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It would seem these ‘lights’ must go from one end of the switching points to the other, on both the main and siding track.

That’s a lot of lights to ignore. Especially for someone who ‘knows’ the track and the schedules of the trains.

I still think something went wrong with communications, and remotely signaled switching equipment, and lights, and that one PR person at Metrolink jumped to a conclusion.

That woman has just resigned, btw.

Metrolink had a closed meeting and discussed track security, instead of the scheduled issue.

Why?

I’m not trying to claim terrorists did it, but that is one possibility. The real possibility is that Metrolink and the tracks they use, have minimal ‘safeties’, and it’s that way because they didn’t want to invest the money, and now they are faced with ANOTHER crash. (there have been others, for Metrolink).

The jump to blame the engineer is likely due to intense concern at Metrolink that their lack of safety precautions, and some unreliable equipment, caused the crash, and that will be further exposed to the public. Which isn’t good for them business wise.

You are missing the concept of a block signal system. You only need a few to protect a large area. Below you will see a signal, called a double signal with both aspects red. The top signal if green tells the engineer he is going straight, the bottom would tell him he is diverging onto another track. Both red, stop. This signal would be, in this case, most likely 10 yards from the switch. This signal gives a engineer all the information he needs for the next section of tack.

Don't know why you say there was communications problem? Once a engineer departs his initial station it is not unusual not to talk to the dispatcher or anyone else until the run is completed. The dispatcher communicates via signal indication. Unless there is a change in a trains work orders there is no reason to talk to the engineer, just ties the radio. I have been told by people involved the signal were working fine, no problem there.