What makes your point invalid is the absence in the The Venus of any hint whatsoever that C.J. Marshall intended the inclusion of the paragraph from Vattel speaking of "natives" and "indigenes" to represent in any way Marshall's view that such related to the Article II meaning of "natural born citizen." It's not just one small step to get to that conclusion, it's one Giant Leap.
" And C.J. Marshall NEVER says that paragraph from Vattel was adopted or supplies the meaning of the Article II "natural born citizen."
So? Erroneous opinion is not restricted to you.
Huh?? This response is unintelligible. The point remains that you've got one large problem with out-of-context-proof-texting the minute you hold up that paragraph from an international law case about domicile and try to draw inferences from there about the meaning of a municipal law question involving citizenship. As I pointed out to you in my subsequent post (the one you brushed aside), "citizenship" is a matter of domestic (municipal law), not international law. Your confusion on this point is what leads you to make this out-of-context blunder.
As a Delegate, and as someone who worked very closely with James Madison to secure the Ratification of the new Constitution in Virginia, His understanding is tantamount to it being a constitutional term.
And you conclude this, notwithstanding there's not one peep about the Constitution in his opinion.. Riiiiiiiggggghhhhttt. Got it. That wave of the hand that cures all your logical gaps is rather convenient.
I note he isn't citing "Blackstone".
No surprise there. This is an international case, and Vattel was a recognized on authority on international law. Citizenship being a matter of domestic law, one would correspondingly expect when citizenship was THE question in the case, that Blackstone and other authoritites on domestic law would be consulted and Vattel would be ignored.
And that's EXACTLY what happened in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.
No, he's not an actual Authority, but he is the match of anyone your side has put forth so far. Given that his position was unanimous within the court, I would say even more so.
All J. Waite says on the citizenship point is that a person such as Virginia Minor was unquestionably a "'natural born citizen." Hey, I agree with the point. He doesn't purport to answer the question "but is someone who has an alien parent(s) ALSO a "natural born citizen?" That question wasn't before him, and you can't infer an answer from an opinion that manifestly wasn't trying to answer that question.
The words unequivocally support a correct understanding of the topic.
Or more correctly stated, his words, interpreted to apply to a question J. Waite explicitly said he didn't need to answer in that case. support your pre-supposed, question-begging assumption of the "original meaning" of "natural born citizen."
He explicitly says the 14th doesn't cover "natural born citizen"
No, he doesn't. That's a poor paraphrase of what he actually says.
"Native" is redefined by the Wong Court to include those born to Alien Parents, and then you cite the Wong court to "Prove" that "Native" includes born to alien parents. Circular reasoning much?
Here's your question-begging methodology (a species of circular reasoning, Mr. Pot) at work again.
There is no redefining going on, since "native" had never previously been ascribed an exclusive definition. Here's "MvH and WKA for Dummies -- Executive Summary." Pay attention:
1. Minor v. Happersett asked the question "who shall be natural born citizens?" That case involved a person born in the U.S. to citizen parents, and the Court answered that question in the affirmative as to a person in Virginia Minor's situation. That case explicitly declined to answer that question as to person born of alien parents.2. U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark presented the situation which MvH stated it need not address, namely, the birth status of a person born in the U.S. to alien parents. WKA answered that such a person also is both a "native born" and "natural born citizen."
So WKA didn't redefine "native," because prior to WKA that term hadn't been presented or resolved as to person born of alien parents. (It had been at the state court level, e.g., Lynch v. Clarke (which answered that children of aliens are "NBC"), but not at the federal level).
You Also completely ignore that the court Invokes the 14th amendment as the governing law,
Right. The WKA court observes that as to "all white persons, at least" the rule was that children of alien parents born in the U.S. were "native born" citizens. The rule wasn't exactly being applied the same way as to children of black or Chinese parents. The 14th amendment corrected that.
But WKA traces the meaning of "born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction" by noting the common law origins of the phrase:
The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, uses the words "citizen of the United States," and "natural-born citizen of the United States." * * * The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words, either by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except insofar as this is done by the affirmative declaration that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." In this as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.
So, right there (and contrary to your repeated assertion) the Court explicitly links "natural born citizen" with the 14th Amendment 'born in the U.S.' language. And it indicates that the latter (the 14th Amendment) "defines" in part the meaning of the former (natural born citizen)!
The Court then resorts to "first principles" by employing (via Smith v. Alabama) the "Hamiltonian" view of Constitutional interpretation -- find the meaning of terms used by reference to English law:
There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common law of England as adopted by the several States each for itself, applied as its local law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own statutes. . . . There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.
J. Gray then notes (Part II of the opintion) the what I've previously cited from Blackstone:
It thus clearly appears that, by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction of the English Sovereign, and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
Then starting Part III J Gray observes:
The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.
This can ONLY mean (given that shortly after the Court states "natural born subject" and "natural born citizen" to be "precisely analogous" terms) that the prevailing "rule" in the U.S. was that every child born of alien parents was a "natural born citizen." There is no plausible alternative reading here.
In Part IV the Court kicks Vattel and appeal to "international law" to the sidelines as inapposite to the domestic law question of citizenship. (Eventually, you may grasp this point if I repeat it enough.)
In Part V the Court demonstrates how "born in the U.S. . . and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" was a formal incorporation of the common law meaning of "natural born citizen" (same jus soli rule with the same exceptions, save for the addition of the additional case of Native Americans:
The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States" by the addition "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases -- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State -- both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 1, 18b; Cockburn on Nationality, 7; Dicey Conflict of Laws, 177; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 155; 2 Kent Com. 39, 42.
So you are correct that the Court invokes the 14th Amendment as the governing law. But the Court also makes abundantly clear that "born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdition thereof" and "natural born citizen" mean the same thing! So by finding Mr. Wong to be a "citizen" under the 14th Amendment, the Court was indicating him to be a "natural born citizen." Chief Justice Fuller, writing in dissent, grasped this point.
So let fly "arrogant" and the many other bits of invective you hurl whenever your argument is dismantled. I'm right. Deal with it.
Meh.