no firm evidence
That's from an agency that has no one on the ground over there. I think I would discount it.
You have got to love the leaks.LOL!
Leaks, leaks and more leaks.
And how many arrests?
The next Bush Cabinet Big who needs to check out is AG Gonzalez who is conspicuously missing in action.
Also - CIA certain Soviets will not move on Hungary!
Seymour Hersh again. I'm bookmarking this article for the time when the Iranians test their first bomb, as seems fairly likely at this point. That, of course, Hersh will call somebody else's fault at that point but it will be handy to have to shove in his face.
Who wrote the report? Valerie Plame? ;-)
That's true. It's not a secret.
CIA Report Cites Continuing Weapons Proliferation
By Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr.
Washington File Staff Writer
Washington - Nations determined to maintain or expand their weapons
of mass destruction (WMD)and ballistic missile development programs
have been significantly insulating them against interdiction and
disruption, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report says.
Additionally, the CIA report said that many of the countries that have
developed WMD and missile programs are rapidly trying to build
indigenous production capabilities to make themselves less dependent
on outside suppliers.
"Although these capabilities may not always be a good substitute for
foreign imports - particularly for more advanced technologies - in
many cases they may prove to be adequate," the semi-annual report
said. "In addition, as their domestic capabilities grow, traditional
recipients of WMD and missile technology could emerge as new suppliers
of technology and expertise."
The unclassified CIA report, "Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," is
sent to Congress every six months. The current report, released
February 23, covers the period from January 1 to June 30, 2000.
The current report analyzes WMD and missile technology acquisition by
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and
Egypt, and also examines the key suppliers Russia, North Korea, China
and western nations.
"Some countries of proliferation concern are continuing efforts to
develop indigenous designs for advanced conventional weapons and
expand production capabilities, although most of these programs
usually rely heavily on foreign technical assistance," the report said
current trends suggest. "Many of these countries - unable to obtain
newer or more advanced arms - are pursuing upgrade programs for
existing inventories."
The CIA said it remains very concerned about Russian weapons
proliferation behavior, as a key supplier, and monitoring "will remain
a very high priority."
"Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a
variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to
countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya," the CIA said.
The reason for continued Russian proliferation stems, at least partly,
from Moscow's need for "badly needed foreign exchange through exports"
from the state-run defense and nuclear industries, which are also
strapped for funds, the report said.
The CIA said that because Iran was able to obtain technology and
materials from Russia, it accelerated Iranian development of the
Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
In addition Russia has remained a significant source of dual-use
biotechnology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for
Iran. "Russia's biological and chemical expertise make it an
attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and
training on biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare-agent (CW)
production processes," the report said.
North Korea continues to export significant ballistic missile-related
equipment and missile components, materials, and technical expertise
to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa, the CIA
said.
The report also said China has continued to provide substantial
missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan. It has also provided
assistance to Iran, North Korea and Libya, the report said.
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD
and advanced conventional weapons technology from abroad to develop an
indigenous capability to produce biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons, the CIA said. It has sought the technology from Russia,
China, North Korea, and Western Europe.
"Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has
manufactured and stockpiled several thousand tons of chemical weapons,
including blister, blood, and choking agents, and the bombs and
artillery shells for delivering them," the report said.
The CIA report may be viewed on the Web at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2001.htm
(The Washington File is a product of the Office of International
Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Website:
http://usinfo.state.gov)
Regards, Ivan
Written by who?Valerie Plame? Go figure.
The CIA doesn't seem to be on Americas side any more. They've been faking info since desert storm. It was their reporting that got us into Iraq looking for WMDs. So far, we've found a few, but nothing like they claimed. Why should we believe anything they say now?
This is such a pantload.
Time to put and end to Tehran's ambitions.
Yeah, the CIA completely missed that PakiNuke but they promise they know what they're talking about this time and it's not political.
Acquisition by Country
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2003. We have excluded countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.
Iran
Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce WMD-nuclear, chemical, and biological-and their delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe.
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in violation of its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran sought technology that can support fissile material production for a nuclear weapons program.
Iran tried to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed that Iran was secretly building a heavy water production plant and a "nuclear fuel" plant. Press reports later in the year confirmed these two facilities using commercial imagery and clarified that the "fuel" plant was most likely a large uranium centrifuge enrichment facility located at Natanz. Commercial imagery showed that Iran was burying the enrichment facility presumably to hide it and harden it against military attack. Following the press disclosures, Iran announced at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) September 2002 General Conference that it had "ambitious" nuclear fuel cycle plans and intended to develop all aspects of the entire fuel cycle. By the end of 2002, the IAEA had requested access to the enrichment facility at Natanz, and the IAEA Director General (DG) for the first time visited the facility in February 2003. The IAEA is investigating the newly disclosed facilities, and previously undisclosed nuclear material imports to determine whether Iran has violated its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement in developing these facilities and their related technologies. At the June 2003 Board of Governors meeting, the IAEA DG presented a report on the Iranian program noting Tehran had failed to meet its safeguards obligations in a number of areas. The DG's report described a pattern of Iranian safeguards failures related to the undeclared import and processing of uranium compounds in the early 1990s, expressed concern over the lack of cooperation from Iran with IAEA inspections, and identified a number of unresolved concerns in Iran's program that the IAEA will continue to investigate. The IAEA Board on 19 June welcomed the report and called on Iran to answer all IAEA questions, cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors, and sign and implement an Additional Protocol immediately and unconditionally.
Although Iran claims that its nascent enrichment plant is to produce fuel for the Russian-assisted construction projects at Bushehr and other possible future power reactors, we remain concerned that Iran is developing enrichment technology to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons under the cover of legitimate fuel cycle activities. Iran appears to be embarking on acquiring nuclear weapons material via both acquisition paths—highly enriched uranium and low burn-up plutonium. Even with intrusive IAEA safeguards inspections at Natanz, there is a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities. Of specific proliferation concern are the uranium centrifuges discovered at Natanz, which are capable of enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Iran claims its heavy water plant is for peaceful purposes. In June, Iran informed the IAEA that it is pursuing a heavy water research reactor that we believe could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We also suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring fissile material and technology from foreign suppliers to support its overall nuclear weapons program.
Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)—including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8)—as well as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had begun production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.
Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents—and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them—which it previously had manufactured.
Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels.
https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#iran
Looks to me like the CIA works for the UN not the USA!
Since there is no "firm" or "conclusive" evidence of an Iranian n-bomb program besides the plans we gave them by mistake and the A. Khan network, etc., I've got a plan.
A daring plan.
Since Iran won't let the IAEA do its inspection job, let's embargo or sanction Iran until they agree to inspectors then we can allay all doubts.
by Seymour Hersh....
Not to mention that all Hersh, the CIA or anyone else has to do is listen to the President of Iran to know that they are indeed working on developing nuikes.
The CIA was also caught totally surprised to find out how far Libyan advanced in their development towards a nuclear bomb, when Kaddaffi decided he didn't want to end up like Saddam, and gave it all up, and let us in to verify.
seymour hersch is a hack