Depends on how much warning & the state of the boilers on battleship row. It ain't like today with gas turbine engines. You don't flip a switch & get immediate full power. You had to 'raise steam' before you could really get underway.
IIRC, only Nevada was able to make a break for it. I don't know that any of the other battleships were anywhere near ready to cast off.
Then you have the problem of where to rally the fleet, and under what protection. The Army Air Forces probably would have been of little value outside of the immediate harbor area. A coordinated air defense between Army fighters & Navy ships? Remember what happened when Army transport planes ferrying part of the 82nd Airborne overflew the Sicily invasion fleet (1943) -- they got wasted by their own Navy's AA guns.
For example, Kahn 1967 text The Codebreakers - The Story of Secret Writing has "... Cavite (sic Corregidor) was spottily reading JN25 messages ..."
NSA historians Gish and Parker each say "some" meassages were read, you might excuse "schedules" as intelligence - I, for one, would not.
Another example, Safford, in his Exhibit No. 151, has the US exchanging technical information and "translations" with the British. That is, translations of Japanese into English.
Wilford has STATION CAST establishing a section to link "C.I." and "R.I." materials together, ...
The above are just from American sources; the British and Australian Archives also have relevant matterials.
Here is a lengthy selection of quotes from Stinnett, starting on page 142. Lieutennant Commander Rochefort was the commander of Hawaii's station HYPO, the combat intelligence center for the Pacific Fleet. Ambassador Grew was US Ambassador in Tokyo. All emphasis below is mine:
"By October 8, Rochefort's operations were on the highest priority -- the scoop watch. It produced two results within two weeks, when Rochefort's cryptographers discovered the scope of an emerging Japanese two-pronged military strategy. (1) the Southeast Asia Invasion and (2), the screening maneuver involving air forces in the North and Central Pacific that became the Pearl Harbor raid..."By the next day, October 22, Rochefort had discovered the formation of a separate Japanese air operation that he said was focused on the Kurile Islands and would extend eastward and south over a vast area of the North and Central Pacific..."
"Major collateral evidence concerning Japanese plans for hostile action came from Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo... 'War with the United States may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness,' was the closing sentence of a lengthy report sent by Grew to Secretary of State Cordell Hull the next day..."
[Grew's aide made a tour near a Japanese naval concentration area.]
"Soon after the attache and his wife returned, Ambassador Grew sent a much stronger warning to Washington...""When Rochefort's estimates and Grew's warnings were received by Washington they triggered another astonishing event. Navy officials declared the North Pacific Ocean a "Vacant Sea" and ordered all US and allied shipping out of the waters.
Rear Admiral Richmond K Turner, War Plans officer for the United States Navy in 1941, explained the reasoning with a startling admission: "We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed that war was imminent. We sent the traffic down via Torres Straight so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic"...
The Vacant Sea order dramatizes Admiral Kimmel's helplessness in the face of FDR's desires. The admiral tried on a number of occasions to do something to defend Pearl Harbor, based on Rochefort's troubling intercepts.
"Exactly two weeks prior to the attack, Kimmel ordered a search for a Japanese carrier force north of Hawaii. Without White House approval he moved the Pacific Fleet into the North Pacific Ocean in the precise area where Japan planned to launch her carrier attack on Pearl Harbor.
"But his laudable efforts came to naught. When the White House military officials learned Kimmel's warships were in the area of what turned out to be the intended Japanese launch site, they issued directives that caused Kimmel to quickly order the Pacfific Fleet out of the North Pacific and back to its anchorages in Pearl Harbor.
"This unfortunate reversal of direction has been ignored by every Pearl Harbor investigation...
The Washington justification for these actions was as clear as it was brutal:
From Admiral Stark (Washington) 11/28/41: "IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT."