Evidently, I'm not reading Natelson's proposed Article V COS rules the same way you are, dear Jacquerie.
RE: the matter of "ad hoc committees."
Natelson's rules presuppose that the COS will be substantially devoted to the issues delineated in the Georgia Application, which are three in number, each with its own standing committee: fiscal restraints (e.g., a balanced-budget amendment), federal jurisdiction — particularly viewed through the lens of the Tenth Amendment — and term limits. These are qualitatively different than the standing committees on rules, credentials, and administration, which refer to the organization and conduct of the convention itself.
The fiscal restraints, federal jurisdiction, and term limits standing committees deal, not with convention organizational matters, but with the very substance and purpose for which the convention is called.
Natelson's rules allow for the appointment of "ad hoc committees," which are appointed by any standing committee in order to enable it to execute its business. The ad hoc committees do not have a license to work on any business beyond the scope of the business of the standing committee that appointed them.
At least, that is my reading, my understanding. On that basis, I would have to conclude that ad hoc committees have no plenary power of their own; their work is confined to the mission of the standing committee that appointed them. And this means that no ad hoc committee has the power to "ultimately debate whatever it wishes to debate."
Just my thoughts, FWTW. Thank you so much for writing!
> “Natelson’s rules allow for the appointment of “ad hoc committees,” which are appointed by any standing committee in order to enable it to execute its business. The ad hoc committees do not have a license to work on any business beyond the scope of the business of the standing committee that appointed them.”
That is correct except that the rules stipulate that the Convention may create them, not just the standing committees.
> “On that basis, I would have to conclude that ad hoc committees have no plenary power of their own; their work is confined to the mission of the standing committee that appointed them. And this means that no ad hoc committee has the power to “ultimately debate whatever it wishes to debate.””
No matter, it is moot. Committees do not vote for the entire assembly, the Convention as it is. Committees work to reach agreement and consensus. They then report to the entire assembly. Motions follow to vote on findings of committees or for any motion brought by any commissioner (member of the assembly).
Hypothetically and absurdly, should the Convention create an ad hoc committee to explore for example replacing the US Constitution with Islamic Sharia Law, and such committee brings its finding to the Convention floor on a motion for a vote, a member need only raise a point of order that the proposed vote is out of scope with the Conventions subject matter. The President can either strike the motion for vote or defer it to the Rules Committee, all without debate. If there is an appeal of the President’s decision, the appeal will likely go to the Rules Committee. In any case the motion dies or the Rules Committee returns its finding. All of the above is based on a hypothetical absurdity which has probability zero.
The above combined with strict time limits of the Convention’s proceedings makes it impossible for the Convention to become uncontrolled.
Nattelson et al have done a stellar job amassing the history of conventions and the principles of good order to create a set of rules that will keep the COS on track addressing the mandatory subject areas.
(1) The standing committees shall include rules, credentials, administration, fiscal restraints, federal jurisdiction, and term limits. . . .
it appears to me that every suggested amendment from Mark Levin's Liberty Amendments could be motioned for consideration by the federal jurisdiction committee. They are precisely the sort of structural changes that must be approved by the convention and submitted to the states.