Kathryn Crocket, Ken Alibek’s assistant, brilliantly addressed these issues in her 2006 thesis.
She expresses her special thanks to Dr. Ken Alibek and Dr. Bill Patrick. As you know, Dr. Patrick consulted with the FBI and so the FBI credits his expertise. We, of course, all credit Dr.Alibek’s expertise. Katie successfully defended the thesis before an esteemed panel that included USAMRIID head and Ames strain researcher Charles Bailey.
She says that scientists who analyzed the power through viewing micrographs or actual contact are divided over the quality of the powder.
She cites Gary Matsumoto’s “Science” article in summarizing the debate.
She says the FBI has vaccillated on silica.
“Regarding the specific issue of weaponization, according to several scientists at USAMRIID who examined the material, the powder created a significant cloud when agitated meaning that the adhesion of the particles had been reduced. Reducing the adhesion of the particles meant that the powder would fly better.”
She explains that “The most common way to reduce electrostatic charge is to add a substance to the mixture, usually a silica based substance.”
On the issue of encapsulation, reports that “many experts who examined the powder stated the spores were encapsulated. Encapsulation involves coating bacteria with a polymer which is usually done to protect fragile bacteria from harsh conditions such as extreme heat and pressure that occurs at the time of detonation (if in a bomb), as well as from moisture and ultraviolet light. The process was not originally developed for biological weapons purposes but rather to improve the delivery of various drugs to target organs or systems before they were destroyed by enzymes in the circulatory system. (Alibek and Crockett, 2005) The US and Soviet Union, however, used this technique in their biological weapons programs for pathogens that were not stable in aerosol form... Since spores have hardy shells that provide the same protection as encapsulation would, there is no need to cover them with a polymer. “
She explains that one “possible explanation is that the spore was in fact encapsulated but not for protective purpose. Encapsulation also reduces the need for milling when producing a dry formulation. By reducing the need for milling, she means permits greater concentration of the biological agent. (See the patents I’ve uploaded above) If the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the use of encapsulation for this purpose, then he or she may have employed it because sophisticated equipment was not at his disposal.
My consulting military scientist who has made anthrax simulants described the patents as relating to an encapsulation technique which serves to increase the viability of a wide range of pathogens. In other words, his reaction was “wow”! To use technical jargon, his reaction was “ Ohmigosh!”
In “connecting the dots” one would want to consider whether any supporter of the militants had access to the now of this encapsulation technique. I’ve asked whether Ali Al-Timimi, the supporter of the Taliban who was working with Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, another GMU grad student at the department did. You are uninterested in the question even though the PhD student working with Dr.Alibek and Dr. Patrick has framed it brilliantly as the pertinent question in a very lucid analysis.
We might also consider whether any has expertise in such polymerization or encapsulation relating to drug delivery.
One scientist, biochemist Magdy al-Nashar is such an expert you might consult with on the subject. Dr. al-Nashar’s Ph.D. is in pharmaceutical enzymology. His dad said his son’s work was for medicine, not bomb-making. The current research interests are devoted to key aspects of biocatalytic materials and include the chemistry of enzyme immobilization on natural and synthetic polymeric supports, biocatalysis and the design and operation of biocatalytic processes with potential for technical applications. He is an expert in functionalized polymers.
The good doctor was detained in Cairo in July 2005 in connection with having leased an apartment used by London bombers to make bombs used to attack London’s transit system, denies any connection to Al Qaeda or any knowledge of what was planned. The flat was used to store things that were then sent to Afghanistan in care of el-Hadi, Zawahiri’s chief aide. Egyptian officials released al-Nashar. His PhD at University of Leedss biochemistry and microbiology department was granted May 2005.
He studied in North Carolina in 2000.
Magdy al-Nashar, 33, told investigators that he knew 19 yr.-old Lindsey Germaine, a Jamaican convert to Islam who lived in Aylesbury, about 140 miles away from the other suspects. He says he helped Germaine rent the apartment thought by officials to have been used to make the bombs. Traces of chemicals linked to the bombs reportedly were found in the rented flat.
One report stated that Al-Nashar was arrested and held briefly while in the company of a man later associated with the massacre of 58 tourists in Luxor. Some reports suggested that it was that “He was quizzed by Egyptian security services for two weeks but released without charge.” Al-Nashar’s brother, Muhammed, confirmed that his brother had once been arrested in connection to radical Islam. After Luxor probably hundreds were rounded up.
After the London bombing, Cairo attorney Mamdouh Ismail volunteered to represent al-Nashar. The Egyptian government would later allege that Mamdouh Ismail was Zawahiri’s chief conduit to jihadists in Yemen, Egypt and Iraq, via the Al Qaeda spymaster al-Hukaymah (aka Abu Jihad al-Masri). Ismail, a former EIJ member, announced in August 1999 that EIJ was renouncing violence because the organization had been infiltrated by intelligence services. In 1999, attorney Ismail sought to co-found the Islamic Party with Cairo attorney al-Zayat. Arrested in April 2007, he has been held incommunicado in Tora prison. His reported contact, Al Qaeda spymaster al-Hukaymah, was the author on US intelligence and law enforcement activitiies to include a section on the anthrax investigation.
Family, friends, neighbors, a former roommate at NC, and al-Nashar himself assure the public he is a good person and not involved in the London bombings and was committed to his research (and looking for a wife in Egypt while on holiday). He told police: “’I pray faithfully but that does not mean that I am a religious fundamentalist or extremist. ‘I was always keen to excel in my studies and had no relationships with any group or political party. My goal was to achieve something for my country.’” His ex-wife, who lived with him in Leeds for two years, said he was not a radical who mixed with strangers. Given the economies involved in making a commercial product using a far less expensive red seaweed, his work seems to be very promising commercial potential and wide application.
“I challenge the authorities to prove my involvement in this crime or my knowledge of it. I condemn the explosions.” Some — most notably the eminent and distinguished chemist TrebleRebel — argue that the anthrax in the second batch was actually highly sophisticated, using a novel (yet relatively simple) technique never before used in a known weapons program that involved functionalized polymers — specifically, polymerized glass. According to his webpage, Al Nashar’s expertise included functionalized polymers. Thus, authorities may be exploring these coincidences quite apart from the fact the bombers could have mixed the bomb chemicals on their own and there is said to be no link with the bombings or Al Qaeda. Although 75 security officials were present at his arrest, there has been no mention of the US FBI or CIA observing his questioning. Despite the number of officers, they politely waited until he was finished with his prayers.
An American FBI cooperating witness, Mohammed Junaid Babar from Queens, explained that the London bombers were connected to the Al Qaeda #3, al-Hadi (Zawahiri’s chief aide). He said at one time they suggested a plot by which Babar could get a job in a soccer stadium as a beer vendor. A syringe would be used to inject a beer can and would be taped over to prevent it from leaking.
errata/spelling - author of thesis is Kathryn Crockett.
Katie says of Al Qaeda (p. 20):
“This type of group would probably have access to sophisticated equipment, access to biological agents and dissemination technology, and would likely be able to produce weapons that cause significant harm.”
Katie now works in threat assessment for the USG.
Her thesis is a must-read for those following Amerithrax.
It might even put a Goosen in the steps of those who credit a Hatfill Theory.
The scientist that Ayman Zawahiri used to infiltrate the UK biodefense establishment was named Rauf Ahmad. Rauf Ahmad wrote Dr. Ayman in 1999, that he had “SUCCESSED IN OBTAINING SOME OF THE IMPORTANT INTERNET CONNECTIONS AND TRIED TO SOLVE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF OUR WORK DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH
[ABOUT 8 LINES REDACTED]
****QUESTION #1: WHO DID HE CONSULT WITH?****
After an earlier visit described in handwritten letter saying that the lab had only nonpathogenic strains, Rauf Ahmad visited a second lab on a long visit. He said “I SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED THE TARGETS DURING MY VISIT TO [name of lab redacted]
Rauf Ahmad discussed his training on a bioreactor. The learned Henry Niman explained that a bioreactor could be used to concentrate the anthrax product to the concentration level observed in the Daschle product.
He wrote: THEN I WENT TO [blanked out] TO MEET WITH DR. [redacted] in charge of [redacted] IN ORDER TO SEE THE FATE OF OUR DEMAND OF CULTURES. I VISITED ALONG WITH HIM ALL THE UNITS OF [redacted] INCLUDING THE SPECIAL CONFIDENTIAL ROOM IN WHICH THOUSANDS OF CULTURES ARE PLACED. HE ALSO SHOWED ME THE HIGHLY ADVANCED LEVEL-3 PATHOGEN LABORATORY.
*****QUESTION #2: WHAT LAB DID HE VISIT AT WHICH HE SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED THE TARGETS.*****
Relatedly, what did he mean by “successfully achieved the targets.”
I have uploaded scanned copies of some 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces describing the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; and the need for vaccination and containment. He explained that the lab director noted that he would have to take a short training course at the BL-3 lab for handling dangerous pathogens. Rauf Ahmad explained that his employer’s offer of pay during a 12-month post-doc sabbatical was wholly inadequate and was looking to Ayman to make up the difference. After an unacceptablly low pay for the first 8 months, there would be no pay for last 4 months and there would be a service break. He had noted that he only had a limited time to avail himself of the post-doc sabbatical.
I also have uploaded a fuller copy of earlier correspondence from before the lab visit described in the typed memo. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided the documents to me, along with 100+ more, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (”FOIA”).
Yazid Sufaat got the job handling things at the lab instead of Rauf Ahmad. More importantly, Zawahiri, as George Tenet has noted in his May 2007 book, kept things strictly compartmentalized at the highest level in connection with his PROJECT ZABADI — leaving the Amerithrax Task Force much to do.
The Pakistan ISI stopped cooperating with the CIA in early 2003. I first identified Rauf Ahmad (I used to refer to him as Abdur Rauf) in 2002.
Question: I have uploaded the resume of a Pakistan government scientist Rauf Ahmad. He is an ecotoxicologist, not a microbiologist. Skilled in the absorption of pesticides sprayed as aerosols into the skin. Is this the resume of the Rauf Ahmad who attended the 1999 and 2000 conferences for the Society for Applied Microbiology and who wrote the handwritten and typed letters in the Summer and Fall of 1999 to Ayman Zawahiri about setting up a lab? (I don’t know). After providing me his resume and graciously offering to answer any further inquries, saying he was looking forward to an “optimistic exchange” (as I was also), he has not responded to any questions. I made the mistake of letting know in a follow-up message (before hearing substantive details from ) that I had Rauf Ahmad’s correspondence with Ayman.
http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com