Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I would like to address S. 149. I believe my colleagues who have spoken are correct in that they have substantial support for this legislation. I do not doubt they have a majority of the Democrats and a majority of the Republicans. I do not doubt they have the support of the administration. My understanding was that the President made a campaign statement or commitment with regard to this issue during the last campaign. President Clinton made the same commitment during his campaign for President.
The President had a group of high-tech executives to the White House, just as President Clinton did, to promote this sort of legislation. My colleagues are correct in that the President now supports essentially a continuation of the Clinton policy with regard to the liberalization or loosening of our export controls law. I disagreed with it when President Clinton was President. I disagree with it now.
While we need an Export Administration Act and while we need to take into consideration commercial circumstances and changes in the world, I think the balance between our national security interests and our commerce interests is not there.
This is not really a bill, as I think about it, that is supposed to balance as such. It is a bill that has very specific purposes. It is consistent with our export administration process that we have had for decades in this country. It is based on the notion that there are some items we need to try to keep out of the hands of some people for as long as we can. The most ardent proponents of liberalized trade restrictions, of course, would acknowledge that. We have the so-called rogue nations, and so forth, to which, we all acknowledge, we should not let any of this high-tech stuff get through. If we were really in a world where the technology genie were totally out of the bottle, I suppose we would not bother ever making the distinctions between really bad countries and pretty bad countries and friends because it would be out there for all to have. This is based on the proposition that is not the case, that there are some things controllable and that we should try to keep these things out of the hands of some entities and some countries for as long as we can.
When you look at the purpose of the act we are dealing with today, I think it correctly states that the purpose is about national security export controls, it is not about enhancing exports. In fact, you might say it is kind of anti-export. I think the norm is and should be that this country is for free trade. I certainly have tried to be one of the leaders in that area. I think the President ought to have trade promotion authority. I think we need to do more in that area. I think it is the basis for a large segment of our economic security and prosperity in this country. We had a debate with regard to a section of NAFTA recently. I think most of us are very committed to the process. But the fact that we have an export administration process and an Export Administration Act acknowledges that, be that as it may, there are some things that bring in extremely serious national security considerations.
I refer to S. 149. It says the purposes of this act are to restrict the export of items that would contribute to the military potential of countries so as to prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. It further says the purpose is to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It doesn't really talk about a balance of those grave and primary considerations that we all must acknowledge are, more than anything else, against some commercial considerations. Here we are talking about I think our total exports to these control countries, which are about 3 percent of our exports. So we are talking about a small fraction--3 percent of our exports as balanced against what I just described in the act.
I am not for some kind of equipoise, or some kind of a balance, when it comes to these things. We shouldn't control things that are uncontrollable. We shouldn't be foolish about it. But we ought to have a very careful process that is not weighted or prejudiced in any way by those whose interest it is to get things out the door, whose interest is to export, whose interest is to come to the White House and come to the Congress and lobby on behalf of more and more exports for economic reasons. You don't have the average man on the street with a lobbying team coming up here saying be very, very careful about how you liberalize our export control laws because we are concerned about what we read about what is going on in the world in terms of proliferation.
The world has changed a lot. We should look at these matters from time to time to see whether or not we are operating in the right century. We don't have the old Soviet Union anymore. We don't have the threat that posed. But in its place are several new threats which, in many cases, are more dangerous than the ones we had. We know, for example, that with the development of technology, weapons of mass destruction can now kill many, many more people than they otherwise could. There are ways of delivering weapons of mass destruction that did not exist a short time ago to countries such as the United States.
We have biological weapons that stagger the imagination with the description of the devastation that just a small amount of it can wreak, again, accompanying that with the means to deliver them, the means that did not exist a short time ago. That is the other side of the technological coin, the technology that has helped us in so many ways and has made the world a better place. That is the other side of that coin. It is real.
Of course, the world has changed in another way. My colleagues are correct when they say that more of this technology is available around the world. In some cases, to some extent perhaps, there is nothing we can do about it. But in some cases, to some extent, there is something we can do about it.
Therein lies what we are trying to deal with here with regard to our export administration policy; that is, being very careful in making sure, with regard to the things we can have some control over, even if it is just to slow down the bad actors that wish our country and our national security ill, that it is a good thing to do. If we are not willing and committed to doing that, regardless of what it does to trade in a certain segment of exports, then we should not have any export policy at all; we should not have any export restrictions at all. I do not think we are there. I do not think that anyone would advocate that. But it concerns me to hear that my colleagues think by passing this bill we are in some way enhancing our security. We are not. You can make a case that it is out of balance the other way, that we are trying to control things that are uncontrollable, and it is hurting our exports to the extent we need a new balance. I disagree with that strongly, but you can make that case. But I do not think you can have your cake and eat it, too.
I do not think you can liberalize trade so people do not have to have licenses anymore for some of this dangerous stuff while at the same time claiming you are enhancing national security. It is just not the case. And it is not as if I have the answer as to where to draw the line. It is not as if my colleagues have the answer as to where to draw the line. Reasonable export controls that do not do any more harm than is necessary but protect us to the extent possible: It is very difficult to draw that line.
What is important is that we have a process because that line has to be drawn every day. There are thousands of applications--15,000 to 20,000 applications--for exports on an annual basis. We must have a very carefully thought-out process where responsible people, in all objectivity, with requisite expertise, have an opportunity to pass on these things and make those judgments. That is what this is all about: whether or not we are setting up the right responsible framework, not to be so irresponsible that we shut things down, but, on the other hand, that we recognize that the world is a much more dangerous place, that countries have the ability to harm us and harm our allies, which would directly involve us immediately, more so than ever before, and that we must do what is reasonably necessary to keep these things out of the hands--as the world's leading manufacturer in the creative genius behind most of the advanced technology that is going on in the world in so many areas now, that we have a stewardship, we have a responsibility to use that in a proper and correct way.
As I said, it may be difficult to draw that line, but we must have a procedure that errs, if it is to err, on the side of national security. Because even the bill, as drafted, points out that this is the purpose of the Export Administration Act. This is the fundamental purpose of an Export Administration Act.
So does this act take into consideration sufficiently the matters of national security? And does it take into consideration sufficiently the matters of commerce and exports?
If we are going to talk about balance, let's talk for a minute about the side where we have our concern, the things that we are trying to address. In many different ways this is just a part of an overall policy of recognizing we live in a more dangerous world. But while realizing that genie is out of the bottle, we are trying to--through our policies, through our diplomacy, and through our policies--mitigate somewhat the danger that we see.
As I have stated, because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the world is a more dangerous place in many respects than ever before. Numerous reports have confirmed that a ballistic missile strike on the United States is not a distant but an imminent threat.
The Rumsfeld report, published in July of 1998, concluded that emerging ballistic missile powers such as Iran and North Korea could strike the United States within 5 years of deciding to acquire missile capability.
Shortly after that, North Korea surprised our intelligence agencies by successfully launching a three-stage rocket over Japan, essentially confirming the Rumsfeld conclusions. Certainly they, along with Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others, can strike our allies and our troops stationed abroad today.
In September of 1999, the national intelligence estimate of the ballistic missile threat concluded that the United States would ``most likely'' face ICBM threats from Russia, China, North Korea, and possibly from Iran and Iraq over the next 15 years, and that North Korea could deliver a light payload sufficient for biological or chemical weapons to the United States right now. It has also said that some rogue states may have some ICBMs much sooner than previously thought, and those missiles would be more sophisticated and dangerous than previously estimated. The classified briefings are even more disconcerting. Perhaps the most alarming report from these commissions and intelligence sources is that, despite the urgency of this problem, the United States' lax export controls are contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by global bad actors--our own export policies. The Cox commission concluded that U.S. export control policies have facilitated, rather than impeded, China's ability to acquire military-useful technology. The Rumsfeld commission has said the U.S. export control policies make it a major, albeit unintentional, contributor to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and associated weapons of mass destruction.
There you have it. I do not know how it can be stated much plainer than that and with more authority than that; that we have a serious problem on our hands and that our own policies are contributing to that problem.
Nowhere is it more clear than in the case of China, which is really the country that stands to benefit from changes to our export control laws the most, and, ironically, is also the country of greatest proliferation concern. China was described by the Rumsfeld commission as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and enabling technologies. The PRC has sold missiles to Pakistan, missile parts to Libya, cruise missiles to Iran, and shared sensitive technologies with North Korea. All these actions have occurred despite the PRC's public assurances and commitments to several international proliferation regimes.
Within the last few days, this Government sanctioned a Chinese company again for transferring missile components to Pakistan. Even more disturbing is that many of the items that China is proliferating to rogue nations around the world may have been legally acquired from the United States. The Cox commission notes that China has deliberately taken advantage of our lax export enforcement policies to further its proliferation efforts.
China has illegally diverted or misused many sensitive dual-use technologies or items to further their military modernization. In January of 2000, the licensing threshold for high-performance computers was 2,000 MTOPS. In January of 2001, the licensing threshold was 75,000 MTOPS, a fortyfold increase in a 12-month period.
As the Cox committee points out, no threat assessment was ever conducted. As we have seen the rapid decontrol of supercomputers in this country to countries such as China, under the notion that, well, MTOP is not a valid criteria anymore and they will get it from somebody else anyway, the defense authorization bill in 1998 required that if we are going to do this rapid decontrol of our computers, that we do a national security assessment as a part of that, because the real bottom line is, we don't know what the effects of this rapid decontrol are. We don't know what the significance to national security is.
We operated for a long time under the notion that it was very important--and the Cox committee will bear this out--to try to keep the supercomputers at a certain level out of the hands of Russia and China and countries such as that because they use them for nuclear simulation, their stockpile enhancement programs, things of that nature. We have totally changed our view about that based on no study, based on anecdotal comments by people who come and testify before these committees who have a direct or indirect interest in companies or represent companies that are interested in exporting in many cases--not all of them, but many--time after time. We have not really had any in-depth study or analysis by this Government as to what the effect of this substantial change in our policy is to our national security.
I am not saying I know the answer. I rest assured that no one else, even in this body, has the answer. It is extremely complex, but it is extremely important. I know of no other change of that importance in that short period of time that has undergone less assessment. That is one of the things we should address.
The PRC diverted and used these American supercomputers to improve their nuclear weapons. The Cox commission notes that in 1992, U.S. satellite manufacturers transferred missile design information to the PRC without obtaining the legally required license, and China used that information to improve the reliability of its rockets.
We are all familiar with the Hughes-Loral problem. I noticed the report in the Wall Street Journal the other day that Loral apparently is about to cut a deal with the State Department and Justice to pay a fine and still be allowed to go ahead and launch Chinese rockets in the future, going back to their business. I will be interested in comparing the amount of that civil fine with the profit they make over the subsequent launches that they have in their deals with the Chinese.
In 1993, China diverted six high-precision machine tools it obtained from McDonnell-Douglas and used them to manufacture military aircraft and cruise missile components. Just months ago we learned that Chinese technicians were installing fiber optic cable for Iraqi air defense in violation of U.N. sanctions. This fiber optic system is based on U.S. technology sold to China in the mid-1990s.
According to published reports, we have discovered twice that companies in China were assisting Saddam Hussein with regard to his antiaircraft capability, which is what this fiber optic cable is used for, in order to help him shoot down our aircraft in the no-fly zone. There have been over 300 incidents where Saddam's troops have shot at our aircraft over that no-fly zone. I hope and pray they never hit one. I hope and pray that if they do, we don't discover that the technology used to shoot that airplane down did not originally emanate from the United States of America. I would not want to be the one to try to tell the mother of that pilot who was shot down: Ma'am, we are sorry about your son, but they probably could have gotten this ability from someone else if we hadn't given it to them. The Cox commission informs us that China pursues a deliberate policy of using commercial contacts to advance its efforts to obtain U.S. military technology. The commission states that China uses access to its markets to induce U.S. businesses to provide military-related technology and to lobby on behalf of liberalized export standards, a policy that has had significant success. We see from the Rumsfeld report, the Deutch commission, the biennial CIA reports, the nature of this threat and the fact that it is based on technology, technology in some cases where we are certainly the leader. We know that a lot of this proliferation activity from these rogue nations, a lot of their assistance comes from China. We claim we need a missile defense system. I believe we do because of the threats these rogue nations present to us. They, in turn, are getting their capability in significant part from countries such as China and Russia. We simultaneously, with all of that liberalizing of our export laws, make it easier to sell high tech items and equipment to China and Russia. That does not make sense.
Where is the balance? What do we balance that threat against? What is the concern--that our export licensing procedure is too onerous? It is not like we are stopping these exports. As was said, 99 percent of them are approved. It is just the ones that are disapproved that are really important, important to our national security. It is not like we are trying to stop a great many exports because we are not. We are trying to have a procedure where we are more likely to not let something important slip through the cracks.
Let's be clear about how much business is at stake. The total value of goods subject to export controls in 1998 was approximately $20 billion, less than 3 percent of U.S. exports. The fact that an item is controlled does not mean that it can't be exported. It only means that it has to go through a review process. The overwhelming majority of them are approved.
But what this legislation does is take certain categories, incorporated parts, mass marketing, foreign availability, and says, with regard to those items, with regard to those matters, if someone within the bowels of the Department of Commerce essentially decides that they fit into these categories, you don't have to have a license at all. You don't have to go through that process. It decontrols those matters and takes them outside of the regulatory process altogether.
They say the President can stop it. We will talk about that in a minute.
First of all, let's understand what we are doing here. In the past there was no such animal as the one I just described. In the past, foreign availability was legitimate as a consideration, and it ought to be. When the licensers looked at the matter, if there was foreign availability, that was something they could take into consideration in issuing the license. Now it is taken out of their hands. If someone in commerce, their technical evaluation team, decides that there is foreign availability, it doesn't even come through the process anymore.
Mass marketing is a whole new concept. Mass marketing was not even used, that concept was not even used in prior administrations.
Now I am sad to say that the embedded component was, but it makes less sense of all. If an item is controlled and deemed to be significant from a potential national security purpose, under this bill if it constitutes 25 percent or less of the item that it is incorporated in, then it is decontrolled.
So if you have a controlled item and it is put into an item that is bigger and worth more, that is not controlled, that makes the item that is controlled decontrolled. Of course, all an importer has to do, in some cases, is to buy the larger item and take out the item that perhaps he wants, which is the embedded part.
If it is significant from a national security standpoint before it goes into the larger item, it is significant from a national security standpoint after it is put into it. What does money have to do with it? What is the fact that it is or is not 25 percent of the price of a larger item? Of what significance is that? Especially from a national security standpoint. That makes no sense whatsoever.
So when we talk about building higher walls around fewer things, point out the higher walls to me. When we talk about making it more difficult to export some things, making it easier for some and harder for others, somebody point out to me the things that this bill makes it more difficult to export.
This legislation provides broad and sometimes exclusive authority to the Secretary of Commerce on important procedural issues such as commodity classifications, license and dispute referrals, license exemptions, and development of export administration regulations.
I have a lot of faith in our new Secretary of Commerce. I think he is a fine man, excellent choice, and is doing a great job. But the fact remains that the mission of the Department of Commerce is to promote exports. We used to criticize Secretary Ron Brown for his export policies and getting items changed from one list to another to make it easier to export, and things of that nature. The Commerce Department simply doesn't have the personnel and expertise to protect national security. It should not have to. That is not their job. Somehow we have set it up this way.
We are letting the tail wag the dog. If national security concerns ought to be given adequate consideration in an export decision, the Departments of State and Defense must be given greater authority and a greater role in this process. This legislation doesn't do that. Really, to the contrary, it increases the authority of the Department of Commerce.
Let me go over a few things here, and keep in mind, first of all, the purposes of this bill, the stated purposes of this bill. I didn't hear it discussed much Let me go over a few things here, and keep in mind, first of all, the purposes of this bill, the stated purposes of this bill. I didn't hear it discussed much when we were talking about the details of it. I think it is probably the most important part:
To restrict the export of items that would contribute to the military potential of countries so as to prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.
And also: To stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.......
That is the stated purpose. Whose job is it to do that? Well, we are going to give it to the guy who is in charge of commercial activities.
Look at some of these areas. The Secretaries of Commerce and Defense must concur in order to add items to the control list. While this is an improvement over the previous draft of S. 149, which left sole discretion to the Department of Commerce, S. 149 still gives the Department of Commerce a veto over the Department of Defense if the Secretary of Defense believes an item should be controlled on the national security control list.
Secondly, on commodity classification, the Secretary of Commerce has sole discretion over classifying items when exporters make commodity classification requests. These classifications determine whether items will require license or not and are particularly critical for new technologies. Commerce must notify Defense, but it is not required to solicit any input.
What about the interagency dispute resolution process? Well, S. 149 gives the Secretary of Commerce sole authority to select a chairperson of, and determine procedures for, the interagency committee to review license applications. The chairperson considers the positions of all the reviewing agencies but then makes the final decision on the license application. The only role of the Department of Defense is to provide a position, and additional levels of review are resolved by a majority vote.
What about foreign availability and mass marketing? The Secretary of Commerce has sole authority to determine whether items are foreign available or mass marketed. He must consult with other agencies, including the Department of Defense. Since items determined to be foreign available and mass marketed are automatically removed from the national control list and decontrolled, this authority to Commerce essentially creates a loophole around the Department of Defense veto over removing items from the national security control list.
What about issuing regulations? The Department of Commerce and the President have the authority to issue regulations. These regulations must be submitted for review to any department or agency the President considers appropriate, but the legislation explicitly notes that the requirement to submit the regulations for review doesn't require the concurrence or approval of any reviewing department. Finally, the catch-all provision in S. 149 provides that unless otherwise reserved to the President or department or agency in the United States, all power, authority, and discretion conferred by this act shall be exercised by the Secretary of Commerce.
Mr. President, that is substantial authority and control by the Office of the Secretary of Commerce. Regarding matters of national security, they should not have to bear that much responsibility. So now in the act here, we are not really building higher walls around anything. We are not trying to come up with a procedure to determine the national security implications of what we are about to do. We recognize that there is more dangerous technology out there than ever before, and we are providing it to people who are misusing it, but we want to continue to do that at a more efficient rate.
With regard to the increased penalties on exporters, I think by and large that is an improvement. But the act totally decontrols large segments of exports. So if you are decontrolled, how are you going to get in trouble? If I were an exporter, I would make that tradeoff, too. Give me a penalty on something that there is no way I could ever be accused of violating if it falls under one of these items that don't even require a license. How do you violate something like that? We are going to make a higher, more onerous penalty on you for violating this, but we are going to amend the law so it doesn't apply to you.
The Presidential override: It is true that there is a section here that, as the proponents indicate, really does override both the incorporated parts provision and the mass marketing and foreign availability provisions. In other words, the President can step in regardless of any of those provisions. To me, it is inconsistent with and renders a nullity many of the provisions in the foreign availability section, for example, because that section says the President must jump through all these hoops and go negotiate with all these countries and report back to Congress.
In other words, Mr. President, if you are going to step in on behalf of national security, we are going to make it awfully tough on you; you have to jump through all these hoops. They are saying: Enhanced control provisions, no, no; the President, if he wants to use this section, does not have to do all that; in other words, if there is a significant threat, not just a threat to national security but a significant threat to national security.
I am not sure how all that operates. I think it bears more studying. I think we are going to have to look at those sections together. If it does what is suggested, I still think we need to ask ourselves: Do we want to create whole new categories that are essentially determined by the Secretary of Commerce to decontrol and then say to our President: Catch me if you can?
If we have made a mistake out of these thousands of applications we get every year--another section says the President cannot delegate this authority, so let's make it as tough on him as we can; he does not have many other responsibilities; let's create these whole new avenues of decontrol and then say to the President: You have the authority if you can come up with something.
I do not know how much longer he is going to sit over there with a skeletal staff in some of these departments. Some people are estimating it will be 14 months before he gets his full team together, as far as his government is concerned.
Assuming the President does have the authority ultimately to step in, is that a wise idea? We are not just giving him new authority to step in with regard to an old situation. We are creating a whole new situation, a much more decontrolled situation, and giving him the invitation without delegating any authority. If he personally wants to step into one of these situations, he has the authority to do that. He did not need this authority before because we did not have a concept such as foreign availability except as something to be considered. We did not have a concept of decontrol based on foreign availability or mass marketing up until this bill.
Under those sections, if a company can persuade the Department of Commerce that it ought to be decontrolled, then it is decontrolled; there is no license requirement. We cannot even keep up with the number of computers we are sending to China or anywhere else. We do not even have a list to make some cumulative effect assessment if we wanted to.
The business community ought to have their say. I get the top rankings from the businesses and small businesses. I do pretty good by them. But I must say, when it comes to matters of export controls based on national security in a world where we are being threatened as we speak by weapons of mass destruction, it irritates me somewhat when I see in this export bill ``the Secretary shall permit the widest possible participation by the business community on the export control advisory committees.''
This bill allows the Secretary to appoint advisory committees to advise the Secretary on these matters--quite objectively, I am sure. It also says the Secretary has to disclose to them information consistent with national security and intelligence sources and methods pertaining to the reasons for the export controls which are in effect or contemplated.
If you want to impose any export controls for national security purposes, you have to go to these business entities and explain what you are doing and why you are doing it. Not only is that unnecessary, I am afraid it gives an indication or it belies the purposes of this act. This bill is going to pass, and we all know that. The forces behind it are strong. When you have the administration and probably the majority of both parties supporting it, that is a pretty fair indicator. I understand that. But for some time now, starting back a couple of years ago, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the chairman of the Commerce Committee, along with Senator Kyl, who is an expert in these matters, have had grave concerns about the balance we are striking; that we are continuing a policy based upon the tremendous pressures that are being brought to bear and based on campaign commitments that were made. It is not in the best long-term interests of this Nation. I do not think any of us can say for sure to what extent it is not or in what way our security might be harmed, but we are concerned that the process is not properly weighted. We are concerned that if we are going to err, we err on the part of national security; that when we are willing to engage in such debate to take on our European allies, to take on Russia and China all for the sake of a national missile defense system, based on the concept of tremendous threats this country faces--and I believe in the system--we must move forward on it because I believe in the threats, but we are refusing to acknowledge and recognize what is right before us and that we are helping to create the threat.
When we are exporting high-tech items to countries that have already shown that they will take them legally or illegally, that they will divert them for military purposes, that they will send them to rogue nations, and we come up with a concept to make it even easier because it takes 40 days to go through a licensing process--we do not want our companies to have to wait 40 days for people take an adequate look at this before they do that--I do not think we have our values in the right place; I do not think we are looking at what is right before us.
I am not suggesting we not reauthorize the Export Administration Act. I am not suggesting we build a wall around our technology. We know we cannot do that. But we must have a procedure that is not dominated by commercial interests, either outside Government or inside Government. And those in the Department of Commerce who are rightfully concerned about our commercial interests, that is their job. It cannot be dominated that way. We have to have a fair shot. All this is weighted too heavily on the side of people who have vested interests in foreign commercial relationships.
We have a $100 billion trade deficit with China today. I just got back from China with the distinguished chairman of the Banking Committee. The biggest meeting we had was with the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. We have tremendous foreign investment over there. That is fine. That is well and good. But surely to goodness we are not going to let that cause us, when we are considering matters of this nature, to come down too heavily on making the process more efficient for exports of potentially sensitive materials.
Again, we are not even talking about stopping exports. What we are talking about is a procedure where, more likely than not, we can stop from making one substantial mistake. We should not back end load this process and put all that responsibility on the President, if he or his people are fortunate enough to catch something on which those who, with good intentions, just simply do not have the expertise to make a call.
That is what we are concerned about. So I hope in the rush to get this bill approved and passed, which will eventually happen, we will have an opportunity to get some fair considerations for some amendments. I would overhaul this whole bill if it were left up to me, but it is not, and I do not have the votes. I am not going to stand in the way any longer. We have held this up now for a couple of years, and we cannot do it any longer. The votes are too great, and I see that. We could not filibuster it successfully if we wanted.
Surely we can consider some amendments that just as an example might give a little bit more time to an agency to review a complicated export request based on the potential impact of the export on national security. An agency now only has 30 days. If they do not get back within 30 days, it is deemed to be approved. Thirty days is fine for most things, but they ought to be able to have 60 days, if they need it, for the complexity of the analysis or if the reviewing agency requires additional time based on the potential impact of export on national security, a bit of additional time under those circumstances.
I hope we consider an amendment requiring the Secretary of Commerce to refer commodity classification requests to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. The current draft of the bill requires the Secretary of Commerce to notify the Secretary of Defense of commodity classification requests, but there is no referral, and the Secretary of State is not even required to be notified. That is a prudent addition, an improvement. We should have unanimous consent of all the reviewing agencies on a license application. The Cox committee recommended that. It can still be taken up and ultimately approved if need be, but if the Department of Defense, for example, objects and no one else does, or the CIA or whoever, should that not require their sign-off?
As to postshipment verification, S. 149 says the Secretary of Commerce may deny licenses to countries that deny postshipment verification, although it says the Secretary shall deny licenses to particular end users. I suggest we add to that language that the Secretary of Commerce shall deny licenses to countries. Why do we mandate denying a license to an end user that will not let you verify it but leave it discretionary with the Secretary of Commerce to deny to a country that will not let you verify, when in many, if not all, of these cases it is a country policy? We have an agreement, for example, with the country of China. If we are being denied the right to go in and do our postshipment verification, it makes no sense to blame it on a company. It is the country that is denying us. So why should we make it mandatory on a company but discretionary with the country that is calling the shots?
As to foreign availability, the definition of ``foreign availability'' requires only that an item or substantially identical or directly competitive item be available to control countries from sources outside the United States in sufficient quantities at a price not reasonably excessive. This definition does not speak to relative quality. In other words, if it is out there, if other countries can supply it but if it is not the same quality as that of the United States, and it is potentially dangerous and it is something that can potentially be used for military purposes to a country of some concern, would we not want to take into consideration the fact we are liberalizing or loosening our standards because they have access to a similar item even though it is not of the same quality as our item? We ought to consider that carefully.
The deemed export issue, the definition of ``exports'' in S. 149 includes transfers of items out of the country or transfers of items within the country with the knowledge and intent that a person will take the item out of the country, but it does not cover any transfer of technology to a foreign national.
We have had a concept of deemed exports in this country for a long time, and that is if you give a foreign national the same kind of controlled information that is sent abroad, it ought to operate under the same rules if it is the same information because of the potentiality of it getting back, and we know that happens.
Under the current definition of the statute, the Secretary of Commerce has discretion over whether to control deemed exports. I do not think the Secretary of Commerce ought to have that discretion.
Now my concern here is that there has been pressure from the business community to eliminate the deemed export requirement altogether, and S. 149 includes language stating it is the committee's understanding that the administration will be reviewing the deemed export process with a view toward clarifying its application. I do not have any idea what that means. What I think it means is that we are going to work to get rid of this sucker, but we need a deemed export rule and we need it to be mandatory.
We had hearings and heard countless hours of testimony about what was happening in our National Laboratories when we were concerned about the information was getting out, and we saw the thousands of hours and thousands of people who were coming in from other countries who had access to information. Private industry was doing much better than the Government, but our own Government people were not submitting the necessary documentation for deemed exports to tell our people what information these folks had access to. It was common sense. We do not want to cut off foreign students. We do not want to cut off foreign experts, the technology; it benefits our own economy; we need that interplay. But it is common sense to protect yourself a little bit. We need to do that.
There are others we might consider, but those are some I hope within the next couple of days we have the opportunity to consider in some detail with an idea toward tightening it up some, and making it so when we leave this, having passed it, we have not unwittingly done something that made it more difficult in the operation of this process. It all sounds pristine when we describe it.
It goes here and here and here, and then someone has this right and the other fellow has the other right and these thousands of things that come rushing through, but in actual application it is not always quite that smooth. This bill, thank goodness, devotes some additional funding for this licensing process, which I think is a good thing. Let us make sure that in all of this we do what we can, at least around the edges, is the way I would look at it, to make sure we give enough time to properly consider these things, and we have them considered by the entities that ought to be looking at it and not being totally weighted or unduly weighted toward the commercial side.
So I look forward to the discussion. I congratulate my colleagues on their perseverance to get this bill this far. We have been arguing and discussing this bill for a long time. It is one of those cases where people have strong feelings on both sides and make valid points on both sides. Everyone is trying to strive for the right thing and the proper balance, and hopefully at the end of the day we will have something that will not produce grave concern among the American people.
I yield the floor. Source: Congressional Record, THOMAS.gov, Sept. 4, 2001
I am not a Thompson fan, but these remarks are excellent. Thank you for the post.
Can you show me something Thompson has stated in the past 4 years that will clearly show his anger and outrage over this monstrous growing government and our out of control, lawless borders?
Besides a Hollywood movie, is there a video somewhere that will show him banging on the podium, voicing his outrage and demanding something be done?
Post the link.