check Korea (1953), Vietnam (1975), various minor conflicts in the 1980s, and today’s current conflicts.
Until the current AF Leadership takes to heart the 1964 study done by AF Systems Command about why contemporary USAF Tactical Aircraft were failing in Vietnam and understands that the same deficiencies exist today, 50 plus years later, and will continue to exist with their current designs we, the Republic, will continue to lose.
BTW in 2009 and again in 2014, the Department of Defense issue a directive on “Irregular War’ that stated that the Republic needed to be equipped and proficient in both Irregular War (the predominate form of conflict since the 1960s) and Conventional War (the exception since the 1960s). This debate over the next generation USAF CAS platform indicates to be that the “Fighter Mafia” leaders at Air Staff think (know?) they can ignore DOD Directives with impunity.
If they really want slow, long lingering, low fuel consumption with higher payloads and low risk, then if they were being honest they would immediately rule out putting a human in it.
That is the crux of the problem. Given the budget constraints, the USAF would rather fund “multirole” aircraft.
The F-35 (the expense of which helped aggravate the budget issue) is probably going to make a decent strike aircraft, a marginal fighter and a poor CAS provider. Commanders won’t want to risk such an expensive aircraft unless there is a high payoff. So as a practical matter, it won’t provide much CAS.
CAS is specialized work. The A-10 was built to be low, slow and tough to deliver effective CAS in support of NATO against the ultimate non-permissive airspace if the Warsaw Pact and NATO had slugged it out. Those virtues directly translated to CAS against all sorts of targets the designers couldn’t even imagine.
We need to pry loose enough money to create an A-10 replacement that is affordable, low, slow, tough, easy to maintain, and capable of fighting threats we don’t know exist.
We used to consider that type of problem a difficult challenge to be overcome. Now, too often too many people see difficult as a reason to not even try.
What a dilemma.
I'm not disagreeing with you. I was assigned to England AFB in 1981 and helped transition from A-7s to A-10s. I have the utmost respect for the A-10, its capabilities, and it's pilots. I've flown simulators and can personally vouch for the fact that it's a lot easier to do close air at 180 knots than it is at 350 knots IAS. The A-10 can fly lower, slower, and maneuver better than most other aircraft. The issue isn't whether the A-10 is better at CAS. The issue is, should the AF take money and pilots from other programs to support a single-mission plane? Having a great CAS platform doesn't mean much if you can't maintain air superiority and the planes aren't free to fly where they're needed. The bottom line is that in order to keep 50% of the population on food stamps and supplied with free Obamaphones, you need to cut the military.
Well, it IS a military contract...
What would be the “decision time” if you asked a Marine on the ground, a SEAL, or the Air Force pilots?
Put them the room, have them slide the decision under the door when they finalize one. Until then, nothing goes in or out. Food, water, toilet paper. Nothing.
I am betting about an hour.
The F-35 (the expense of which helped aggravate the budget issue) is probably going to make a decent strike aircraft, a marginal fighter and a poor CAS provider. Commanders won’t want to risk such an expensive aircraft unless there is a high payoff. So as a practical matter, it won’t provide much CAS.
CAS is specialized work. The A-10 was built to be low, slow and tough to deliver effective CAS in support of NATO against the ultimate non-permissive airspace if the Warsaw Pact and NATO had slugged it out. Those virtues directly translated to CAS against all sorts of targets the designers couldn’t even imagine.
We need to pry loose enough money to create an A-10 replacement that is affordable, low, slow, tough, easy to maintain, and capable of fighting threats we don’t know exist.
We used to consider that type of problem a difficult challenge to be overcome. Now, too often too many people see difficult as a reason to not even try.
Absolutely.
CAS is one of the most critical roles the AF has to fill in the type of warfare we're facing today. The A-10 and its successor will be very important to the overall mission. The A-10 can get to its target a lot faster than an attack helicopter and can do a lot more damage once it arrives.
I don't see the replacement issue being such a daunting task, either. The problem is a small pot of money and a lot of requirements.
The AF needs CAS aircraft.
It needs modern refuelers or the assets can't get to the battlefield. Every year that I can remember the refuelers have been a big item on the budget requirements list.
We need to have Airlift aircraft to get people and materiel to the battle zone.
We need to have a replacement for 40 year old F-16s and F-15s.
We need Electronic Warfare assets to reduce the effectiveness of SAMS.
The BUFF was first flown in 1952 - over 60 years ago. They keep upgrading them, but they're still 60 year old, post Korean War era airplanes.
You need maintainers and pilots to fly them.
The list is huge and it can be tough to find a balance.
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