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The Uncertainty Principle was formulated by Bohr's student, Werner Heisenberg working at Bohr's institute in 1926.... That's why it's called the "Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle."

I 'm already aware of this, dear BroJoeK. Unlike his friend Einstein, who mainly worked as a loner (and didn't take much interest in professional scientific journals), Bohr loved collaboration, and surrounded himself with brilliant younger thinkers, such as Heisenberg and Wolfgang Pauli. (Also a young physicist by the name of Abraham Pais was part of this charmed, dynamic circle. It was he who wrote the magisterial biographies of both Einstein and Bohr. From which one can learn a great deal of physics, indeed.)

The Copenhagen Interpretation was a group effort. The "uncertainty" principle was Heisenberg's great contribution. (Which caused Schrödinger to run for the exits.) And my account of Bohr's reservation WRT the term "uncertainty principle" is still correct.

To recap Bohr's critical insight, quoting from Post 1240. (In what follows, I'm inserting [bracketed material] to try to further elucidate my meaning):

Bohr himself did not like the term, “uncertainty principle.” He reasoned: A condition of “uncertainty” could be resolved by the acquisition of further relevant knowledge.

But that would not describe what Bohr found: The “condition” we are trying to describe here cannot in principle be resolved by any further acquisition of knowledge. We are speaking of a limitation on human perception (and thus apperception) itself. Bohr thought the problem is not one of “uncertainty”; it is a problem of [absolute] undecidability. [A sort of "cosmic censorship" principle seems to be at work here....]
An insight further supported by Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem….
A condition of “undecidability” is one in which no matter how much additional knowledge of the world one acquires, one will never be able to answer an “undecidable” question.
So Bohr preferred the term, “undecidability principle.” It did not stick.

You wrote:

...[A]s first pointed out by Aquinas, the super-natural realm is different from the natural realm in that our understandings of super-natural begin with the Bible, while those of nature begin with input from our senses.

I'm just not buying that, BroJoeK. I reason: Our understandings of the "super-natural" arise, not principally from Holy Scripture, but from movements of the apperceptive mind (which may or may not be inspired or influenced by the texts of Holy Scripture). It is considered virtually certain that neither Plato nor Aristotle ever read the Holy Scriptures, or were in cultural contact with Israel or Christianity (the latter did not exist in their time).

And yet Plato's cosmology describes one single, integrated, eternally living cosmos "possessing nous" whose generative cause is the Unknown God "beyond" the cosmos. In other words, the physical (natural world) has a metaphysical (super-natural) origin. Possibly to Plato's mind, it would exhibit a spectacularly beautiful piece of geometry.... [See: Max Tegmark's "Parallel Universes", and check out the section on the Level IV Parallel Universe — which should give you a very good idea about the shelf-life of the Platonist mathematical approach to describing cosmic reality unto this day.]

Aristotle speaks of a Prime Mover, the first uncaused cause of everything that exists in the natural world.

Consider these lines from Eric Voegelin ("On Debate and Existence," 1967):

...There is talk about a first mover of the universe — who must be assumed to be an intellect — from whom emanates somehow an order of being that is at the same time an order of truth. Why should we be concerned with a prime mover and his properties? — you will ask. And does the matter really improve when Aquinas identifies the prime mover with the God of revelation and uses the Aristotelian argument for the prime mover as a demonstration of the existence of God? At the risk of arousing the indignation of convinced Aristotelians and Thomists I must say that I consider such questions quite pertinent. The questions must be raised, for we do no longer live, as did Aristotle and even Aquinas, at the center of a cosmos, moved with all its content by a prime mover, with a chain of aitia, of causes, extending from existent to existent down to the most lowly ones. The symbolism of a closed cosmos, which informs the fundamental concepts of classic and scholastic metaphysics [and also, arguably, Newtonian physics], has been superseded by the universe of modern physics and astronomy.

Nevertheless, if we admit all this, does it follow that Aristotelian and Thomist metaphysics must be thrown on the scrap heap of symbolisms that once had their moment of truth but now have become useless?
You will have anticipated that the answer will be negative. To be sure, a large part of the symbolism has become obsolete, but there is solid core of truth in it that can be, and must be salvaged by means of some surgery.... [I]f we remove from it everything that smacks of cosmological symbolism, there remains as a pièce de résistance the argument that a universe which contains intelligent beings cannot originate with a prima causa that is less than intelligent....
Human existence, it appears, is not opaque to itself, but illuminated by intellect (Aquinas) or nous (Aristotle). This intellect is as much a part of human existence as it is the instrument of its interpretation. In the exegesis of existence intellect discovers itself in the structure of existence; ontologically speaking, human existence has a noetic structure. The intellect discovers itself, furthermore, as a force transcending its own existence; by virtue of the intellect, existence not only is not opaque, but actually reaches out beyond itself in various directions in search of knowledge. Aristotle opens his Metaphysics with the sentence: "All men by nature desire to know."...
With regard to things, the desire to know raises the questions of their origin, both with regard to their existence (I include under this title both the hyletic and kinetic arguments) and their essence (the eidetic argument). In both respects, Aristotle's etiological demonstration arrives ultimately at the eternal, immaterial prima causa as the origin of existent things. [I added some bolds there.]

I just don't see how you can "separate" mind — itself somehow "super-natural" — and sense perception — which seems "natural" enough — the way you seem to want to do. Among other things, mind is the "mill," to which sense perception delivers the "grist."

You act as if you did not know that you yourself are a very model or example of a super-natural/natural composite. Plato knew that the human being is a natural composite of physical (material) body and (noetic) eternal soul. Of death itself, he said: "Death is but the separation of body and soul; nothing more."

Plato believed in physical death right enough. He just also believed that souls are immortal.

Do you really you want me to accept that "super-natural entities" are irrelevant to the conduct of "science?" — science as historically understood, as a process promulgating, pursuing, and fulfilling the natural desire to know of natural human beings?

Must leave it for there for the moment, dear BroJoeK. Thank you so very much for writing!

betty boop: "You act as if you did not know that you yourself are a very model or example of a super-natural/natural composite."

Dear Ms boop: Why do you act as if your reading comprehension were no greater than a small child's?
In fact, I've suggested no such misunderstanding.
I have merely reminded you ad nauseam that the word "science" refers to studies of the natural universe, and that anything outside nature -- anything super-natural, spiritual, teleological, theological, religious, metaphysical, etc. -- those are, by definition, simply non-scientific studies.
Of course, all of those studies have long and distinguished histories, shedding strong lights on truth and Truth.
But they are not natural-science, and should not be confused with science.

Indeed, that's the major point I've been hoping to make in all these hundreds of posts.

betty boop: "Do you really you want me to accept that "super-natural entities" are irrelevant to the conduct of "science?" — science as historically understood, as a process promulgating, pursuing, and fulfilling the natural desire to know of natural human beings?"

Relevant or irrelevant, vital or inconsequential, of all-consuming-importance or of no-importance -- it doesn't matter.
Whatever they are, they are not within the boundaries of natural-science and so cannot be studied as science.
Of course, anyone-anytime-anywhere is free to study and learn as much as they wish about such subjects, and to publish their considered opinions on them -- just so long as they don't call such opinions "science".

Seriously, is that hard for you to "get"?