Posted on 01/19/2007 5:47:40 PM PST by SmithL
This always happens with the Navy. Bucher was found culpable when the Pueblo was captured by the KorComs even though he had begged for weapons and all sorts of assistance. If the Captain is not capable of being God, the Captain will be shit canned if there is a problem.
Lousy practice.
Nah....Ruff,The CO will retire. The XO however doesn't have 20 years in yet. He will separate without a pension.
If this guy's getting beached (rightly or wrongly) for losing a couple of sailors, what should have happened to Bull Husley for losing a couple of destroyers and hundreds of sailors by ordering, against advice and with no military necessity, them to sail into the middle of a typhoon?
But Husley was already a media hero by then, so he wasn't punished.
I understand the Navy is a no-excuse outfit, but I also understand that it makes exceptions at it's convince.
Highly unlikely ... however, career wise this sub captain will be looking for work in the civilian world.
I think you mean Bull Halsey?
Unless he has 18 years. Probably doesn't. Could go reserves to get pension at 60.
The XO was commissioned in 1991. He would have 16 years in. To retire he would have to have 19 and six months. Ruff the CO has 21 in.
Ironically,the XO, an LCDR, was just designated "approved for command" in July. He would be slated for his own boat upon making 05. Neither will happen now. Don;t think the Navy is gonna let him hang around for 3 1/2 years just to pick up an 04 pension.
I thought I read on the earlier thread that once an officer reached LCDR, he was allowed to stay in until 20. Granted, the duty won't be that great, but he'll at least be able to draw a pension.
Once you hit 18 years you have hit sanctuary and are allowed to retire.
I am in a reserve unit and have had 3 reservist hit 18 years of active duty. Two of the 3 told their branch, and were given orders to report to an active duty post for their last 2 years. The 3rd rode it out in our unit and then called his branch and told them he was ready to retire.
Back in the 90s, soldiers got out with 14-16 years. Easy to get four in the last 8 years. Mobilize to go to Kosovo for a year. Mobilize to do a year in Iraq. Since my reserve unit trains reservists and National Guard units, we have had lots of soldiers mobilized. Could easily have been mobilized for the last 2 years.
Here is what I would recommend to the XO. Join a reserve unit and volunteer to go to Iraq or Afghanistan. Could be active for 12-16 months depending on the training required. While in country, volunteer again for another year, hit 18 and he is golden. Of course the navy would give him a crappy job his last 2 years but he would get his pension.
Don't think that is gonna happen. Don't think the Nav wants any officer with a high profile reprimand in his jacket hanging around in ANY capacity. A real Jonah and a morale problem.My guess is they both get separated as soon as possible. Not like the Navy is hurting for submarine officers. They may line up a job with a contractor for the XO to hasten his departure.
He could always join another service when he joins the reserves.
How would they separate the XO? I know you are booted if you don't make the promotion list after the 2nd look. You said he was promoted so that avenue isn't available. I figure if the XO sticks around he gets job away from troops where is some staff guy for some recruiting HQs.
I think they put him in an untenable position like making him Deputy commander of the Naval Hull Technician Safety Training in Elizabeth, New Jersey OR offer him a job at Electric Boat on a three year contract to seperate now. He will be given a nice title and an office at EB. Four years of shit in Elizabeth would be very tough...
Sadly, the once very proud US Submarine Force is headed the WRONG WAY> In this context it is important to include in the record the following blog, the URL of which was forwarded by SmithL, http://makeyourdepth.blogspot.com/2007/01/insider-thoughts-on-submarine-safety.html
The submarine force has gotten itself here in the usual nanny-state way, ever more time spent on training and admin to the point that there is no on the floor supervision, and those doing real work are so rushed for time with the little time left for real work that they don't have time to stop and think about what they are doing. The Navy continues to ratchet up the level of useless nonsense, rather than rely on line management accountability and execution of work by smart well-trained experts who are in control of what they are doing.
Thursday, January 18, 2007
Insider thoughts on the submarine safety standdown
Being on the crew of a sub, I got to take part in the safety standdown today (being in overhaul, ours was somewhat of a different agenda than the operational guys).
I can't delve into boat-specific issues, of course, but I got the impression that the VCNO (Subs) and the SubLant and SubPac commanders, as well as all in the upper chains, are really ready to listen to us in the blue shirts. At least I hope I'm right in that assessment.
One of the big issues my fellow PO1's and I brought up to our CO was how our time is so committed that we (and our CPO's, and our junior sailors) have somewhat less than 30% of our "workday" time to actually devote to our jobs. We have had an ever-increasing mandate of admin, training, and externally directed requirements that have eaten big chunks out of our day. I gave the example of a nuke in an overhaul situation, where the training requirements laid out by NavSea 08 put us in 6-10 hours of classroom training per week, with another 1-3 hours a week taking continuing training exams. That doesn't even count the time spend preparing the training and writing/grading exams. That is just 7-13 hours total per week in a chair getting either "death by PowerPoint" or a sore hand from multiple exams. I, for example, weekly attend 4 hours of Engineering Department training, 2 hours of Divisional training, and 2 hours of EOOW/EWS training, plus at least 2 hours of exam time. That's 10 hours per week. An ELT qualifies EWS gets 2 more hours a week (in addition to their Divisional training they are required to attend M-Division training) and one more divisional exam. That's nearly 25% of the theoretical "work week" just spent on your butt doing training. And it doesn't count GMT, training preparation, exam preparation/grading, and the myriad of reports and other admin that come with the job (especially for supervisors). The point we wanted to drive home is that as you move up the food chain to LPO, LCPO, Division Officer, Department Head, and up, there is more and more training and admin taking you away from deckplate supervision, on-the-job training, mentoring, and the things that were very likely missing that caused the 13 "tier I" events in the past 6 years.
I sat down and calculated up a typical inport (shipyard) schedule once, and discovered that I get somewhere around 30% or less of the work week with my division. Yes, about 70% of the time is "hardwired" such that my personnel aren't available to me as an LPO to do our jobs. And it wasn't just the nukes echoing this point...it was across the board, forward and aft (to varying degrees).
My opinion; many of the issues contributing to the problems the submarine force has faced in recent years is the decreased time we have to actually focus on the jobs we are put on the boat to do. Every incident adds more training, more admin, more time on inspections. There's less unencumbered "CO discretionary time" (time at sea not committed to some external requirement). There is less time for the sailor to actually work for his LPO. There is less time for the LPO/LCPO to actually be the LPO/LCPO. And the junior sailors don't just magically train, mentor, and perform without deckplate leadership.
The best thing the submarine force leadership could do...take a big knife and hack out about 30-40% or more of the admin, training, and inspection requirements. We on the boats know our jobs; LET US DO THEM. Let us go to sea in local op areas without some squadron rider that we have to show off for, mandate less on-your-ass "death by PowerPoint" training and let us at the LPO level train on what we see as our divisional needs, and TDU the non-essential admin and "check the box" paperwork. Give us back our time to do our jobs, and we'll keep the OOD's and EOOW's out of trouble out there.
I know I got long-winded, but this is an issue I have seen get worse and worse in my 16 years in submarines; the metric shows that throwing more training and checklists at the boats when there are incidents doesn't work. Following the 2001 incidents with Greeneville and subsequent major mishaps there was more admin and training mandated following each critique, yet each year (save 2004) since the number of major mishaps has actually risen. We've lost sight of the forest for killing all the trees for paper for the admin.
This problem seems, to my observation, plague the Navy as a whole to varying degrees. There was a time when the mission was the #1 priority, and if it didn't support the mission or the sailor accomplishing the mission it wasn't important...and was thus deep-sixed. Now we have the same missions, and the same number (or more) of them, and fewer ships/subs/sailors to do them with. If any time was the right time to trim the fat and get back to mission essentials, it is now.
'nuff said, I shall now step down from my soapbox
Officers cannot get Dishonorable Discharges. Officers get what are called "Dismissal" when a courts-martial determines they should be eliminated from the service. Only enlisted can get bad conduct and dishonorable discharges.
Wrong. He's already gotten NJP. This was just the final act.
This is because the British expect seamanship and forehandedness among it officers and NCOs. With our nanny-state navy, admin, training attendance, and petty rule following are the key indicators of promotability. That we don't get competent leadership is because it is not important on our scale of things.
And make no mistake about it. Attempting to conduct topside operations in 20ft swells is not competent seamanship. The weather conditions were no secret, and topside should have been cleared within 50 yards of the pier. There was no excuse in leaving sheltered waters before full rig for dive had been in place. You don't do what these guys did. An accident was not a likely outcome - it was going to happen, and with these guys in charge the death sentence was passed with the posting of the watchbill.
My prayers for the sailors, dead and injured who did their duty as ordered. I have no sympathy for my fellow officers in command on that day.
bump
Yes, he was the XO during the incident. The PXO was on board too, but they hadn't turned over yet.
"The topside crew was still involved in that when the sub cleared the breakwater and exposed the topside crew to the full force of the sea conditions beyond the breakwater"
If this is true, it betrays a severe lapse in judgement.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.