Meh.
We have at last identified what you can do that will keep me from having to correct your mistakes: don't say anything.
But then you press forward with this comment to TauFood:
Too many people have simply equated the Wong ruling as meaning "Born a citizen = "Natural citizen", when in fact, the Wong decision rests expressly on the power of the 14th amendment.
Tsk. Tsk. And this after I had just set you straight on this point. Happily, my draft with format codes still exists, so it's a simply matter to repeat the lesson for you. Here it is:
************
You Also completely ignore that the court Invokes the 14th amendment as the governing law,
Right. The WKA court observes that as to "all white persons, at least" the rule was that children of alien parents born in the U.S. were "native born" citizens. The rule wasn't exactly being applied the same way as to children of black or Chinese parents. The 14th amendment corrected that.
But WKA traces the meaning of "born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction" by noting the common law origins of the phrase:
The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, uses the words "citizen of the United States," and "natural-born citizen of the United States." * * * The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words, either by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except insofar as this is done by the affirmative declaration that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." In this as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.
So, right there (and contrary to your repeated assertion) the Court explicitly links "natural born citizen" with the 14th Amendment 'born in the U.S.' language. And it indicates that the latter (the 14th Amendment) "defines" in part the meaning of the former (natural born citizen)!
The Court then resorts to "first principles" by employing (via Smith v. Alabama) the "Hamiltonian" view of Constitutional interpretation -- find the meaning of terms used by reference to English law:
There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common law of England as adopted by the several States each for itself, applied as its local law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own statutes. . . . There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.
J. Gray then notes (Part II of the opinion) the what I've previously cited from Blackstone:
It thus clearly appears that, by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction of the English Sovereign, and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
Then starting Part III J Gray observes:
The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.
This can ONLY mean (given that shortly after the Court states "natural born subject" and "natural born citizen" to be "precisely analogous" terms) that the prevailing "rule" in the U.S. was that every child born of alien parents was a "natural born citizen." There is no plausible alternative reading here.
In Part IV the Court kicks Vattel and appeal to "international law" to the sidelines as inapposite to the domestic law question of citizenship.
In Part V the Court demonstrates how "born in the U.S. . . and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" was a formal incorporation of the common law meaning of "natural born citizen" (same jus soli rule with the same exceptions, save for the addition of the additional case of Native Americans:
The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States" by the addition "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases -- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State -- both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 1, 18b; Cockburn on Nationality, 7; Dicey Conflict of Laws, 177; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 155; 2 Kent Com. 39, 42.
So you are correct that the Court invokes the 14th Amendment as the governing law. But the Court also makes abundantly clear that "born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and "natural born citizen" mean the same thing!
**************
So the following propositions are easily demonstrated in the text of WKA:
1. The 14th Amendment in part "defines" the meaning of the original terms "citizen" and "natural born citizen."2. The 14th Amendment language "born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" incorporates the American common law meaning of "natural born citizen," which in turn followed the same rule which had prevailed in England: that every child born of alien parents was "natural born."
3. The decision of the case (that Mr. Wong was a citizen under the "born in" clause of the 14th Amendment) means ipso facto that he was thus a "natural born citizen" under the original constitution, since "natural born citizen" and "born in . . the U.S., and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the Court's analysis mean the same thing.
So, yes, the decision "rests expressly on the power of the 14th Amendment," but the 14th Amendment in turn is a statutory and Constitutional incorporation of the common law meaning of "natural born citizen." This is why every court that has been presented with the argument that President Obama is ineligible because of his father has rejected it. (And why every court will do the same if that claim is pressed as to Rubio or Jindal). I realize denialism runs deep in you, but the language and import of the opinion is inescapable.