Posted on 10/12/2014 4:21:23 AM PDT by iowamark
France's military history is littered with cautionary tales and glorious triumphs. And the secret differentiator between the two may be age.
The average age of Napoleon's generals was 41, and many of the brightest were even younger. Jean Lannes was named a general at 27, and a field marshal at 35. Andre Masséna was named a general at 35. Louis-Nicolas Davoust was named a general at 23 (really), and a field marshal at 34. Joachim Murat, Napoleon's legendary cavalry commander, was named a general at 29.
By contrast, in 1939, when France started what would be the most serious debacle in its history, the supreme commander of its armed forces was Maxime Gamelin, age 67. Before the end of the Battle of France, he was replaced by Maxime Weygand, 73. France's only World War II victories were won by a young general, who had previously written a prophetic book on blitzkrieg tactics, by the name of Charles de Gaulle.
This is a pattern so often repeated in military history that you can't help but ask, "When will they ever learn?" A military force wins a series of victories. After doing so, it becomes cocky, set in its ways, sure that its tactics will work forever. A hungrier force comes up with new and unexpected tactics. The older force cannot adapt. It is defeated. The phenomenon is so well known that "generals fighting the last war" has become a common expression.
We should always be wary of over-generalizations. Obviously, some of the world's most daring and innovative people are senior citizens, and some of its dullest and most conservative are in their 20s. But broadly speaking, these are exceptions that prove the rule. It seems hard to deny that there is indeed an inverse correlation between age and willingness to try new ideas, and between age and aggression, which are among the most critical features for military commanders.
And that brings us to America. Today, the U.S. military seems both as strong as ever and as weak as ever. As strong as ever because it has no great power rivals that can even hope to match its conventional strength; and because it has the most aircraft carriers, the best technology, and unattainable command of the skies. And yet, no one but a fool would claim that the U.S. military's recent war-making record is sterling. As Thomas E. Ricks has argued, a great many of the U.S.'s military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan are directly attributable to poor generalship.
The U.S. military is the most powerful fighting force in history. And warfare is changing faster than ever. The entire world depends on the U.S. military for security. Whatever the "next war" ends up being, we will all be sorry if U.S. generals are fighting the last war while it happens.
I don't know what the "next war" will be, so I can't make tactical recommendations. Instead, I can make a recommendation that will bias the U.S. military toward more inventiveness, more risk taking, more daring. Is it sure to work? Of course not. Will it make a true difference? Is it necessary? I believe so.
That recommendation is simple: The U.S. military should have a firm retirement age of 50 for officers.
This would be a sea change. It would mean the chairman of the joint chiefs would be in his mid-40s, instead of 62, as he is today. The career path would be compressed to an astonishing extent. It is not just generals who will be (much) younger; it will also be every type of superior officer.
There are, of course, laws in America that ban age discrimination. There are very good reasons for these statutes, and I don't propose changing them anywhere — except in the military's officer ranks.
Now, you might be concerned that my plan will promote people past their level of competence. Don't worry about that. Bureaucracies promote people to their level of incompetence; startups and adventurous militaries promote people past their level into competence, into jobs that they must grow into as they do them. A very common feature of military campaigns, especially successful ones, is officers being promoted very early due to high rank turnover, whether due to dismissals or death in action.
Plus, the U.S. military needs more accountability for senior officers. Some senior officers will not be ready for significant command by their mid-30s. Replace them!
Aren't there a lot of very valuable old commanders? Of course. As I said earlier, there are exceptions to every rule, and there are or should be a lot of exceptions to the current, never-justified, unwritten rule that says senior commanders should be in their 50s or 60s. The point of setting a general rule of this type is not to catch every single eventuality in its net. It is to find a way to shape incentives and culture and probabilities to improve the organization.
One effect of this new rule is that, given the shorter career span, and, therefore, a much more brutal "up or out" promotion system, younger ambitious officers who want to make general very fast will be more incentivized to try to stand out, to try new things and methods.
I realize, of course, how audacious my proposal is. Almost as audacious as Napoleon.
Eisenhower was in his 50s during WW2, Schwartzkopf was about 60 during the Gulf War.
“Sounds like a good idea to me”
Extremely bad idea. Army Chief of Staff Marshall forced elderly officers over a certain age to retire in the buildup before U.S. entry into World War Two after the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941. Fortunately, General Marshall made an exception in the case of Colonel George S. Patton and waived the age restriction for him. Col. Patton was promoted in rank to Brigadier General and given the task of organizing the U.S. Tank Corps for the U.S. Army in a desert training center around Ft. Irwin, California. Patton then planned the first major American amphibious invasion with the Allied attack upon French Northwest Africa in 1942. His leadership set the example for future U.S. amphibious invasions in the war.
Blind age prejudice against older military officers without regard to skill, luck, and sheer audacity is extremely harmful to the capabilities of the American armed forces. Any attempt to foolishly squander such human capital on the sacrificial stone of blind and ignorant policy should be and must be opposed with all the derision it deserves.
MacArthur’s heroism in WWI cannot be disputed. His actions as a General in WWII were appalling.
People are more complex than movies or histories can ever portray, but facts are stubborn and MacArthur was little more than a publicity-seeking figurehead when he ignominiously left the PI. LT GEN Wainwright may have been forced to surrender, but the defeat can only be attributed to MacArthur. He was an extreme narcissist and a poor general in the field as can be seen by any study of the PI campaign. Finally, his men did not respect him—my determining factor when it comes to command.
I won’t dispute his administrative or political skills in the aftermath. As I said, real life doesn’t always fit our neat boxes.
Now that is funny! Lol
Half the current generation will be dead before they reach that state.
There was a point after World War 1 where the British had more admirals than ships, a problem in bureaucracy and “rank inflation”.
That our military suffers it now, as we enter a second decade fighting militant Islam, bodes poorly for the nation.
“Old? Who’s old?”
Oookay, you shamed me into one more round. While in Vietnam I got a letter from my mom stating my draft notice had arrived. I don’t know what ever became of it or what. However, not to long after serving my three years in the army I did receive another card, think I was 4-A, as I recall, meaning inactive reserves but no sure. About your last comment; I have several friends and associates, all conservatives, who are pro-draft.
I reckon you already know this but.........
The 42nd Division got it’s nickname from being an amalgamated division formed from Guard units across the US. They were the first National Guard division to go to the Western Front because of that. Politicians and socially important people from many states were demanding that their units have the distinction of being the first state units to go fight the Huns so the War Department deployed the 42nd first due to their being raised from around the nation.
As an aside, my grandfather was a national president of the division association. He died when I was a kid so I didn’t get to hear much from him about the war.
Retire all the guys with experience and knowledge and replace them with young guys steeped in pop-theories of the day and beholden to whatever politician happens to be in office....
What could possibly go wrong??
Funny my uncle serve under MacArthur as and 18 year old in the Pacific an worshipped the guy
Hyman Rickover (Father of the Nuclear Navy) joined the navy at age 18 in 1918 and was forced to retire in 1982 after 51
years of service.
So did my great uncle, but he couldn’t stand him. Of course that may have come from being bayonetted a couple times while Mac was enjoying his Australian jaunt. Different perspectives, I suppose. From what I hear, he was very charismatic.
Your rants about MacArthur seem to.focuse on the Philippines but leave out they has no hope of holding them as the Japanese had overwhelming superior numbers..... and that he was order out by the President
Obvious question then...
How do attain “critical skills”??? Time in rate, re-enlistments...
If the two privates are not considered to be retainable for opportunities for “critical skills” you cannot learn without a little time in, then where does that leave us???
Your two privates are not going to be encouraged or retained if the impetus is to release them regardless if they have the evaluations, and or experience attained at that point in their enlistments if this trend continues...
Remember how we are told this is an ALL Volunteer force in this country...
Well, at this rate we have pretty much lost that pool because of these policies...
A lot of kids WANT to serve, they want it to mean something, it is important to them and they are motivated to sign on the dotted line...Destroy those virtuous ambitions and you destroy our armed services...Period...
MacArthur men did not respect him?... where to you get that nugget.of wisdom...
have ever spoken directly with any Army veterans that served under him?..
or are you just talking to Marines who harbored a resentment against MacArthur and the US Army in general in the Pacific feeling the Marines did all the heavy lifting....
or just reading books
Again your major beef with MacArthur seem to be the he left the Philippines to Australia. .. fair enough. ...
But do you deny he was given a direct presidential order to do that...
do you also denied as he was the primary force on getting the United States to retake the Philippines as soon as possible instead of bypassing it.
Can’t believe it took so long for someone to mention Rickover. Thanks, thought I was going to have to do it.
“...How do attain “critical skills”??? Time in rate, re-enlistments....”
Those are handled a number of ways that work together.
For critical entry level skills that are having a hard time drawing volunteers there are enlistment bonuses.
Others that have lots of volunteers but are technical with long training requirements they will have required time in service remaining requirements at graduation.
A private is worth a private’s pay. He/She is expected to be proficient at their tasks. To be considered for advancement they need to show the potential of mastering the next skill level. Get promoted, master the tasks, show potential for the next level, get promoted and keep repeating.
It makes no sense to retain a soldier who can only be a good private when you have time in service pay increases. Otherwise you would have a 20 year time in service private earning more pay than a 3 year sergeant.
“..I have several friends and associates, all conservatives, who are pro-draft....”
I don’t think with a 2014 mission, for the active Army, of 57,000 recruits (Reserves another 15,569) - getting a draft will not put much skin in the game for All American.
This web site shows the Army recruiting requirements. It was around 80,000 (active) for a number of years but has been falling the last couple of years down to now 57,000.
http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/apa/goals.htm
Balancing the Pros and Cons I think the Cons outweigh the Pros.
Of course my rants focus on the Philippines — that was MacArthur’s Command. There probably was no hope of holding them, but MacArthur’s incompetence did not help.
If he had listened to Major General Brereton, Commander United States Far East Air Force, he could have eliminated significant portions of that overwhelming Jap force and maintained air superiority. MacArthur’s refusal to allow Brereton’s to attack Japanese air bases on Formosa (Rainbow 5 plan) directly led to the loss of control of the skies over the Philippines.
Instead, he left the planes on the ground to be destroyed. Even the Japanese expressed surprise at how unprepared the bases were. Due to weather delays, they were expecting a significant resistance and a counterattack at Formosa, neither of which MacArthur provided.
His staging the only combat ready Marines on Corregidor, his refusal to implement Rainbow 5 and the unconscionable delay of Operation Orange (Bataan supply and defense) caused what should have been a defensible retreat into the worst defeat ever suffered by American forces. He made those decisions and he is responsible for them.
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