their commander, Blücher,
Posted on 04/24/2008 10:43:29 PM PDT by bruinbirdman
I fear that the French are wasting their time. The problem is that every time they look at Waterloo they say that Napoleon won on points.
Napoleon’s army was the best he had commanded since he advanced into Russia – an army of veterans, 200,000 strong. Wellington referred to his force as “an infamous army”.
My predecessor, David Chandler, who wrote the definitive account of Napoleon’s campaigns, said that the Emperor’s idea had been to get between the Prussians and the British. “I will defeat the British and the Prussians, then the Austrians, then the Russians, and Europe will be mine,” Napoleon said.
He hits the British at Quatre Bras, who go reeling north back towards Brussels, and he hits the Prussians at Lingy. They retreat east, thinking that their commander, Blücher, is dead. He is found under a dead horse and revived with gin, rides after his soldiers and turns them around.
Napoleon doesn’t know anything about this: on the morning of June 18, 1815, he is terribly complacent.
Wellington decides to fight a defensive war of attrition. Through drunkenness, stupidity or fear of their officers, the British line holds. The French have been aware for some time of soldiers advancing on their right flank. Napoleon knows that these are the Prussians, but he sends his aides out through the ranks to say they are French soldiers. He has calculated that the British will fall first and he will have time to redeploy. It is a massive miscalculation.
When the Prussians come into musket range they open fire. The cry goes up among the French: “Treason!” They think these are French soldiers that have changed sides. It is then that the French army collapses.
That is Dr Chandler’s reconstruction and it is the most telling I have ever heard. Napoleon was responsible for his own defeat: he was complacent. Wellington was anxious and left nothing to chance. And if you are going into battle it is far better to be in a state of deep anxiety, as the events of the past four years prove.
— Duncan Anderson is Head of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst
WoW is this true?
This makes little sense, particularly for someone with his title. “Complacency” and calculated risk are totally different animals.
“Complacency” is to patiently sit in camp and wait for the enemy to gather their forces for co-ordinated action. There is nothing “complacent” with outmaneuvering between superior enemy forces to grab the advantage of interior lines of communication and piecemeal opposition.
That such an article comes from “Head of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst” may go some distance in explaining the peculiar lack of British military initiative in the Army’s recent campaigns.
^
The key to Napoleon’s success was that he was a living computer. His mental skills enabled him to bring greater force to bear in the required place at the key moment in time. Everything thing he did - his strategy, his planning, his logistics, his tactics were all geared towards that objective. As a result, he won every fought battle he fought - except for one. And that is the one where Blucher did what he promised Wellington he would do and brought superior force to bear in the required place at the key moment in time.
their commander, Blücher,
Somehow I never considered the Russian invasion to be a success.
He didn’t lose any battles to Russian generals - unless you consider General Snow and General Winter to be Russian generals.
It is reported that primary source material concerning these subjects (Napoleon) from the French perspective are state secrets, archived by France and off limits for research.
yitbos
Chandler’s Campaigns of Napoleon is an incredible book. If you haven’t read it, I would very much recommend it. The one problem Napoleon had was that he either couldn’t or wouldn’t teach to others what he was able to do himself. The Germans learnt this lesson and the result was the German General Staff which Scharnhorst (Blucher’s chief of staff) recreated based on the lessons learned from Napoleon. The principal goal of the German General Staff was to identify and then train officers who would excel at fighting on an operational level.
I mention this because that would mean what we have is the perspective of everyone who was defeated by Napoleon.
They would have an incentive to say he was a genius.
yitbos
Only if you consider the battle to be an 18th century style battle where the armies face off against each other. The Russians let Napoleon enter Moscow but left no supplies in the city and set the city on fire. Once Napoleon decided to evacuate Moscow and retreat to Paris, Cossacks did harrass the French. The scorched earth strategy was just as much a military tacic in 1812 when Napoleon tried to conquer Russia as it was in 1941 when Hitler tried an even bigger invasion of the Soviet Union.
Nobody did scorched earth like Sherman. He set the standard. And it seems nobody has quite duplicated it.
I agree. “Complacency” is a terrible word to use in the context of the events portrayed above.
I think “over-confident” or even “arrogant” would have fit better.
Sounds like a Southern perspective.
yitbos
And he lost outright at Leipzig.
>>He didn’t lose any battles to Russian generals - unless you consider General Snow and General Winter to be Russian generals.
Two of their most successful, along with General Mud.
General Mud at work:
http://www.history.jp/wehrmacht/001-07.jpg
The graphic of Napoleon’s Russia campaign that Tufte loves. “The best statistical graphic ever drawn“
http://strangemaps.wordpress.com/2007/12/31/229-vital-statistics-of-a-deadly-campaign-the-minard-map/
The French army collapsed at Waterloo when the French Imperial Guard broke.
"La Garde recule. Sauve qui peut!" ("The Guard retreats. Save yourself if you can!").
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