"Putin stressed in his address to the nation in April 2005 that "the civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Eurasian continent should continue."
Posted on 10/17/2006 3:26:42 AM PDT by MarMema
Until the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, Russian influence in Central Asia was beyond dispute. The emergence of independent states from Soviet republics and a succession of paralyzing domestic crises in Russia put an end to the days of diktat. But President Vladimir Putin has made the restoration of Russian influence throughout the former empire a priority in his second term. In a phrase redolent of 19th-century empire-building, Putin stressed in his address to the nation in April 2005 that "the civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Eurasian continent should continue."
Putin's rhetorical flourish came amid a number of real and rumored initiatives to bolster ties with Central Asian states. Most recently, "Kommersant-Daily" reported on 5 September -- just as newly elected Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev was arriving in Moscow for a visit -- that the Kremlin has developed "a special plan to strengthen Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan." According to the newspaper, the 2005-07 action plan envisions the "gradual transfer of the Kyrgyz energy sector to Russian companies." Gazprom, Russia's state-controlled natural-gas monopoly, will undertake "the exploration and development of gas fields and the modernization and construction of new gas-transport facilities." Russian electrical company Unified Energy Systems (EES) will build two hydropower stations, possibly with help from Russian Aluminum, which is seeking a convenient source of power for aluminum-production facilities it hopes to construct in Kyrgyzstan. In return, Moscow will write off half of Kyrgyzstan's $180 million Soviet-era debt and pass legislation to ease conditions for an estimated 300,000 Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia.
The plan has a geopolitical component as well, the newspaper claimed. Russia hopes to boost its military presence at its air base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, Moscow would like to see Kyrgyzstan put pressure on the United States to set a departure date for the U.S. air base at Manas. Another point of contention for the Kremlin is what it perceives as the excessive pro-Americanism of several ministers in the Kyrgyz interim cabinet: Foreign Minister Roza Otunbaeva, Defense Minister Ismail Isakov, and Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov. The grand plan, the report suggests, would involve their replacement with figures more palatable to Moscow.
There is, of course, no proof that such a grand plan actually exists. The results of Bakiev's visit to Russia confirmed only some of the newspaper's bold predictions -- a Russian commitment to speed the passage of legislation codifying the status of Kyrgyz migrant workers and a debt-restructuring agreement. According to "Rossiiskaya gazeta," Bakiev and Putin discussed hydropower and aluminum projects in Kyrgyzstan but did not reach any concrete agreements.
The Plan In Effect The purported plan's general outlines, and especially its economic component, are consistent with existing initiatives in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, however. President Putin visited Tajikistan in October 2004 accompanied by Kremlin-friendly oligarch Oleg Deripaska, who heads Russian Aluminum. The result was a comprehensive agreement involving a Russian exchange of Tajik sovereign debt for a surveillance facility, the establishment of a permanent Russian military base in Tajikistan, and a RusAl commitment to undertake a multibillion-dollar project to build hydropower stations and aluminum-production facilities.
Similar trends are evident in Uzbekistan. Even as Tashkent's relations with the West cooled after the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and then abruptly nosedived after the violence in Andijon in May 2005, Russia and Uzbekistan have embarked on a rapprochement after an extended chill. Putin and Uzbek President Islam Karimov inked a strategic-partnership agreement in June 2004, and Russia's Gazprom and LUKoil have signed on to some $2 billion in long-term investments in Uzbekistan. Most recently, LUKoil joined a consortium of companies from Uzbekistan, China, Malaysia, and South Korea to explore and develop gas fields in Uzbekistan's Aral Sea region, RFE/RL's Uzbek Service reported on 12 September. Specialists queried by Russia's "Vedomosti" said that the consortium, which hopes to sign a production-sharing agreement in 2006, could spend up to $2 billion to identify 1 trillion cubic meters of recoverable reserves.
Suspicions that neo-imperial aims may underpin these moves feed on a steady stream of articles in Russia that voice precisely such ideas, often in strikingly anti-Western and anti-American tones. And the authors need not be Russian nationalists. In fact, one of the most stirring calls for a revivified empire was written by Aleksandr Chachia, a Georgian opposition figure. In an article that appeared in "Ekspert" on 22 August (No. 31) under the title "Bring Back Our Russia," Chachia accused Western forces of mounting an "operation to expel Russia for good from post-Soviet space." He dismissed described recent upheaval in Georgia and Ukraine as attempts to "replace one puppet regime with another without any qualitative changes in the nature and structure of power" and bemoaned the two countries' fates as "post-socialist states that have become toys in the hand of the State Department."
According to Chachia, the so-called "revolutions" are "a component part of the American project of globalization" in which "national culture is intensively replaced with an Americanized cultural surrogate." Only Russia can save these potential victims of globalization from extinction. For Russia has already produced two world-moving ideas -- first when Moscow pronounced itself the Third Rome in defense of Christendom, and later when it embraced communism. The time has come for a third idea: "Russia must become the bearer of an elevated spiritual and cultural idea what will be attractive for peoples striving to preserve their national individuality under conditions of globalization, which Americanizes and Westernizes anything and everything."
As Dmitry Shlapentokh pointed out in a 2 September commentary on EurasiaNet, such notions of "benevolent imperialism" emerge from the political philosophy of Eurasianism as it was espoused by a number of Russian thinkers in the 1920s. Shlapentokh notes that "there is a vital geographical component to Eurasianism, dictating that Russia should control the Eurasian heartland, including Central Asia and the Caucasus." Modern Eurasianists such as Aleksandr Dugin have "branded the United States, not Europe, as the mortal enemy of Russia/Eurasia...[and] forcefully argued that only Eurasianism could resolve Russia's numerous post-Soviet dilemmas." Shlapentokh concludes that while Eurasianism's "selective analysis of Russia's past" -- manifested in a tendency to ignore the seamier side of empire -- and failure to account for current regional complexities make it ill-suited to serve as a modern blueprint, the "apparent contradictions...do not preclude the possibility that Russian policy makers will rely on Eurasian thinking in making future policy decisions."
The Rise Of Russia's Eurasianist
In fact, Russia's best-known Eurasianist, Dugin, has become an increasingly prominent figure in Russia. A polyglot autodidact who once worked in the archives of the Soviet intelligence services, Dugin dabbled in esoteric extremism in the early 1990s. As the decade wore on, he adopted a Eurasianist ideology and started to make contacts with the political establishment. In 1998, he became an adviser on strategic and geopolitical questions to the speaker of Russia's parliament. With Putin's ascent, Dugin broke into the mainstream. Today, he runs the International Eurasian Movement, appears on national television, and publishes in big-name newspapers.
In early September, Dugin held a press conference in Moscow to announce plans to unify nationalist youth movements in an effort to fight the spread of "orange" revolutions, "Vremya novostei" reported on 8 September. "We're creating an organizational committee to hold a congress of Eurasian nationalists in November-December," he said. Painting Eurasianism as a non-Western imperial project that will allow small states to retain their identity under Russia's big umbrella, Dugin claimed 40,000 supporters and described the Kremlin's attitude toward his project as "benevolent." With an eye to upcoming electoral struggles in Russia, Dugin hinted at clenched fists, "Gazeta" reported. "The 'orange guys' are definitely going to beyond the realm of the law, which means that we have the right to do this as well," he said. And while Dugin disavowed direct Kremlin involvement in his latest project, he stressed: "Business knows what's what, and now we have a solid economic base."
Though the rhetoric is tantalizing, it does not necessarily form a natural backdrop to a neo-imperialist turn in Russian foreign policy. For one, Dugin's project, despite its Eurasianist geopolitical pretensions, is firmly rooted in the vicissitudes of domestic politics. As Aleksei Makarkin, deputy director of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technologies, told "Gazeta," "The Kremlin is also getting ready for a scenario that involves violence in the new 2007-08 electoral cycle, so Dugin's initiative to unite nationalist organizations will definitely come in handy."
In other words, Dugin's new project, like the Kremlin-sponsored youth group Nashi, falls under the rubric of nationalist-tinged attempts to stir up popular sentiment for a defense of the status quo. In this context, Dugin's comment on business makes perfect sense: if people with money who "know what's what" have forked over enough cash to give a nationalist youth movement a "solid economic base," one can safely assume it's not for a revolution at home. It is, rather, to ensure that the powers that be continue to be just as they are.
Money And Power
For if one common thread runs through Russia's recent development, it is the increasing intertwining of money and power. Oligarchic capitalism was supposed to be the hallmark of Boris Yeltsin's Russia, with financial-industrial groups meddling in public politics for personal gain. The arrival of Putin and his much-ballyhooed "siloviki" has been taken by some to indicate a qualitative change, with the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovskii and the subsequent court-assisted hostile takeover of his oil company presented as proof that the days of all-powerful oligarchs with a penchant for politics are over. But there is equal reason for viewing the change as qualitative, with fewer boundaries than ever between money and power making for a more placid exterior and seemingly authoritarian policy initiatives such as increasing state control over media emerging from a compact that is more material than it is political.
Khodorkovskii, for example, told "Zavtra" in a recent interview: "I'm convinced that they put me in prison not because of politics but to take away Yukos. Politics was just a pretext. ...I underestimated the extent to which a person close to Putin -- [deputy head of the presidential administration] Igor Sechin -- and some of his business partners are motivated by property and how far they are willing to go in the fight for other people's money."
Perceptive critics of Putin also couch their analyses in terms that have little to do with politics and a great deal to do with money. Here is how Stanislav Belkovskii, the founder of the National Strategy Institute, explained to "Zavtra," in an interview published on apn.ru on 12 September, why Putin is unlikely to seek a third presidential term: "As soon as the relatives of the former president stuff their pockets with revenues from the sale of Sibneft and the second president himself carefully carries out of rotting Russia a sizeable stake in Gazprom and $5 billion-$6 billion in cash, staying in the Kremlin will lose all meaning for [Putin]."
What this suggests is that the main "project" for the Russian elite is the preservation of a profitable status quo. In the context of Russian foreign policy, and specifically policy toward Central Asia, this project raises specific questions. When, for example, Oleg Deripaska travels to Tajikistan with President Putin, the president would appear to be advancing Russia's geopolitical interests as he oversees a debt agreement and establishes a permanent military base while the aluminum tycoon, moving in his wake, tends to economic interests with a promising investment initiative. But are the geopolitics and the economics really as complementary and coordinated as they appear? Which is the true driving force? And if the tail is wagging the dog, what does that mean for the "project" as a whole?
"Putin stressed in his address to the nation in April 2005 that "the civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Eurasian continent should continue."
Exactly. Plus some messianic and religious stuff too. Look at this arrogance from a thread in the religion forum, which sickened me to read.
However, to our dismay, we see that the current Russian government continues to unhesitatingly interfere, and, indeed, to even 'make policy' concerning matters that are strictly ecclesiastical."
"Those who speak of a 3rd Rome are totally unsuited to hold leadership positions in the Orthodox Church, because they will play a role in transforming her from a Christ-worshipping faith to a feudalistic organization based upon the exercise of raw power."
"On the other side of this issue, the official representative of the Russian government, Vladimir Zorin, spoke of the need to unite all of the Orthodox nations "...under the banner of the Russian Church, which is the largest, and, as such, holds the leadership position among the Orthodox Churches."
The Metropolitan of Smolensk, Cyril, stated unequivocally that: "The Russian Orthodox Church holds the de facto first place among all of the other Orthodox Churches because of her great spirituality, her ethics and virtues, her tradition, and her political influence; as such, she speaks for the over 350 million Russians throughout the world. Moreover, she exercises influence in all of the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans, as well as in those countries where the Orthodox faithful represent a minority. We are the rightful spiritual heirs of Byzantium."
See reply 5. The Russian church has suddenly decided they are bigger and better than all of the rest of the Orthodox churches, and this follows what is happening in the secular part of Russia just perfectly.
It is different, in what we are "selling". We are selling freedom and democracy, self-reliance. Your country is selling restrictions and authoritarian control.
Thanks for coming by! Do you think it works to say "The Russians are coming?"
>We are selling freedom
freedom from what?
freedom to do what?
What i hear about "lack of freedom" in Russia is coming from biased press, grant-fed journalists and NGO. What i feel about this is "they are working hard for the money they are receiving".
>and democracy
We want to have our own democracy, why should it be western-style?
>self-reliance
We are trying to be self-reliant while neo-democracies are living on financial injections.
>is selling restrictions
Which restrictions?
>authoritarian control
Don't confuse authoritatian control with fight against anarchy. What we had before Putin was clearly anarchy.
Tell me the freedoms you have and cherish in your country.
Well, it obviously annoys sime pro-Putin Russians, that is fot sure!
I can do whatever i want if i do not break the law.
I can openly state my opinion, i can read whatever i want, practice whatever religion i believe in.
I know that noone taps my computer or phone, that my neighbours do not report about me to police or sue me.
I have no idea about political correctness, sexual harrasement laws, equal opportunity/reverse discrimination scam.
I can live my life, with noone trying to intervene.
Isn't it freedom?
China to set up Confucius institutes in Russia
Russian state wire service to promote media exchanges with China
IT's Eurasia Time!
"He said the Russian authorities also assured of their cooperation in training, equipping and strengthening of Afghan police and military. Russia has already pledged $170 million in aid to Afghanistan's reconstruction during the Tokyo Conference in 2002 in addition to the $50 million pledged for training of the Afghan National Army (ANA)."
But if you had no parents, required a wheelchair or insulin, were gay or blind, then what would life be like in Russia?
>you had no parents
I have plently of friends who lost one or both parents early, yet they they have no complexes about this and are successfull in life.
>required a wheelchair
I know many people in wheelchair working out of home, they are fully capable persons usually
>insulin
All diabete suffering patients in Russia receive free insulin, care, and other medication. Yet they are free to buy expensive insulin if they can and want to.
I personally know many of diabete suffering persons who live normal life, have family, travel and do sports.
>were gay
Gays are free to meet, live together and do whatever they want with each other. Laws prohibiting sexual minorities are gone long ago (at the same time USSR has gone if i remember it correctly). I know many gays/lesbians who are open about their orientation yet they have no problems about it.
In our city they even have couple of night clubs.
>or blind
We have a society of blind people, most of them live in small enclave in the center of the city, where semaphors make sound dependant on light colour, shops with audible marks, club, and even factory.
Same to deaf persons (they just don't have a factory since they can work in places where hearing can be easily damaged - like jet engine testing)
Offcourse they have less opportunities in receiving high education, but nobody prevents them from homeschooling.
>Chinese students in Russia sought after in job market
China to set up Confucius institutes in Russia
Russian state wire service to promote media exchanges with China
Is it disturbing to you? There are lot more Chinese in U.S. than here.
>Dollar drops after weak industrial production report, Yen continues to benefit from Russia diversification talk
Dollar is at least overvalued. Diversification is good in all senses.
>S.Korea, Russia to cooperate in gas development
Is selling energy to YOUR ally a sign of so called Eurasianism? :)
Since you are promoting all the wonderful benefits of living in 'Col Putin's Peoples Paradise' how come you re-entered FR under another name on October 17th, 2006. What was wrong with your old FR name?
Comrade, do you believe I should relocate to Putin's 'new & improved' Russia. Are there now express trains to Siberia? :)
which name?
No, I think those are signs of how Putin is following his Eurasian plan.
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