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Posted on 01/29/2011 1:21:21 PM PST by robowombat
Army The birth of Egyptian civilization on the Nile was fashioned in war, and the kingdom of the Pharaohs was maintained by military force. Over an astonishing history dating back more than five thousand years, Egypt maintained an advanced and relevant military force. In different historical stages, Egypt alway scame to prove itself as a dominant military force in the region that acquired all the characteristics of a great military power.
The army has always been the largest and most important branch of the armed forces. During each of the wars with Israel, the army had demonstrated weaknesses in command relationships and communications. Under the influence of Soviet military doctrine, higher commanders had been reluctant to extend operational flexibility to brigade and battalion commanders. Rigidity in planning was another shortcoming. Commanders reacted slowly in battlefield situations; the system did not encourage initiative among frontline officers.
The first time electronic warfare was used in the Middle East was in 1960 when the Egyptian Army moved five entire divisions into Sinai under the cloak of signal silence, completely surprising Israeli intelligence monitors who remained unaware of the big operation. Israeli intelligence has been haunted by that operation ever since, investing huge amounts of money in sophisticated signals intelligence equipment, much of it locally developed to solve the problem.
The wreckage of Egyptian columns caught by Israeli aircraft in the Mitla Pass and soldiers throwing their boots away and fleeing into the desert in 1967 are remarkable similar to the scenes of the Iraqi Army in defeat in 1991. Both ground campaigns were brief, lasting approximately 100 hours, and both left similar questions over the ability of Arab armies to cope with the modern battlefield. Prior to the June 1967 War and the Gulf War, the Egyptian and Iraqi armies were rapidly expanded without the time for any meaningful training to take place or the establishment of internal unit cohesion. This expansion seemed to be more of a political statement than a reasoned military response. In the case of both wars, the Iraqis and Egyptians entered into them carried more by emotion and faith in big numbers tan with a carefully crafted plan.
The stunning Israeli success in 1967 stemmed in part from a unique set of Egyptian failings, in large measure self-inflicted. In the three weeks prior to the war, the Egyptians changed their war plans, command structure, senior personnel, and troop deployments in ways that undermined their army's ability to fight against a powerful foe. Consequently, widespread confusion resulted throughout the Egyptian Armed Forces so that by the eve of the conflict, the senior military leadership concerned itself more about events in Cairo than those in Tel Aviv. To unravel the sinews of a vulnerable Egyptian senior command, the IDF needed only to launch a bold and imaginative campaign that seized key terrain at the outset of war and threatened a penetration into the Egyptian operational depth.
The results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War presented another image of the Arab soldier. Prior to the October 1973 War, the army made many improvements in the way it prepared officers for combat. Moreover, the complex planning that preceded the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the execution of the initial attack demonstrated a high level of military competence. The Egyptians surprised the Israelis by not only being able to cross the Suez Canal, in broad daylight, but also by withstanding Israeli armor counterattacks using infantry armed with ATGMs and RPGs. The innovative engineering techniques used by the Egyptians allowed them to quickly breach the 60-foot sand berm built on the bank of the canal and move heavy armored formations across the 100-meter wide Suez Canal. Although the Egyptians would later have their bridgehead int he Sinai flanked by the Israelis and the Third Army's bridgehead in danger of being cutoff, the improvement in combat efficiency between the army of 1967 and the one of 1973 made for an interesting case study in a Arab army's ability to adapt.
Appointment of a charismatic and dynamic leader prepared the army for the retaking of the Sinai: LTG Saad El Shazly was appointed as Chief of Staff to the General Headquarters. LTG Shazly focused a great deal of effort on rebuilding the trust between officers an soldiers and laid particular emphasis on ensuring his subordinate commanders trained and developed the individual soldier; he than constantly moved among his subordinate units checking on progress. Tough realistic training with numerous live-fire exercises and extensive use of training simulators, particularly for the SAGGER ATG gunners; soldiers were encouraged to offer suggestions for improvements in techniques and equipment; one imaginative suggestion, provided by a junior officer, critical to the initial success of the operation was the use of fire hoses and high-pressure water pumps to breach the sand berm along the Suez Canal.
The Army undertook an objective assessment of the weaknesses associated with the army vis-a-vis the capabilities of the Israelis and modifying plans and training accordingly. The key component of the initial successes of the Egyptian Army was not based on technology but rather on the efforts of well-trained and motivated soldiers. Subsequent failure occurred when the Egyptians were unable to adapt to changing battlefield circumstances. They had planned for the Canal crossing, but were not properly prepared to exploit their success. When Israel launched its counterattack, the Egyptian high command reacted with hesitation and confusion, enabling Israel to gain the initiative in spite of determined Egyptian resistance.
Decision making in the army continued to be highly centralized during the 1980s. Officers below brigade level rarely made tactical decisions and required the approval of higher-ranking authorities before they modified any operations. Senior army officers were aware of this situation and began taking steps to encourage initiative at the lower levels of command.
A shortage of well-trained enlisted personnel became a serious problem for the army as it adopted increasingly complex weapons systems. Observers estimated in 1986 that 75 percent of all conscripts were illiterate when they entered the military and therefore faced serious obstacles when trying to learn how to use high-technology weaponry. Soldiers who had acquired even the most basic technical skills were eager to leave the army as soon as possible in search of higher-paying positions in the civilian sector. By United States standards, the army underutilized its noncommissioned officers (NCOs), many of whom were soldiers who had served a long time but had not shown any special aptitude. Officers with ranks as high as major often conducted training that would be carried out by NCOs in a Western army. In a move to retain welltrained NCOs, the army in the 1980s started providing career enlisted men with higher pay, more amenities, and improved living conditions.
By 2010 the Egyptian Army was implementing changes to the Officer Education System to improve the preparation of field grade officers (Majors andLieutenant Colonels) in planning and executing full spectrum operations at the tactical and operational level.
Order of Battle Until the late 1970s, the Egyptian army comprised 10 divisions, half of them mechanized or armored. The army had an estimated strength of 320,000 in 1989. About 180,000 of these were conscripts. Before the June 1967 War, the army divided its personnel into four regional commands. After the 1967 debacle, the army was reorganized into two field armies--the Second Army and the Third Army, both of which were stationed in the eastern part of the country. Most of the remaining troops were stationed in the Nile Delta region, around the upper Nile, and along the Libyan border. These troops were organized into eight military districts. Commandos and paratroop units were stationed near Cairo under central control but could be transferred quickly to one of the field armies if needed. District commanders, who generally held the rank of major general, maintained liaisons with governors and other civil authorities on matters of domestic security.
The army's principal tactical formations in 1988 were believed to include four armored divisions (each with two armored brigades and one mechanized brigade); six mechanized infantry divisions (each with two mechanized brigades and one armored brigade); and two infantry divisions (each with two infantry brigades and one mechanized brigade). Independent brigades included four infantry brigades, three mechanized brigades, one armored brigade, two air mobile brigades, one paratroop brigade, and the Republican Guard armored brigade. These brigades were augmented by two heavy mortar brigades, fourteen artillery brigades, two surface-to-surface missile (SSM) regiments, and seven commando groups. Each consisted of about 1,000 men.
As of 1989, an estimated five of the twelve divisions and portions of other units had made the transition to American equipment and order of battle. By the late 1990s the army had 12 divisions, all but one either mechanized or armored, and at that time planned to field a completely mechanized army by 2005. The Egyptian army was a modern mechanized military that can move with speed and firepower equal to that of most modern armies.
Although disposition of the forces was secret, foreign military observers estimated in the late 1980s that five Egyptian divisions were in camps west of the Suez Canal while half a division was in Sinai. The Second Army was responsible for the area from the Mediterranean Sea to a point south of Ismailia; the Third Army was responsible from that point southward to the Red Sea. The government deployed the armies in this way partly because of a desire to protect the canal and the capital from a potential Israeli invasion and partly because the housing facilities and installations for the two armies had long been located in these areas. The commander of the Western District controlled armored forces supplemented by commando, artillery, and air defense units (possibly totaling the equivalent of a reinforced division) that were stationed at coastal towns in the west and in the Western Desert (also known as the Libyan Desert) facing Libya.
The London-based Sunday Times newspaper said on 12 August 2001, that Egypt was considering sending its Third Army into the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula. The newspaper, quoting a senior Egyptian security source, said that the Egyptian Government would send in the army if Israel moved into Palestinian territories. President Mubarak had come under increasing pressure to help the Palestinians, the paper said. A Third Army exercise took place east of Cairo in September 2001. Israeli security sources said the prospect of an Egyptian military intervention is being considered. They told the Times that an Egyptian invasion of the Sinai would be regarded as a violation of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. In early September 2001, Egypt’s Third Field Army held a major exercise near the Suez Canal. The exercise was meant to train the military to repel any attack from Israel.
The Frontier Corps, a lightly armed paramilitary unit of about 12,000 men, mostly beduins, was responsible for border surveillance, general peacekeeping, drug interdiction, and prevention of smuggling. In the late 1980s, the army equipped this force with remote sensors, night-vision binoculars, communications vehicles, and high-speed motorboats.
Units HQ, Operations Authority: Cairo HQ, Second Field Army: Ismaelia HQ, Third Field Army: Suez HQ, Western Military Region: Sidi Buraimi HQ. Central Military Region: Cairo HQ, Northern Military Region: Alexandria HQ, Southern Military Region: Assiut 4 armored divisions (each consisting of 2 armored brigade and 1 mechanized brigade, and 1 artillery brigade). 8 mechanized infantry divisions (each consisting of 1 armored brigade, 2 mechanized brigades, and 1 artillery brigade). 1 Republican Guard Armored Brigade. 4 independent armored brigades. 2 independent infantry brigades. 1 airmobile brigades. 1 airborne brigade. 6 commando groups. 15 independent artillery brigades. 2 heavy mortar brigades. 6 ATGW brigades. 2 SSM brigades Army Equipment - Introduction Even though the Egyptian military became oriented toward the West after the October 1973 War, it still had large amounts of Soviet equipment in its arms inventory. In the 1970s, the Egyptian armored corps was comprised almost exclusively of Soviet tanks, the best of which was the T-62. In the 1980s, the stock of main battle tanks consisted of 785 M60A3s from the United States, together with more than 1,600 Soviet-made T-54, T-55, and T-62 models. Some of these older Soviet tanks were being refitted in the West with 105mm guns, diesel engines, fire-control systems, and external armor. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) consisted of 1,000 M-113A2s from the United States, more than 1,000 BTR-50s and OT-62s from the Soviet Union, and about 200 Fahds, which were manufactured in Egypt based on a design from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The army also had more than 700 infantry combat vehicles that were manufactured by the Soviet Union and Spain. Egypt also launched a program to increase the mobility of artillery and rockets by mounting them on the chassis of tanks and APCs.
By the late 1990s the mechanized divisions consisted of 4,500 armored personnel carriers, the core of which was 2,000 US M113's. In the late 1990s Egypt took delivery of 611 Dutch YPR-765 armored infantry fighting vehicles to replace its BMPs. By the late 1990s, Egypt's armored corps was comprised of the most modern US tanks. Cairo acquired 850 M60A3s, and formed two armored divisions. After the Gulf War, under the 'Factory 200' program Egypt began to assemble the US-made M1A1, widely regarded as one of the finest tanks in the world. By the late 1990s Egypt had 1,700 M60's (1,100 M60A3's), and approximately 200 M1A1's in addition to approximately 1,600 Soviet tanks. At that time Egypt planned to upgrade all M60A1 tanks to the A3 standard. Additionally, Egypt expanded domestic production of military armaments.
The M1A1 'Factory 200' program was a major milestone in Egyptian efforts to achieve limited military self-sufficiency. Egypt obtained US approval in 1984 to build a giant factory to produce new tanks. Under the agreement, the Egyptians will assemble 524 M1A1 tanks and officials hope that will eventually rise to 1,500 tanks. Six production cycles were established with each increment increasing the level of technology from General Dynamics Land Systems. The cost was estimated at $3.2 billion. The Egyptians produced the 120-mm cannon as well as an increasing number of parts for the tank. Egyptian officials said the goal was to make Cairo self-sufficient in tank production. Egypt substantially improved its anti-tank capability with the acquisition of 500 TOW-2 missiles and its intention to buy 540 TOW launchers. The army possessed a variety of antitank rockets and missiles, including older Soviet models, Egyptian rocket systems derived from the Soviet ones, and Milan missiles from France, Swingfire missiles produced in Egypt under British license, and TOW (tube-launched, optically sighted, wire-guided) missiles from the United States. The army mounted the TOWs and Swingfires on locally built jeeps. A plan to add TOWs to Fahd APCs was still at the prototype stage.
During the 1980s, the armed forces implemented a program to improve the quality and efficiency of its defense system by introducing modern armaments while reducing the number of personnel. The army was expected to lose more personnel than the other branches of the military. The army, however, had little incentive to cut its enlisted strength because doing so would further reduce the need for officers, who were already in excess of available positions. Moreover, service in the army helped relieve the nation's unemployment situation and provided some soldiers with vocational training. Nevertheless, plans called for a reduction in army strength by as much as 25 percent.
The 1991 Gulf War, in which Iraqi equipment, several generations newer than Egypt’s Soviet equipment, was badly outclassed by Western types, convinced the Egyptian military that it must devote more effort to replacement than upgrading of old equipment. The arms reductions following the CFE treaty and the end of the Cold War provided the means. Talk of upgrading T-55 MBTs gave way to scrapping them, one-for-one, as surplus US Army M-60s were acquired and converted to M-60A3 standard. Even so, while some 700 M-60s had been acquired by mid-1992, updating fell behind schedule and more than half the Army’s equipment was still of Eastern origin. A replacement APC, able to keep up with M1A1, was the main priority. It was announced in October 1992, that major purchases of new US military equipment would be postponed until 1997 or later.
dictators have never liked having a too-powerful air force because one disloyal pilot....
Great...
They have 900 plus M1A1’s.
The Egyptians moved SAM missiles right up to the canal so that when the Israeli fighters came in, they were sitting ducks. The Israelis always regretted defending the Suez forts instead of immediately hauling back and getting out of range of those damned AA missiles.
The innovative engineering techniques used by the Egyptians allowed them to quickly breach the 60-foot sand berm built on the bank of the canal and move heavy armored formations across the 100-meter wide Suez Canal.
They used water cannon to eat huge gaps in the embankments. Pretty savvy.
I guess all that foreign aid adds up. Yikes.
Will this potent arsenal soon fall under the control of The Muslim Brotherhood or Huzbullah?
If you’d like to be on or off, please FR mail me.
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