MacArthur’s heroism in WWI cannot be disputed. His actions as a General in WWII were appalling.
People are more complex than movies or histories can ever portray, but facts are stubborn and MacArthur was little more than a publicity-seeking figurehead when he ignominiously left the PI. LT GEN Wainwright may have been forced to surrender, but the defeat can only be attributed to MacArthur. He was an extreme narcissist and a poor general in the field as can be seen by any study of the PI campaign. Finally, his men did not respect him—my determining factor when it comes to command.
I won’t dispute his administrative or political skills in the aftermath. As I said, real life doesn’t always fit our neat boxes.
Your rants about MacArthur seem to.focuse on the Philippines but leave out they has no hope of holding them as the Japanese had overwhelming superior numbers..... and that he was order out by the President
MacArthur men did not respect him?... where to you get that nugget.of wisdom...
have ever spoken directly with any Army veterans that served under him?..
or are you just talking to Marines who harbored a resentment against MacArthur and the US Army in general in the Pacific feeling the Marines did all the heavy lifting....
or just reading books
“His actions as a General in WWII were appalling.”
Utter nonsense. Yes, the man had some serious character flaws, but his actions as a strategic commander were highly effective and produced far fewer casualties then those of Nimitz and Eisenhower.
Furthermore, it was Eisenhower who caused the surrender of Wainwright in the Philippines, and not MacArthur. It was Eisenhower’s recommendation on the war planning staff that President Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff relied upon to withhold further support to the garrison in the Philippines. MacArthur wanted to conduct a forward defensive campaign at the beachheads of the Japanese invasion landings, but he was repeatedly overruled by the war plans staff, especially Eisenhower. In the final case, MacArthur tried to make a last minute change of the war plan and make the forward defense, rather than immediately withdraw into Bataan. It worked so well, the Japanese invaders were very nearly defeated in detail after the landings on Luzon. The decision by Eisenhower and the war plans staff to withhold further attempts to resupply and reinforce MacArthur’s defensive campaign denied the defenders the ammunition needed at the critical moment when the Japanese invaders were all but broken. When the ammunition ran out, the defense began a rapid collapse back into the Bataan defensive positions.
Even after the defense fell back into the Bataan defensive positions, the Japanese invasion forces once again were very nearly defeated by the emaciated defenders of Bataan. In assault after assault on the American defensive lines in Bataan, the Japanese attackers took crippling losses of men and material. The situation grew to desperate proportions to the point where the Japanese discussed sending no further reinforcements of troops or supplies to the Philippines and instead to send them to the attacks upon the Malay Barrier. It was only at the last possible moment the Japanese decided to sen in one more substantial reinforcement to the Philippines, which finally broke Wainwright’s lines for a lack of munitions, food, medicine, and able bodied manpower.
MacArthur got it right, and Eisenhower and his backers were wrong. The same thing happened in Europe, where Patton had it right and Eisenhower, Bradley, Clark, and Hodges too often got it wrong.