Today, the Japanese have begun their main effort against the Battalion, with heavy weapons and bayonet charge. They succeed in cutting off C Company and fighting continues through the night.
Have Yourself a Merry Little Christmas is an ironic song as at that time in the movie the family has had anything but. It will take on even more irony during Christmas 1944.
If C Company can hold on until tomorrow my father's battalion, 2nd of the 128th Inf., will arrive to reinforce them. The top map on my profile shows their path up Kilay Ridge.
The capture of Limon essentially signaled the end of the battle of Breakneck Ridge, although some Japanese pockets resisted bitterly until the middle of December. The battle cost the 24TH and 32D Divisions a total of 1,498 casualties, killed, wounded, and missing in action, as compared with an estimated 5,252 Japanese killed and 8 captured. (Cannon 225) The cost had been great, but X Corps had secured the northern entrance to the Ormoc Valley and could now continue its push south to link up with XXIV Corps to eventually complete the eviction of the Japanese from Leyte.
In no small measure, the establishment and maintenance of a roadblock south of Limon by the 2D Battalion, 19TH Infantry [Col. Spragins] , and the defense of Kilay Ridge in the rear of the Japanese front lines by the 1ST Battalion, 34TH Infantry [LTC Thomas E. Clifford], had made this achievement possible. Under constant fire and greatly outnumbered, these units had prevented General Suzuki from sending additional troops into Limon. (Cannon 225)
Both of these units had been under the operational control of the 32D Division since the relief of the 24TH Division on Breakneck Ridge on 16 November. The 2D Battalion, 19TH Infantry, had maintained its roadblock from 12-23 November under extremely difficult conditions. The 1ST Battalion, 34TH Infantry had been stubbornly holding Kilay Ridge since 10 November. Both units were often isolated, constantly outnumbered, under equipped, and under supplied. Both units received Presidential citations.
Late on 27 November a patrol from the 128TH Infantry made contact with the 1ST Battalion, 34TH Infantry on Kilay Ridge to let them know that reinforcements were on the way. This was welcome news because LTC Clifford had been seeking reinforcements for some time.
CPT Harry W. Lusk, commander of Co. C, 128TH Inf., was KIA on 28 November, he was reported MIA for a while. Originally from Pennsylvania, he entered service from Eau Claire, Wisconsin. He had been WIA and earned the Silver Star ca. 22 Nov. 42 at Buna. [added 16 Dec. 12]
SSG Milton Rosenstein, from Ellenville, New York, and assigned to the 126TH Inf., was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his actions on 28 November on Leyte. He was seriously WIA and DOW later that day. More information about him and his medal can be found on the roster of Silver Star recipients. [added 1 Feb. 13]
The 2D Battalion, 128TH Infantry, reached Kilay Ridge on 29 November and was placed under LTC Clifford’s control. Co. G, 128TH Infantry, the first to arrive, was immediately sent to reinforce Co. C, 34TH Infantry, the most threatened unit, on the southwest end of the ridge. When the remainder of the 2D Battalion, 128TH Infantry, arrived it was initially held in reserve.
TSgt. Lloyd E. Fisher, from Newton, Kansas, and assigned to the 128TH Inf., earned the Silver Star, bestowed posthumously, for his actions on 29 November. He successfully reunited his mortar platoon with their company after they had been separated during a Japanese attack. He was KIA soon after. More information about him and his medal can be found on the roster of Silver Star recipients. [added 3 Mar. 14]
On 1 December, companies from both battalions attacked several knolls, believed to be key Japanese strongpoints, at the southeastern end of Kilay Ridge. While artillery and mortars from both battalions laid prepatory fire, Co. B (34TH Infantry) sent out a patrol to attempt to approach the knolls from the rear. Meanwhile Co. E (128TH Infantry) passed through Co. C (34TH Infantry) in order to directly assault the knolls, while Co. C protected its flanks with heavy machine gun fire.
The company [Co. E, 128TH] took the first knoll easily, but heavy fire from behind a huge log on the second knoll halted Company E. Company A [34TH Infantry] sent a bazooka team forward to knock out the position and Company C [34TH Infantry] sent all of its grenades forward, but by 1320 the Japanese soldiers were still resisting all attempts to dislodge them. (Cannon 234)
2LT John Hatlestad, Minnesota and assigned to the 128TH Inf., was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his actions on 1 December on Leyte. He was KIA that day. More information about him and his medal can be found on the roster of Silver Star recipients. [added 28 Jan. 13]
No more progress was made that day and the patrol from Co. B (34TH Infantry) returned about mid-afternoon to report that it had seen no Japanese activity near its objective.
On 1 December General Gill ordered the 1ST Battalion, 34TH Infantry (Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Clifford, Jr., former All-American West Point football star), to withdraw from its position where it had done excellent work in preventing the Japanese from reinforcing the Limon Forces. His message concluded: You and your men have not been forgotten. You are the talk of the island, and perhaps the United States. Army beat Notre Dame 59 to 0, the worst defeat on record.
Actually, it was several days before the withdrawal of Colonel Cliffords battalion could be completed. The Japanese were still resisting strongly although their 1st Division had already sustained over 3,000 battle casualties. From postwar examination of Japanese records it appears that the 1st Divisions mission was not changed from attack to defense until 6 December when it had reached the stage of collapse. The fact that the enemy continued to operate with an offensive mission for some time after the bulk of his forces were actually on the defense probably accounts in part for the sporadic fighting, involving all three infantry regiments of the 32D Division, which broke out repeatedly throughout the Divisions area. (Blakeley 185)
On the morning of 2 December, Co. E, 128TH Infantry, again attacked the Japanese positions on the knolls, while Co. F, 128TH Infantry, launched an assault against Japanese positions on another ridge south of Kilay Ridge. Co. E captured the knolls by about mid-day, and Co. F, after overcoming stiff opposition, gained the crest of the ridge by the end of the afternoon. Although the 1ST Battalion, 34TH Infantry, started to withdraw from Kilay Ridge during the afternoon, their withdrawal was halted until 4 December and wasn’t completed until two days later.
http://www.32nd-division.org/history/ww2/32ww2-10.html
Some idea of the difficulties of the advance can be gained from the Armys official history of the campaign: Every bend of the road was lined with foxholes dug into the banks of the road and spider holes dug underneath the roots of trees and under logs on the hillsides. It was bitter, close hand to hand fighting, and because of the steepness of the terrain, and denseness of the tree growth, the inaccuracy of maps and the nearness of adjoining units, artillery and mortar fire could not be used to its full advantage in reducing these positions. (Blakeley 190)
The Japanese were well entrenched on a series of ridges overlooking Highway 2. A heavy rain forest covered the ridges and the deep ravines in between. The enemy had carefully selected his defensive positions and camouflaged his machine guns, which were flanked by hidden riflemen. Targets could not be spotted beyond a range of about seventy-five feet. The employment of mortars was very limited because of the lack of visibility, and the hazards of tree burst were equally dangerous to both the Japanese and the Americans. The troops had to approach within spitting distance of the [Japanese machine] guns before they could locate the weapons. (Cannon 339)
The main Japanese defensive line had been reached. By 14 December the 32D Division had advanced more than two miles south of Limon. The 77TH Division had crushed the Cogon defenses and was in a position to drive north and make juncture with elements of X Corps. The northern and southern entrances to Ormoc Valley were denied to the Japanese. The jaws of the Sixth Army trap were starting to close. (Cannon 328)
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