Hmmmm.... a very curious term that: "Gettysburg Raid."
What do you call a "raid"?
Was Hitler's 1944 Ardennes offensive a "raid"?
Was Napoleon's march to Waterloo a "raid"?
Each involved the largest military force their countries could muster.
Each was intended as a war-winning knockout blow to their enemies.
Each was an act of desperation by an out-gunned army hoping to turn the tide of war.
Each was launched by men often considered tactical geniuses.
The failure of each campaign eliminated all future possibility of eventual victory.
As to which theater was more important, East or West, when Lee surrendered at Appomattox, the war was effectively over. Doesn't that answer the question?
Napoleon's campaign was intended to split the Prussian and British Armies in Belgium, defeat them in detail, and consolidate those gains prior to Schwartzenberg and the Czar mobilizing in Germany to invade eastern France.
Both operations were undertaken with geographical and military objectives and with fairly detailed knowledge of both enemy strength, location, and probable movements.
Lee, at the start of the Gettysburg campaign lacked the first, and seemed unconcerned with the third. If you have a source that indicates memoranda, orders, etc. from Lee showing any of these things, I'd be honored if you'd share it/ them.
Lee's announced intention was to give the northern part of Virginia, especially the Shenandoah, a respite from combat and troops ‘living off the land’. The flip side of that intent was to ‘requisition’ whatever the Army of Northern Virginia could find.
When the meeting engagement at Gettysburg started, Lee had one Corps up near Carlisle, [Ewell], one Corps at the north end of the Blue Ridge mountains [A.P. Hill], and one Corps still coming up from Taneytown [Longstreet]. He had no idea where most of his Cavalry Corps was [Stuart] [although in fairness, Stuart left Lee with two brigades of cavalry he didn't much use], nor the Army of the Potomac. That's one hell of a campaign.
As to your second point, two Corps of Lee's Army, combined with Bragg's Army would have constituted the ‘largest military force’ the Confederacy could have mustered.
There is absolutely NO evidence that Lee's Gettysburg operation was intended as a ‘war winning knockout blow to [the South's] enem[y]’. Until the Iron Brigade was identified on the field, Lee didn't even know who he was fighting. And an argument he did militates strongly against the claim of tactical genius [based on that one battle], since Lee let the hostilities start when over two thirds of his Army was dispersed over an arc of considerable distance [Longstreet's last unit, Pickett's Division didn't close up until the night of day two - which was after Stuart showed up].
Gettysburg was not ‘an act of desperation’. It was an act of hubris. Lee could have pulled out at any time the first two days. He could have chosen to maneuver between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, D.C, and let the Union troops come to him. He didn't. He chose to engage in a series of dispersed frontal attacks against a superior enemy operating on interior lines some four miles shorter than his own. While Lee may have been a tactical and/ or operational genius [see Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville], he wasn't at Gettysburg.
And strategically, the South lost all future possibility of victory at Vicksburg, Atlanta and the March to the Sea. Lee didn't forfeit what chance he had until the Wilderness, when his penchant for offensive action [except at Frericksburg, and possibly second Manassas he always lost a higher percentage of his army than his Union opponent], finally ran up against the South's inability to furnish any more troops.
By the time Lee surrendered at Appomattox, the war had been effectively [not formally] over for months. Sherman had laid waste to Georgia and South Carolina, and was marching on Lee's rear through North Carolina [Lee's Army was deserting in droves]. Wilson was riding though Alabama on the biggest cavalry campaign of the Civil War. And AFTER Lee through it in Johnston surrendered the Army of Tennessee and the Trans-Missippi Department held out even longer.