Hez Hacked Israeli Radios

Defense Technology.org ^ | 9/19/06 | n/a

[LS]

This is downright shocking, if true. "Hezbollah guerrillas were able to hack into Israeli radio communications during last month's battles in south Lebanon, an intelligence breakthrough that helped them thwart Israeli tank assaults," Newsday reports.

Using technology most likely supplied by Iran, special Hezbollah teams monitored the constantly changing radio frequencies of Israeli troops on the ground. That gave guerrillas a picture of Israeli movements, casualty reports and supply routes. It also allowed Hezbollah anti-tank units to more effectively target advancing Israeli armor, according to the officials.

The Israeli military refused to comment on whether its radio communications were compromised, citing security concerns. But a former Israeli general, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Hezbollah's ability to secretly hack into military transmissions had "disastrous" consequences for the Israeli offensive.

Like most modern militaries, Israeli forces use a practice known as "frequency-hopping" - rapidly switching among dozens of frequencies per second - to prevent radio messages from being jammed or intercepted. It also uses encryption devices to make it difficult for enemy forces to decipher transmissions even if they are intercepted. The Israelis mostly rely on a U.S.-designed communication system called the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System.

With frequency-hopping and encryption, most radio communications become very difficult to hack. But troops in the battlefield sometimes make mistakes in following secure radio procedures and can give an enemy a way to break into the frequency-hopping patterns. That might have happened during some battles between Israel and Hezbollah, according to the Lebanese official. Hezbollah teams likely also had sophisticated reconnaissance devices that could intercept radio signals even while they were frequency-hopping.

During one raid in southern Lebanon, Israeli special forces said they found a Hezbollah office equipped with jamming and eavesdropping devices. It was my impression that this kind of signal interception was really, really hard to do -- especially for an irregular force like Hezbollah. I know there are some radio and commsec gurus who read the site regularly. Weigh in here, guys.

Or maybe the article itself contains the seed of what actually happened. "Besides radio transmissions, the official said Hezbollah also monitored cell phone calls among Israeli troops," Newsday notes. A raided Hezbollah base had list of "cell phone numbers for Israeli commanders."

Cells are, of course, way easier to intercept. "Israeli forces were under strict orders not to divulge sensitive information over the phone." But maybe they talked anyway. Maybe they thought Hezbollah would never be sophisticated enough to grab their calls. Weeks ago, the Times of London and Asia Times had hints of this. Apparently using techniques learnt from their paymasters in Iran, they were even able to crack the codes and follow the fast-changing frequencies of Israeli radio communications, intercepting reports of the casualties they had inflicted again and again. This enabled them to dominate the media war by announcing Israeli fatalities first.

[LS]

Not good.

[TexasRepublic]

If true, they were mighty stupid to tip off the Israelis.

[MAD-AS-HELL]

Highly believeable. What I find unbelievable is that Israel didn't know they had these type of weapons or at least know that they had the capablility to hack and didn't take the steps to counter act it. Remember that Israel is one of the worlds hi tech leaders and should have known to look out for this.

[Uncle Hal]

Folks we are in for a real battle over the next several years. This is just the beginning.

[sigSEGV]

Bruce Schneier's, god of all things encryption, take:

But I have even more skepticism. If indeed Hezbollah was able to do this, the last thing they want is for it to appear in the press. But if Hezbollah can't do this, then a few good disinformation stories are a good thing.

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/09/did_hezbollah_c.html

[SMM48]

If true, they were mighty stupid to tip off the Israelis.

I was thinking the same thing. I think it's a safe bet that loophole will be corrected by the next time.

[MeanWestTexan]

It's not a technology problem, it's an implementation problem.

The Israelis have (with good reason) contempt for the rock-throwing savages that are Islam.

This caused them to be sloppy.

I respect mad dogs, rattlesnakes, the black plague, cyanide, and muslims, in all about the same way.

[LibLieSlayer]

Spread Spectrum and 128 bit encryption would stop this.

LLS

[BeHoldAPaleHorse]

Not good.

If true, not good. But, given that breaking the enemy's crypto is something that you keep absolutely secret even long after the war is over (see: ULTRA), it's probably not true.

[ASA Vet]

MI Ping

MIJI Report

[jdege]

I don't think we could intercept frequency-hopping communications, unless we had the keys.

Three possibilities:

1. Israeli troops were using cell phones, and they were listening to those (as has already been suggested).
2. Israeli troops were using commercial FRS/GMRS radios. Which is something our own troops have done.
3. Some Israeli troops were sloppy with their key handling - and some managed to find their way to Hezbolah.

[1COUNTER-MORTER-68]

TANKS,,,Great Post,,,Yes the IDF was Hacked,,There were
Some PICS on the Middle East Live Thread of the bunkers
With the Computers etc. Intact ! Some IDF Grunts paid in
Blood for those Bunkers (intel) It would be great to post
the pics again,,,If anybody still has them,,,?

[Diogenesis]

"Three possibilities:
1. Israeli troops were using cell phones, and they were listening to those (as has already been suggested).
2. Israeli troops were using commercial FRS/GMRS radios. Which is something our own troops have done.
3. Some Israeli troops were sloppy with their key handling - and some managed to find their way to Hezbolah."



4. Some Israeli troops are Islamic plants giving keys, intel, etc. to their mullahs.
5. Some US troops/CIA/State Dept. are Islamic plants giving keys, intel, etc. to their mullahs.

[Red Badger]

Cell PHONES?!?!?!?!?!?! IN A BATTLEZONE?!?!?!?!?!?!?!..........How crazy can one be?........

[samadams2000]

Thats why they needed to level the place with all they had early. Clusters, fuel air, MOABs, Spectres, Tactical diamond tips, whatever. They needed to scare the muhammed out of them.

[zerosix]

Gotta really love those terrorists. Most of the time they just can't wait to come forward as perps of their heinous behavior but this is a real gift!

Don't know how long it might have taken the Israelis (under the liberal government) to realize that the reason they were getting rolled in that skirmish was that someone knew in advance of their plans and locations.

Former Israeli military changed tactics when they realized one wasn't working or was failing all the way around.

Those guys know that everyone in their neighborhood has a bulls eye planted on each and every man, woman and child and the only friend on the face of the globe is us, most of the time when we're not trying to play nice with the U.N. idiots.

[Mariner]

I don't buy it. It's mis/disinformation.

The Israeli's have the best encryption technology in the world...at worst, they're tied with the US.

As for Iran, I doubt they could break a PC's SSL encryption in a week, much less in real time.

[Dr.Deth]

Not original.

Off da Hezzie.

[taxcontrol]

"...During one raid in southern Lebanon, Israeli special forces said they found a Hezbollah office equipped with jamming and eavesdropping devices. It was my impression that this kind of signal interception was really, really hard to do -- especially for an irregular force like Hezbollah. I know there are some radio and commsec gurus who read the site regularly. Weigh in here, guys. "

Ok, some short comments.

Jamming can be done by just about anyone who has access to an electronics store, some wire and power. The problem with jamming is that it gives your position away (at least the position of the transmitting antenna). This in turn, makes it a nice target. In short, not difficult... just not "wise" to do it often and at high power levels. Selective jamming takes a bit more common sense but is not that effective.

As for eavesdropping.... depends. A lot of people confuse signals interception and signals interpretation. In short, can you hear them (intercept) and can you understand them (interpret) are two different activities. Most often, when people say eavesdropping they are mixing the two terms.

Interception of frequency hopping signals is doable but often requires a bit of skill / luck / intelligence to track the hopping pattern. Once you know the pattern or can identify (interpret) a signal within the transmission, frequency hopping is not as effective of a signals defense. I should point out that a lot of non-signals people tend to not practice good transmission practices and this can lead to compromises in the overall security.


As for interpret, the fundamental protection against interpretation is encryption. Low levels of encryption can be broken by a few high powered machines in a few hours. This requires a bit more skill and knowledge and is normally thought to be outside of the range of a non-state sponsored terror cell. However, I believe it has been shown that the Hezzies are state sponsored and much stronger encryption should be employed.

My opinion is that following the frequency hopping is not that technically difficult and if weak encryption was used, then with the sponsorship of Iran, the Hezzies would have the capability to listen in. BTW, one of the warning signs that your encryption has been broken is when the other side stops or significantly reduces jamming efforts. You see, if they are jamming you, they can't listen in.

[taxcontrol]

Not if the operators are sloppy. One of the techniques employed by the Germans with Enigma that lead to the down fall of the crypto method was to transmit a 3 letter designation of the transform set, followed by the same 3 letters at the beginning of each message.

In short cryptography is no stronger than the weakest link... many times, that is the operators.