I have been following the daily posts by Homer_J_Simpson (ketword worldwarii) in which he posts the New York Times from 70 years ago today and I noticed that in the time from D-Day to present, the Soviets have advanced nearly 150 miles on Warsaw, the Allies have advanced 150 miles on Florence, but the Allies in Normandy have advanced barely 20 miles from the beach. I know that after Patton takes over (a week from today) the allied advance against the Germans in France will be epic. The folks back home must have seen him as heroic, even invincible.
In fairness to all our GI’s in Normandy, the single biggest limiting factor was the Hedgerow country they were fighting in. The boundaries between different farmers’ fields were thickly planted with trees that over the centuries, built up not only thick roots, but stones and excess dirt was piled up along these boundaries to make a sometimes 8 foot high by 8 foot wide wall. The Normandy fields were also quite small. Upon busting through one wall, the troops would find the German machine gun positions imbedded in the next wall 100 yard away, and so on and so on.
By late June, early July of 1944, the GIs devised a cowcatcher like device to put on the front of a Sherman tank that made it like a bulldozer, the pointed end of this device would cut through the roots while the heft of the tank could push the wall down. The German MG 42 bullets would bounce of the tank, and then the tankers could use their machine gun or main gun to destroy the German machine gun nest allowing the infantry to take that field without enormous casualties. This was very effective, but deploying it throughout the theater took time.
By the time we were ready to unleash George Patton, we had broken through most of the most difficult hedgerow country. We had reached the vicinity of St Lo, and the farms here were open, wide fields, excellent terrain for Patton’s tank armies!
I’ve actually driven all over Normandy in the Summer of 1994, 50 years later, and was lucky enough to encounter many groups of Americans who fought then, revisiting for the 50th anniversary as well. Their stories were fabulous, and they told me in many famous places marked as battle sights what went on then. I was quite happy, with my Michelin map of France, as I scouted out the next site, to see a tour bus there that I knew would have those old heroes on it!
I also read Homer J Simpson’s daily posts.
Operation Cobra started on July 25, 1944 (70 years ago tomorrow). 1500 B-17s and B-24s dropped about 3000 tons of bombs with another 1000 tons of bombs and napalm dropped by medium bombers. Some of our own soldiers were killed by bombs falling short because our bombers dropped perpendicular to the road instead of parallel. Cobra allowed Patton’s 3rd Army to breakout across France.
Starting tomorrow (7/25/44) the allies start the carpet bombing of France to facilitate the breakout that Patton would take over.
Not trying to minimize Patton’s role, but the breakout IS coming in bocage.
Must be patient....
The Sherman tank, for all the badmouthing it has taken since that war, was ideally suited for those narrow lanes in villages and between hedgerows in France. Burning gasoline also meant no problems with needing lots of two different kinds of fuel. Of course, they got shut down anyway, as the number of troops and quantity of hardware on the continent ballooned and there were still inadequate port facilities. Patton didn’t like set-piece battles, and Monty practically lived for them. After the remnants of the Afrika corps broke at El Alamein II, Monty (having lost something like 600 various kinds of armored vehicles, against a foe which was depleted to a level known exactly thanks to Ultra intercepts) had no plan for pursuit.
Rommel himself expressed a lot of curiousity about that, to the point of implying that Monty must have been nuts not to have one, and to sit on his ass once the Germans had to run for it. Rearguards waited for the enemy which never came.
Monty wasn’t nuts, he was only good at self-promotion, and liked his predecessor’s battle plan so well he kept it, used it, took the credit for it, and didn’t develop a pursuit plan of his own.