[freedumb2003]

And yet Newtonian science has not been "replaced" by a "better" theory. It continues to be the best description we have of Nature when the phenomena under observation are so little affected by relativistic and quantum effects that such effects are for all practical purposes negligible. E.g., the trajectory of an apple falling from a tree is not observably affected by relativity and quantum effects. Though they are still present, the extremely high velocities involved in relativistic effects, and the extreme smallness and indeterminacy of quantum "objects" are typically not necessary considerations in describing the gravitational motion, to a sufficient degree of accuracy, of a falling apple in the "macroworld" of the Newtonian paradigm..

I am speaking of the Einsteinien "replacement" of Newtonian physics. As I said, when the new theory replaced the older, the underlying events did not magically disappear, and the replacement theory did account for all known facts and events. You accurately pick up on the nuances.

Now, post-relativity and quantum theory, the Newtonian science of motion and mechanics is widely regarded as a "'special case" of a more general description of nature which has its root in the quantum world. Yet for all practical purposes, it continues to serve as our "trusty friend."

Well stated, BB. A "larger" theory or "super theory" certainly stepped in and was eventually embraced by science -- using the scientific tools which we use now.

I am truly pleased that you note that Newtonian Physics wasn't really "replaced" but it is close enough to make my point. F=ma applies across the board for most situations and almost all we encounter on the planet Earth (again, using an example). Obviously I need an example of a Scientific Theory that was usurped by another to note the downstream effects and the ability of science to accommodate new information.

Something similar may eventually happen with Darwin's theory. (I wouldn't rule it out in principle.) It may end up being a "special case" of a more general and universal description of Nature. To the extent that Nature itself increasingly gives evidence of being "informed" in some fashion, and given the fact that Darwin's theory is incapable (evidently) of dealing with the problems of life and consciousness, we shouldn't find this surprising.

Indeed it may, BB. But it hasn't. And those who are pursuing abiogenesis know that there is a possibility that what they discover may change some of the linchpins in TToE, But I suspect the concept won't be defeated or undermined -- Evolution as a stochastic process is pretty much a given (unless and until your new theory comes to light).

As far as consciousness goes, you do indeed walk up to the problem -- when did God introduce a soul into what we now call Homo Sapiens? Which step along the evolutionary path did God point to and say "this shall be the first being with morals?" I am not sure science can or should answer this question, although there are indeed anthropologists working on it.

After a point, one must just give it up to God and say "well, I know you created all these processes, and I will work to understand them, but some things will have to wait until I stand before You -- and I hope I live my life good enough to see You and get the answers."

That changes the underlying science not a whit.

[betty boop]

Obviously I need an example of a Scientific Theory that was usurped by another to note the downstream effects and the ability of science to accommodate new information.

An obvious example would be the supplanting of geocentrism by heliocentric theory.

But to get back to Darwin's evolution theory, the main problem seems to be that it really has no method to explain complex systems. Its evolution is linear, local, and historical and focuses on species (and that mainly through the lens of "survival fitness" for "reproductive success" — how reductive can you get!), not on individual biological organisms as complexes of functions (which imply non-linearity, non-locality, and purpose). Which they obviously are.

Further, Darwinism seems to function wholly within the Newtonian paradigm, with its emphasis on mechanism and material bodies. What research into complexity is beginning to show, however, is that complex systems are not inherently mechanical, and an immaterial element — information — is present in their composition.

I came across a notable paper the other day, by Donald C. Mikulecky — Robert Rosen: The Well Posed Question and Its Answer — Why Are Organisms Different from Machines?. The following excerpt addresses our present question as follows:

What is a complex system and why is a complex system different from a machine?
A complex system falls outside the formalism called the Newtonian Paradigm. That is not to say that complex systems cannot be seen as machines for limited kinds of analysis. This is, in fact, what traditional science does. Using [mathematician Robert] Rosen's general characteristics to separate the two kinds of objects, we see that complex systems contain semantic aspects [meaning of a communication] which cannot be reduced to syntax [the grammar or parts of speech of a communication]. Therefore they are not simulatable even though, when viewed as machines, the machine model is simulatable. They have no largest model from which all other models can be derived. This is simply because complex systems, by their very nature, require multiple distinct ways of interacting with them to capture their qualities. Their models are now distinct. Analytic models, which are expressed mathematically as direct products of quotient spaces are no longer equivalent to synthetic models which are built up from disjoint pieces as direct sums. Using this formulation every synthetic model is an analytic model, but there are analytic models which are not synthetic models. In other words, these analytic models are not reducible to disjoint sets of parts. This is a most profound distinction and requires some elaboration, for in it lies the essence of the failure of reductionism. In the machine, each model analytic or synthetic, is formulated in terms of the material parts of the system. Thus any model will be reducible and can be reconstructed from its parts.

This is not the case in a complex system. There are certain key models which are formulated in an entirely different way. These models are made up of functional components which do not map to the material parts in any one to one manner. The functional component itself is totally dependent on the context of the whole system and has no meaning outside that context. This is why reducing the system to its material parts loses information irreversibly. This is a cornerstone to the overall discovery Rosen made. It captures a real difference between complexity and reductionism which no other approach seems to have been able to formulate. This distinction makes it impossible to confuse computer models with complex systems. It also explains how there can be real "objective" aspects of a complex system that are to be considered along with the material parts, but which have a totally different character [i.e., they are immaterial].... [emphasis added]

I find this "stuff" so fascinating, freedumb2003! Truly exciting. Liberating!

If you have the time and interest, please do take a look — and let me know what you think?

Thank you so very much for your excellent essay/post freedumb2003!