Please note my post #65 above. It comes from Victor's chapter 3, "Warnings of the Pearl Harbor Attack."
Same chapter, page 45:
"In summary, agents provided sixteen usable warnings of the Pearl Harbor attack. Twenty-five indications of it, ranging from vague to clear, came from intercepted [Japanese] "bomb-plot" messages, of which about twenty were decoded before the attack. And ten percent more of the relevant Japanese naval messages probably were decoded as well.
"And radio direction-finding helped track the fleet moving to Hawaii. Given the U.S. Navy's expectation of thirty years that Japan would start a war against the United States with an attack on the fleet when it was in Hawaii, even one warning from a reliable source should have been taken seriously and alerted high-level officers for signs to come.
"The Dutch naval attache in Washington, Captain Johan Ranneft, often visited ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence], where he discussed the expected Japanese attack with ONI officers. He noted in his diary on December 2:
"2-12-41. Conference at Navy Department, they show me on the map the location of 2 Japanese carriers departed from Japan on easterly course."
"...Ranneft later said a member of ONI commented, "This is the Japanese task force proceeding east," and that it was half way between Japan and Hawaii on December 2. And on December 6, Ranneft wrote in his diary:
"At 1400 to Navy Dept., the department is closed, except the division O.N.I. where a night watch is kept. Everyone present at O.N.I. confer Director Admiral Wilkinson, Capt. Mac Collum, Lt. Cmdr. Kramer... At my request, they show me the location of the 2 carriers (see 2-12-41) west of Honolulu."
The book includes other similar quotes. Yes, the issue of radio-direction tracking is controversial. Victor argues that Japanese' radio silence was not as silent as has been portrayed, and he offers evidence of that.
"In summary, agents provided sixteen usable warnings of the Pearl Harbor attack. Twenty-five indications of it, ranging from vague to clear, came from intercepted [Japanese] "bomb-plot" messages, of which about twenty were decoded before the attack.
The use of a term like "decode" should immediately alert you to the fact this writer is a boob. It's not a technical intelligence term, at least in the manner in which he uses it. This makes it sound like there were "messages" that some intel officer just "picked up," "ran through a machine," and "sent up the chain." INTEL DOES NOT WORK THIS WAY. First, Japanese messages had to be 1) intercepted. The intercepted message then had to be passed on to a team of 2) translators and 3) "decoders" who analyzed the content. But this is NOT matching up little call signs with symbols on a sheet. Codes were written in codes. So you would have to sit and compare your intercept to dozens of others to find a pattern. At Midway, we thought we had discovered the Japanese code WORD (just one word!!) for "Midway." We ran a clever test by broadcasting in the open that Midway's water processor/condenser was out, then listened for any use of that word again. When it came, we knew that from that point on, "x" word meant "Midway." There was never, ever any such intercept, let alone "decoding" or analysis of ANY Pearl Harbor memos, no matter what this guy says. But we aren't even to #4 in the steps, which is ANALYSIS. Once you actually have intercepted, then translated, then decoded a possible message, it doesn't mean it's worth anything. It is then sent to Intel HQ (in Hawaii, in this case) where Rochefort's guys would have put it alongside HUNDREDS of other pieces of evidence. Of the "twenty five intercepted 'bomb-plot' messages"NOT ONE referred to a strike force at sea. They were all related to guerillas possibly blowing up the airplanes at Hickam!! It was precisely because of these bomb plots that the fighters were bunched together!!!!!
And ten percent more of the relevant Japanese naval messages probably were decoded as well. Here is a typical mush phrase that I found, for example in Stinnett's book, to the tune of almost 100 of these!!! "probably." Sorry, such a word doesn't exist in history. Either it was and you can prove it, or it wasn't. Since you can't prove it, clearly it didn't happen, but the author wants you to think it did. Gotta completely throw out this line.
"And radio direction-finding helped track the fleet moving to Hawaii. Given the U.S. Navy's expectation of thirty years that Japan would start a war against the United States with an attack on the fleet when it was in Hawaii, even one warning from a reliable source should have been taken seriously and alerted high-level officers for signs to come.
Absolutely false. I repeat: you cannot find ONE SINGLE AMERICAN RADIO OPERATOR WHO EVER STATED HE EVEN ONCE INTERCEPTED JAPANESE SIGNALS FROM SEA. This really is end game. You're going to take the word of some Dutch guy over ALL the Americans whose job it was to find this fleet. But there's more: The Japanese, to a man, affirm that NO ONE in the Kido Butai---NO ONE---ever transmitted at sea. Yamamoto had ordered the trasmitting keys disabled and held by the captains up until the day before the attack to even prevent an accident.
What we HAVE discovered is that people like Victor, who don't know what they are talking about, failed to understand that the IJN was broadcasting phoney signals on a variety of frequencies FROM JAPAN. Yes, we picked those up, and the very nature of them (i.e., not coming from a fleet at sea) soon led the radio guys to shrug them off as decoys, which they were. Again, the focus was entirely on SINGAPORE and possibly the Philippines, NOT PH.
"The Dutch naval attache in Washington, Captain Johan Ranneft, often visited ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence], where he discussed the expected Japanese attack with ONI officers. He noted in his diary on December 2: "2-12-41. Conference at Navy Department, they show me on the map the location of 2 Japanese carriers departed from Japan on easterly course."
This is utterly meaningless. They DEPARTED on an easterly course. If you were heading south, and wanted to throw off enemy surveillance, would you head straight south? Moreover, this is FEBRUARY. What in the hell does this have to do with December?
"...Ranneft later said a member of ONI commented, "This is the Japanese task force proceeding east,"
Caught him. This is February. It doesn't take 10 months to cross the Pacific, even in a carrier.
and that it was half way between Japan and Hawaii on December 2. And on December 6, Ranneft wrote in his diary: "At 1400 to Navy Dept., the department is closed, except the division O.N.I. where a night watch is kept. Everyone present at O.N.I. confer Director Admiral Wilkinson, Capt. Mac Collum, Lt. Cmdr. Kramer... At my request, they show me the location of the 2 carriers (see 2-12-41) west of Honolulu."
Man, are you falling for this? Do you know where the Kido Butai was? It was not "west" of Honolulu. It did not consist of "two carriers" but SIX (I'm pretty sure two carriers accompanied the forces headed to Singapore, but could be wrong). And it was NORTH of Hawaii.
The book includes other similar quotes. Yes, the issue of radio-direction tracking is controversial.
No, it is not "controversial." Neither AMERICAN nor JAPANESE sources have ever claimed one time that they, respectively, intercepted or transmitted any signals from Kido Butai. Phil Jacobsen has blown this silly radio thing out of the water many times. I suggest you check out his web sites and SCHOLARLY papers. It's a shame that people keep tarring the good name of our radio guys and our intel guys with this garbage.
Victor argues that Japanese' radio silence was not as silent as has been portrayed, and he offers evidence of that.
There is no "evidence to "offer" because the Japanese didn't transmit.