Posted on 03/20/2013 9:57:49 AM PDT by mnehring
Zo has strong words for neo-confederate libertarians, especially those who infiltrated the CPAC conference. He reminds viewers why some libertarians have no place in the conservative movement, and why Republicans should embrace the vision of Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass.
(Video at link)
(Excerpt) Read more at pjtv.com ...
Sure, Lincoln was brand new at the job, but he did order the USS Powhatan returned to the Fort Sumter mission.
The important point here remains that Confederates (and you?) apparently see this as adequate excuse to start Civil War.
I'm saying that's because some excuse was all they really wanted.
That's the important point.
Lincoln's policy then was to delay and delay as long as possible, in hopes (futile as it turned out) that Southern Unionists would exert pressure on Confederates to rejoin the Union.
In the mean time, he intended to hold onto those few Federal properties still under Union control -- Sumter and Pickens.
But there was no way to hold Sumter beyond April 15 without resupplying it, and so that's what Lincoln attempted, and notified South Carolina Governor Pickens on, April 6.
Kettel lived and wrote when?
Book published in 1858. It’s an extended triumphalist apologia for the South. Lots of interesting statistics, though.
You said: “This is an act of the Confederate Congress.
It does “recognize” war with the United States.
It authorizes acts of war against the United States.
Yes, but there is no vote of the Confederate Congress declaring war.
Say what you will, you have no fact.
Now, you can rag on about this idea if you want.
You did not read Rustbucket data:
Month ... % change from 1860 to 1861
Feb ..... -15.6
Mar ..... -22.8
Apr ..... -12.3
May ..... -11.5
Jun ..... -34.0
Jul ..... -40.0
Aug ..... -65.7
Sep ..... -55.1
Fifty to Sixty per cent drops cannot be passed off as normal fluctuations.
Next, it was the tariff/trade derivitives that jeopardized Northern ports. Gold was already flowing South after Morrill passed the house and just before secession. Credit resolution was in jeopardy due to the politicians in Washington.
Read this comment: "In 1860,...the secession crisis was reflected in a business panic," wrote historian James A. Rawley. "The stock market fell, New York merchants found difficulty in collecting bills in the South, and gold began to flow to Southern ports. It was estimated that $3,500,00 in gold moved in ten days. New Yorkers engaged in Southern trade feared debt repudiation; by November 14 panic had set in and business failures began. Found here
You then said: "Second, Republican policy was to reduce imports and encourage domestic production through use of higher protective Morrill Tariff rates. So Lincoln could not "start war" just because Republican policy succeeded!"
Do you realize how utterly stupid that comment is....with all due respect. I would suggest you go backward about 25 posts and read the commentary of the newspapers, businessmen, and politicians....all of whom realized the meaning of the Confederate Tariff rates relative to Morrill.
I'd also call him a mercantilist, since he apparently believes that currency and bullion are more important than the goods and services for which they are exchanged in the real economy. That's a little more controversial -- some people see "mercantilism" as opposition to free trade and free markets and assume that anyone so friendly to slaveowning plantation economies can't be opposed to free trade and free markets -- but these labels are more or less metaphors since different people living at different times don't subscribe to the exact same ideologies.
See Stephen Colwell's Five Cotton States and New York for a rebuttal of Kettell's main argument.
A ridiculous semantic distinction with no practical, legal or logical significance.
In the mean time, no Confederate soldier was killed in battle with any US force, and no Union army "invaded" any Confederate state.
OK, let's look at them one-by-one:
The first seven Deep South secessions were all about slavery, and nothing else of any importance.
At that same time the Upper South (Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas) refused to secede just to protect slavery, but later felt compelled to secede -- after Fort Sumter -- when the issue became which side would they chose in war: slave or free?
He (or she) was going on his or her own rage. I guess a lot of people felt the same way, so the prediction turned out to be true. If you weren't on the scene and didn't feel all that rage (or didn't want to believe it existed) your view of the situation might be different.
One could perhaps judge what the South would do based on what they had already done.
Then they would have fired on the ship (or tried to stop it in someway or parlayed with Anderson). They hadn't fired on the fort yet, or tried to reduce it to rubble, so one assumption might be that they wouldn't do so this time.
It appeared from his inaugural speech that that Lincoln would have been satisfied and wouldn't send obnoxious strangers down South if he could have all the tariff revenue from imports to the South, hold the forts the Union still held, and possibly reoccupy those taken by the South. His inaugural speech words were somewhat ambiguous and unclear about forts already taken by the South. Perhaps he simply wanted Union troops in those forts throughout the South which would basically make the South a military-occupied province. This was perhaps a step down from the colony status the South had held for years with respect to the extraction of Southern wealth via the tariff.
1) The federal government was hardly going to be able to collect tariffs without the ports. My own supposition is that tariffs, like the mails were one of the few ways that the federal government interacted with citizens. If Lincoln were going to maintain the pretext that the union was undivided, then tariffs, mail, and forts were what he'd have to talk about, so that's what he talked about. Tariff collection could provide a pretext for a blockade, though. That may not have been on Lincoln's mind, but it was a logical step for the future.
2) Does Guantanamo make Cuba our militarily-occupied province? Does Gibraltar make Spain a militarily-occupied province of Britain? Did Hong Kong make China a militarily-occupied province of Britain? Maybe, maybe not.
Maybe those are difficult questions. But having two forts, one near Charleston and the other near Pensacola and two further out off the Florida coast wouldn't have made the Confederacy anyone's militarily-occupied province. Leave all the emotionality aside for a minute: a fort or base or two was a pittance to pay for independence if that's what was desired.
Think of the context here. Davis wanted Maryland. Some Marylanders agreed. What would that have done to Washington, DC. Or even Philadelphia? And if all of Virginia had seceded: what would it have meant to have rebel troops less than 150 miles from Lake Erie, poised to cut the United States in half?
3) The South was a colony? Maybe. To the extent that they didn't develop their own industries and had to rely on others to supply them with finished goods. But Southern planters wanted that kind of colonial dependence. The notion that the South payed the lion's share of tariffs is a lot more dubious. Southerners did produce much of America's exports -- I guess we're talking about slaves, here. But it's not clear that they bought most of America's imports, which are what was taxed.
If Lincoln thought the South wouldn't fire, then he badly misjudged the attitude of the South and South Carolina. However, I don’t think he misjudged the South at all – he wasn't stupid – he expected the South to fight.
One argument is that war was inevitable -- that we were already at war -- and Lincoln just wanted to make sure that the rebels fired the first shot. That's a little different from saying that he "tricked" or "forced" the enemy into firing first. The secessionist leaders did have free will after all. On the other hand, it's well documented that Lincoln thought that unionist sentiment in the South was stronger than it was, and that cooler heads might prevail. I think you have to look at the other side. If somebody says you won't have a war unless you start it yourself, and you start a war, talk about being manipulated into it is beside the point.
The idea that the Confederates were tricked or forced into war goes back to Davis and Stephens. Probably it goes back further, but if I'm not mistaken you find it expressed in their interminable books in very similar language. In their version they are principled and passive and only reacting to events, and Lincoln is unprincipled, active, and initiating the events that the rebels can only react to. He has free-will and they are slaves of circumstance. But come on, Lincoln did have principles. You might not agree with them, but he did have them. And Lincoln was as much reacting to events as creating them, as much a creature of circumstances created by others as a molder of them.
But there was no way to hold Sumter beyond April 15 without resupplying it, and so that's what Lincoln attempted, and notified South Carolina Governor Pickens on, April 6.
I hope you aren't still using that discredited almanac you've used before for "facts" about the war. April 6? Try this online source: April 8
Oh, and why on March 5, the day after his inauguration, did Lincoln secretly start trying to reinforce Fort Pickens and break the truce without informing the other side, possibly beginning the war there like Adams and Meigs said? Was Fort Pickens running out of food like Sumter?
How do we separate the effects of the Morrill tariff from the general effects of the secession crisis? Surely the prospect of national collapse could also have effected trade.
And what is the Collector of the Port of New York doing writing to newspapers whether in New York or in Memphis?
Would that be the old collector who was a pro-Breckenridge DNC chairman, or the new one, and abolitionist who was married to Lewis Tappan's daughter?
Anyway, some have said that the country teetered on a fiscal cliff in 1861, not so much due to the Morrill tariff, as to Buchanan's mismanagement. The original rise in tariff rates (lower than what they eventually became) was, perhaps misguidedly, intended to remedy the situation.
FWIW, most of the collectors are biographed on Wikipedia. I did not know that Chester A. Arthur held the post. Rutherford B. Hayes got rid of him and tried to replace him with Theodore Roosevelt's father, but Roscoe Conkling, Arthur's patron, killed the nomination.
With respect to Virginius, didn't the authors of the Federalist Papers and some who wrote opposition papers often called the Anti-Federalist Papers use pseudonyms? And who could forget all the pseudonyms that posters use on FreeRepublic? Virginius could have been a well connected individual, possibly one with ties to Virginia.
Anyway, some have said that the country teetered on a fiscal cliff in 1861, not so much due to the Morrill tariff, as to Buchanan's mismanagement. The original rise in tariff rates (lower than what they eventually became) was, perhaps misguidedly, intended to remedy the situation.
Interesting comment about Buchanan. You've reminded me about a series of FreeRepublic posts about the US public debt under Buchanan and in particular in the 1860-1861 Congress. The posts I remember point out that under Buchanan the tariff revenue dropped due to a recession but the government persisted in spending far more than it took in. Government debt stood at roughly 29 million dollars in 1857. It rose steadily to about 70 million dollars in 1860. But under huge spending increases proposed by Congress in 1860-61, government debt would become 250 million dollars, some 8 to 9 times what the debt was four years earlier. Since they apparently couldn't control spending, they decided to substantially increase taxes.
That somehow sounds familiar. Mismanagement, you call it?
Here is a link to the old posts that testify to Buchanan's and Congress's fiscal mismanagement: See Posts 484, 485, 488, 490
Many posts recently have referred to the Morrill Tariff. Here is a link for everyone to the terms of that tariff: Morrill Tariff
That data makes very good sense. Each jyear, part of the imports from overseas were sold South. That amount in 1859 was $106,000,000. The amount of Northern and Western productions sold south for the same year was $240,000,000. See page 74, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, 1860.
Regarding your comment: "Indeed, basic economic facts ...Union states....accounted for 80 to 90% of the country's totals.
Not germaine to this discussion nor accurate.
Your comment: "the North's manufacturing and trade economy was not destroyed by embargos, blockade or war."
Not relevant.
Your comment: "You cite no source for these numbers, and they appear very dubious. What exactly do they represent?"
I did cite the source, if you will take the time to read it. And it will make sense to you too.
My comment: "But it neither raised its own food nor its own raw materials, nor did it furnish freights for its own shipping"
You said: "You are obviously very confused. Those words apply to the South, not the North. The North was self-sufficient in virtually every respect, except its need for Southern cotton, and even that, as it happened, could be done without."
If that were true, then why did the Northeastern states import such large amounts of food each year?
Of course I read them.
You did not record that in January 1861 imports rose 23.5% which means that as of April (end of March report) year-to-date imports were down overall about 15%.
That does not sound to me like "panic time", especially since the whole idea of a protectionist Morrill Tariff was to increase US manufacturing and reduce foreign imports.
Sure, by August, imports were down 50% & more, but that was well after war began, in April 1861.
PeaRidge: "Read this comment: 'In 1860,...the secession crisis was reflected in a business panic,' wrote historian James A. Rawley."
Your link refers to events after the election on November 6, 1860, which certainly had nothing to do with the Morrill Tariff.
But what rusty's numbers show is that this November 1860 "secession crisis" on Wall Street did not really hit Main Street imports until well into 1861.
But if you are just trying to make the simple point that New Yorkers were upset and afraid of consequences from Deep South secession, then of course, you're correct in that.
Was there something else you want to add?
PeaRidge: "Do you realize how utterly stupid that comment is....with all due respect.
I would suggest you go backward about 25 posts and read the commentary of the newspapers, businessmen, and politicians....all of whom realized the meaning of the Confederate Tariff rates relative to Morrill."
With all due respect...
Do you realize how "utterly stupid" it is to assume that 1860 era Republicans were overly concerned with opinions of their Northern Democrat countrymen?
The simple facts here are that protectionist Morrill Tariff passed the House in 1860 because Republicans wanted it, and neither Southerners nor Northern Democrats were solidly opposed.
But Morrill was not finally passed and signed into law until March 1861, and is not mentioned in any official secessionist document.
Sure, doubtless there were disruptions in the period after November 1860, but how much was caused by fears of secession resulting in financial disruptions, how much by fears of war, then by actual war's blockade, embargo and disruptions, and how much by the effects from Morrill's rise in tariffs, I doubt if we can say.
But none of this, imho, was the main concern on Lincoln's mind after inauguration on March 4, 1861.
What Lincoln was hoping to do then was preserve as much of the Union as possible, while maintaining peace, if possible.
Failing that, then Lincoln wanted to make certain that if war came, it was started by Confederates.
So Morrill was not the driving force.
All my sources, including this one, say that Lincoln sent the message to South Carolina Governor Pickens on April 6, some say delivered April 8 by US State Department clerk, Robert S. Chew:
They also say that in response, by April 8 Confederates were making final preparations to assault Fort Sumter, and on April 9, Davis' cabinet endorsed his orders to capture Sumter before the resupply could arrive.
Your source for this data is what?
Your post #382 makes no sense where it says:
PeaRidge: "Not germaine to this discussion nor accurate."
Not responsive.
PeaRidge: "Not relevant."
Not responsive.
PeaRidge: "I did cite the source, if you will take the time to read it."
Not responsive. You cited no source for the numbers, much less a link. They make no sense as is.
PeaRidge: "If that were true, then why did the Northeastern states import such large amounts of food each year?"
Re-read my post #415.
Again, your problem is: you reduced "The North" to just the Northeastern states, and expanded "The South" to include not only Upper South but also Border States of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland and Delaware.
In actual fact, when push came to shove, "The North" included not only Northeastern states, but also Middle-Atlantic, Mid-Western, Northwestern, Far West and those Border States.
So, "The North" accounted for 80% of the free-white population, 80% to 90% of industry and was, for all intents and purposes economically self-sufficient.
Of course, I'm not saying "The South" wasn't important economically -- since it accounted for the majority of the nation's exports -- only that it's just as wrong to over-state as under-state "The South's" importance.
Indeed, this was a lesson secessionists learned the hard way in 1861 when they embargoed cotton shipments to Europe, expecting that would help them to "win friends and influence people" there.
It didn't.
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