The scientist that Ayman Zawahiri used to infiltrate the UK biodefense establishment was named Rauf Ahmad. Rauf Ahmad wrote Dr. Ayman in 1999, that he had “SUCCESSED IN OBTAINING SOME OF THE IMPORTANT INTERNET CONNECTIONS AND TRIED TO SOLVE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF OUR WORK DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH
[ABOUT 8 LINES REDACTED]
****QUESTION #1: WHO DID HE CONSULT WITH?****
After an earlier visit described in handwritten letter saying that the lab had only nonpathogenic strains, Rauf Ahmad visited a second lab on a long visit. He said “I SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED THE TARGETS DURING MY VISIT TO [name of lab redacted]
Rauf Ahmad discussed his training on a bioreactor. The learned Henry Niman explained that a bioreactor could be used to concentrate the anthrax product to the concentration level observed in the Daschle product.
He wrote: THEN I WENT TO [blanked out] TO MEET WITH DR. [redacted] in charge of [redacted] IN ORDER TO SEE THE FATE OF OUR DEMAND OF CULTURES. I VISITED ALONG WITH HIM ALL THE UNITS OF [redacted] INCLUDING THE SPECIAL CONFIDENTIAL ROOM IN WHICH THOUSANDS OF CULTURES ARE PLACED. HE ALSO SHOWED ME THE HIGHLY ADVANCED LEVEL-3 PATHOGEN LABORATORY.
*****QUESTION #2: WHAT LAB DID HE VISIT AT WHICH HE SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED THE TARGETS.*****
Relatedly, what did he mean by “successfully achieved the targets.”
I have uploaded scanned copies of some 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces describing the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; and the need for vaccination and containment. He explained that the lab director noted that he would have to take a short training course at the BL-3 lab for handling dangerous pathogens. Rauf Ahmad explained that his employer’s offer of pay during a 12-month post-doc sabbatical was wholly inadequate and was looking to Ayman to make up the difference. After an unacceptablly low pay for the first 8 months, there would be no pay for last 4 months and there would be a service break. He had noted that he only had a limited time to avail himself of the post-doc sabbatical.
I also have uploaded a fuller copy of earlier correspondence from before the lab visit described in the typed memo. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided the documents to me, along with 100+ more, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (”FOIA”).
Yazid Sufaat got the job handling things at the lab instead of Rauf Ahmad. More importantly, Zawahiri, as George Tenet has noted in his May 2007 book, kept things strictly compartmentalized at the highest level in connection with his PROJECT ZABADI — leaving the Amerithrax Task Force much to do.
The Pakistan ISI stopped cooperating with the CIA in early 2003. I first identified Rauf Ahmad (I used to refer to him as Abdur Rauf) in 2002.
Question: I have uploaded the resume of a Pakistan government scientist Rauf Ahmad. He is an ecotoxicologist, not a microbiologist. Skilled in the absorption of pesticides sprayed as aerosols into the skin. Is this the resume of the Rauf Ahmad who attended the 1999 and 2000 conferences for the Society for Applied Microbiology and who wrote the handwritten and typed letters in the Summer and Fall of 1999 to Ayman Zawahiri about setting up a lab? (I don’t know). After providing me his resume and graciously offering to answer any further inquries, saying he was looking forward to an “optimistic exchange” (as I was also), he has not responded to any questions. I made the mistake of letting know in a follow-up message (before hearing substantive details from ) that I had Rauf Ahmad’s correspondence with Ayman.
http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com
Wow, you folks have been busy while I have been away. Here are some responses for you.
Post 56 - I most definitely am not saying in my dissertation that microbiologists are the people we need to turn to for our biodefense expertise. In fact I am saying the exact opposite, that though they are an important source of SOME types of information, there is an over-reliance upon them due to our own ignorance of biological weapons. We don’t know any better than to rely upon them, physicians, and public health experts. All of them are important BUT all of them have particular areas of expertise that only provide a small part of the picture. Biodefense is a highly eclectic science.
Post 65 Yes, faulty intelligence analysis occurs as a result of overreliance upon the people we incorrectly believe to be fully qualified. The example regarding growth in a mineral media was Burkholderia mallei (causative agent of glanders). Another example was Yersinia pestis (causative agent of plague). Just because an agent grows in a lab by a microbiologist under certain conditions does not mean that the requirements remain the same while production is scaled up. This would apply to growth of both harmful and beneficial organsisms.
Post 78 - Sorry, Dr. Alibek is completely engaged in building his biopharmaceutical production facility, the hospitals, hospice, and a whole host of other healthcare related endeavors. I choose not to distract him.
Take care, I’ll check back in next weekend.
Debra