This is a travesty, and the "trial" defines "Kangaroo Court".
From the 9th circuit decision”
“A. Waiver
A threshold issue is whether the government waived its right to appeal the Hammonds’ sentences in the plea agreement or otherwise failed to preserve its objection. We find no grounds for dismissing the appeal.
UNITED STATES V. HAMMOND 7 The Hammonds first argue that the government waived its right to appeal in the plea agreement. Because a plea agreement is partly contractual in nature, we interpret it from the perspective of a reasonable defendant. See United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (9th Cir. 1993). But there is no ambiguity here to interpret. A reasonable defendant would expect that the absence of any statements on the government’s right to appeal simply means that no waiver was contemplated. See United States v. Anderson, 921 F.2d 335, 337–38 (1st Cir. 1990).
The Hammonds respond by arguing that the statements of defense counsel show that an all-around waiver of appellate rights was the sine qua non of the plea agreement. The record, however, belies that assertion. The statements made by defense counsel just before the judge accepted the plea agreement underscore that all parties sought to resolve the case swiftly, but finality was not the only benefit supporting the plea agreement. Other benefits included favorable recommendations from the government and the dismissal of charges. We thus cannot reasonably read defense counsels’ references to finality as meaning that no party could take an appeal.
Assuming then that the plea agreement is silent on the government’s right of appeal, the Hammonds urge us to imply a waiver into the plea agreement. We have never before done so. But relying on United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1991), the Hammonds argue that construing the government’s silence as an implied waiver will promote fairness and finality. We reject that position.
The principles governing the formation and interpretation of plea agreements leave no room for implied waivers.
UNITED STATES V. HAMMOND8 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, not the common law of contracts, governs the making of plea agreements. See United States v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568, 571 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 634 (9th 1988). Although Rule 11 gives courts discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement, it does not authorize courts to remake a plea agreement or imply terms into one. See United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455 (1985) (per curiam) (“Rule 11[] . . . speaks in terms of what the parties in fact agree to, and does not suggest that such implied-in-law terms as were read into this agreement by the Court of Appeals have any place under the rule.â€); United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1977) (observing that Congress rejected a version of Rule 11 that would have allowed a court to modify a plea agreement in favor of the defendant). We accordingly “enforce the literal terms†of a plea agreement, construing only ambiguous language in the defendant’s favor. United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Johnson, 187 F.3d 1129, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 1999). These principles preclude us from implying a waiver where none exists.
Moreover, nothing in the nature of plea agreements requires that each promise must be “matched against a mutual and ‘similar’ promise by the other side.†United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 2001). To be sure, the idea behind a plea agreement is that each side waives certain rights to obtain some benefit. See Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d at 633. But there are ample reasons that a defendant might enter a plea agreement short of extinguishing the government’s right to appeal, including the possibility of a lower sentence and the dismissal of other charges. Hare, 269 F.3d at 861; cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (listing possible reasons for entering a plea). For example, the
UNITED STATES V. HAMMOND 9 Hammonds negotiated for favorable recommendations from the government and the dismissal of charges. Such benefits are consideration enough to support a plea agreement. See Hare, 269 F.3d at 861–62.
Finally, contrary to the Hammonds’ assertion, the record leaves no doubt that the government preserved the objection to the sentences that it raises on appeal. Nowhere did the government make a “straightforward†concession. United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991). Nor did the government fail to give the district court an opportunity to address the argument it raises on appeal. See United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 694–95 (9th Cir. 2008). In its sentencing memorandum and at sentencing, the government argued that the trial judge lacked discretion to deviate from the statutory minimum. The government thus preserved its objection, and we may hear its appeal.”
I read this as the government reneged and here uses silence in a plea agreement to leave a back door.
IIRC, the Hammonds were convicted of arson. The re-sentencing permitted them to be convicted of something else-and without a trial.
The Hammond ranch is the last ranch standing out there. If you read my other posts, you’ll see the mining interests that may prove profitable-say, for Weyden and DeFazio-and provide bonuses to certain, read husband and wife team, people working for the BLM.
Then again, the Chinese may demand the gold, uranium, and other resources found. Or 0bama could give Iran the right to buy.