Switches, out of necessity are easily moved from one position to another it isn't like the commute would have derailed by going through it. A engineer can run through a misaligned switch and not even know it.
Posted on 09/13/2008 6:49:23 PM PDT by BenLurkin
CHATSWORTH, Calif. (CBS) ― Metrolink officials Saturday put the blame squarely on the engineer of the train for the deadly crash that has claimed at least 25 lives. They say he ran a red light.
But a group of local teens, train enthusiasts, who know the engineer well doubt that he was to blame.
They called their friend professional and caring and said he helped them learn about trains and being an engineer. To a man, they said he would "never" have been reckless or unprofessional or run a red light.
But one minute before the deadliest crash in Metrolink history, one teen -- Nick Williams -- said he received a text message on his cell phone from the engineer, whom the teens identified as Robert Sanchez.
Williams' received text was brief, "Just two lines", reported KCAL 9 and CBS 2 reporter Kristine Lazar, exclusively.
The text apparently told Williams and his friends where Sanchez would be meeting another passenger train.
The teens posted a tribute to their friend on YouTube.
A Metrolink spokeswoman earlier stated that the train's engineer, who has not officially been named, ran a red signal.
Another one of the teens, Evan Morrison, told Lazar that Sanchez " was not the kind of guy who would run a red light."
None of them believe he was at fault.
Saturday, Sanchez's teen friends all went to the crash site. Mark Speer, choking back tears said, "this is absolutely devastating."
Denise Tyrell, a spokesperson for Metrolink commented on the report that Sanchez might have been texting immediately before the crash.
She said, "I can't believe someone could be texting while driving a train."
Could the engineer have left the siding, and gotten back onto the main track without noticing a whole sequence of lights, and wouldn’t crossing the ‘switch’ have at least have generated something similar to going over a speed bump?
Are ‘lights’ the only thing the engineer depends on before leaving a siding?
1.The UP train was to enter the siding with the commuter continuing on the main track.
2. No, the UP didn't make it to the siding before getting hit.
3.As the UP train hadn't entered the siding he didn't have a chance to exit and enter the main track.
4 It looks like the signal the commuter would have seen is somewhere beyond the station, this is very common signal displaced as the signals are usually located to protect a switch telling the engineer that he is either going straight on the main, leaving the mainline or in some cases holding the main while another train enters the siding. No, no speed bumps but I understand that some railroads are trying new technology that will stop a train if it passes a signal.
Now that I have bored you to death, one minor point about sidings. It isn't unusual for a siding to have a "derail" device protecting the main in case a engineer forgets and tries to re-enter the main without the proper signal.
“No, the UP didn’t make it to the siding before getting hit.”
So how could he have ‘run a red light’, if he wasn’t on the siding?
The signal the commute ran was next to the mainline and gives authority for a train to occupy the next section of track. In other words the commute would have seen a red signal before it came to the switch for the siding, thus protecting the switch.
OK. But with the scenario you are discussing, that means the commuter train passed the ‘switch’ that would have routed it onto the siding.
Since the engineer doesn’t have a steering wheel, how was he able to pass straight through that switch?
Is it because the commuter was on a separate track that merged with the main track? If so, I could see running that red light causing the problem.
If not, the commuter had to get to the siding, as a normal routine. It’s not like the commuter could back up fast enough to do any good.
Switches, out of necessity are easily moved from one position to another it isn't like the commute would have derailed by going through it. A engineer can run through a misaligned switch and not even know it.
Thank you. You answered one of my questions.
“A engineer can run through a misaligned switch and not even know it.”
“Commute ran the red, kept going and ran into the UP train on the main.”
So, had the freight train even gotten to the switch for the siding yet?
I can see what you are describing, but a map of the Metrolink line would be more helpful.
I searched for it, and it doesn’t seem to be available.
The accident happened before the UP train had arrived at the switch for the siding. I think the cause will come down to engineer error, he was distracted, ran the red and was exceeding a speed that would have permitted him to stop short of the red.
It would seem these ‘lights’ must go from one end of the switching points to the other, on both the main and siding track.
That’s a lot of lights to ignore. Especially for someone who ‘knows’ the track and the schedules of the trains.
That woman has just resigned, btw.
Why?
I’m not trying to claim terrorists did it, but that is one possibility. The real possibility is that Metrolink and the tracks they use, have minimal ‘safeties’, and it’s that way because they didn’t want to invest the money, and now they are faced with ANOTHER crash. (there have been others, for Metrolink).
The jump to blame the engineer is likely due to intense concern at Metrolink that their lack of safety precautions, and some unreliable equipment, caused the crash, and that will be further exposed to the public. Which isn’t good for them business wise.
Don't know why you say there was communications problem? Once a engineer departs his initial station it is not unusual not to talk to the dispatcher or anyone else until the run is completed. The dispatcher communicates via signal indication. Unless there is a change in a trains work orders there is no reason to talk to the engineer, just ties the radio. I have been told by people involved the signal were working fine, no problem there.
I really appreciate you being patient with me and sharing your knowledge of the RR, and your experience.
“You are missing the concept of a block signal system. “
Maybe. However, I do think I understand how that part works.
I see the lights in the photo, and understand what you are saying.
Now, this signal would likely be 10 yards from the switch.
Since it takes freight trains MILES, not FEET, to stop, if moving at 40 mph, there must be other lights preceding that one, that tell the engineer to go slow.
One poster linked a picture of all the possible traffic signals combinations and their meaning.
How did both trains get up to 40 mph, on the same track, headed for each other?
Are you telling me that the engineer, with a train going 40 mph, sees a light 10 yards from a switch, and is supposed to be able to stop?
“Don’t know why you say there was communications problem?”
I was wondering if there was one.
I was assuming that besides the switches, and lights, that the trains communicated with each other, and with a central terminal.
(I think you zeroed in on the pertinent part)
“ran the red and was exceeding a speed that would have permitted him to stop short of the red.”
Why would he also be exceeding the speed limit for those conditions?
The way this sounds, from the media and the posts, is that The Engineer of the Commuter Train left the station at high speed, running red lights all the way, and crashed into the Freight train BEFORE it could even get near the damn switch for the siding.
And all because he was text messaging. Like it takes an astronaut to text message and rub your tummy at the same time.
How does the engineer of a commuter train leave the station, without knowing that he will have to ‘wait’ for a Freight train to get off on the siding?
How many other lights did he have to ignore, to get to the final ‘red’ light (that he allegedly missed), and to be doing such speed? I assume commuter trains have better accel/deceleration than a freight train.
“I have been told by people involved the signal were working fine, no problem there. “
I’d guess there’s no trains on the track, what with the people walking in the middle of it.
Wonder what color it turns when there is a train?
: )
The freight may have been doing 40, not surprising if the turnout (switch) speed and siding are authorized for 40mph. The signal the UP would have seen would have been a red over yellow (or green if lined out the other end of the siding). The signal the UP saw before this one was red over green telling him he was going to leave the track at the next signal, he is not responsible to be going at a speed to stop short only track speed. This is the communications part. The dispatcher "told" him what he was going to do with signals.
The commute, assuming he had reached 40mph was in error as we have discussed. Because he couldn't see the next signal and had stopped between signals (the one entering the station and the one beyond) he was required by rule to proceed not exceeding 20mph prepared to stop short of the next signal. This he didn't do.
Because he forgot (got distracted) what he was supposed to do.
How does the engineer of a commuter train leave the station, without knowing that he will have to ‘wait’ for a Freight train to get off on the siding?
He was told by signal indication before entering the station and stopping. For him to have red after leaving the station he had to have entered on a yellow..telling him the next signal may be red. Once again he forgot what he was doing.
How many other lights did he have to ignore, to get to the final ‘red’ light (that he allegedly missed), and to be doing such speed?
He ignored or forgot about the one before he ran. That is all it takes, miss one and you are in trouble. And yes commute trains accelerate much faster than a freight.
Sir, the manner in which you explained the operation of the lights, switches and trains allowed even a dumb fool such as myself to understand it. Congratulations!
Thank you.
The event recorder in the Metrolink unit was damaged during the collision and they were unable to download it in the field. It's been sent to the manufacturer for further testing and downloading. The data about the operation of the Metrolink train came from the event recorder in the cab car on the other end. Likewise, the data from the UP train comes from its second unit (UP8491).
The data shows that the Metrolink train accelerated away from its station stop and passed the signal at CP Topanga, about 1.1 mile distance, at 50-52 MPH. The engineer then reduced the throttle to allow the train's speed to fall to the 40 MPH Maximum Authorized Speed for the six degree left-hand curve starting up the Pass. The grade here is 1%. Its last recorded speed before impacting the UP train was 42, which was about 600 feet beyond CP Topanga. The UP train's speed was 25 (operating prepared to enter the siding).
It is 1.37 miles from the Chatsworth station to the point of impact.
The reenactments earlier this week show that the line of sight (i.e., when both trains could see each other on the curve) to be approximately 1000 feet.
Like running into a rock wall at 67 mph. OUCH!
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