Geopolitical Diary: Implications of a Shaky Cease-Fire
The fighting in Lebanon over the past 34 days has set off a chain of unprecedented events. Hezbollah declared a "strategic, historic victory" against Israel on Monday, and rightfully so; the invincibility of Israel's military might has come into question. The importance of this reality cannot be overestimated.
Hezbollah has gotten exactly what it was aiming for. As we have stated throughout the conflict, an imminent cease-fire allows Hezbollah to emerge effectively victorious. It hardwires the perception throughout the region that a nonstate militant actor has defeated Israel (by fighting it to a draw) in a conventional war. Regardless of what Israel states it accomplished on the ground in Lebanon, Hezbollah has sustained itself as a viable fighting force.
The battle of perception is what Hezbollah's patron, Iran, values most. Iran has used its influence in Iraq, in concert with its nuclear gambit, to reclaim its position as the regional hegemon. Activating Hezbollah in Lebanon and exposing Israel's weakness -- when no Arab state dared to confront the Jewish state militarily -- has only reinforced Iran's ability to reconfigure the balance of power in the Middle East in favor of the Shia.
While Hezbollah, Iran and Syria are celebrating, the Arab regimes surrounding Israel are beginning to reconsider the Israeli military deterrent. Meanwhile, a tenuous cease-fire is hanging over Lebanon, with enough caveats in place to make the entire agreement fall apart. If the cease-fire does actually fall through -- which is extremely likely -- it will probably not be due to a conscious decision by one side or the other to breach it. Rather, it will be the inevitability of events that will lead to its collapse.
The cease-fire is fraught with Catch-22's: Israel will not withdraw until the Lebanese army deploys to the south, the Lebanese army won't deploy to the south until Hezbollah disarms on its own, and Hezbollah says it will not disarm, period. At the same time, Israel and Hezbollah have each reserved the right to resume hostilities if they feel threatened.
Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, delivered a very telling speech Monday, in which he essentially told the Lebanese army to think twice before attempting to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River. Nasrallah welcomed the return of National Dialogue talks with the leaders of Lebanon's major factions, shedding light on Hezbollah's intention to use its political prowess to gridlock the government once again and postpone the issue of disarmament. Iran is not about to give up its most prized militant asset in the region, and Hezbollah is feeling confident enough to deflect any attempts to disarm it.
But Hezbollah has its own share of worries. The Lebanese army will not go into southern Lebanon unless ordered to deploy there alongside U.N. peacekeeping forces. If Hezbollah is confronted with a forceful attempt by the Lebanese army to disarm its fighters, it will face the dilemma of whether to open fire on its countrymen -- something Hezbollah wants to avoid at all costs. With much of the country already in ruins, and with frustration brewing among Lebanese over the conflict provoked by Hezbollah, going to war against the Lebanese armed forces will only undermine Hezbollah's position as a resistance movement working on behalf of Lebanon against Israeli aggression. At the same time, the Lebanese army refuses to get embroiled in a situation in which it will be forced to open fire on Hezbollah fighters, especially as the group's success against Israel is being celebrated by a significant number of Lebanese civilians. The dilemma on both sides bodes ill for the permanence of the cease-fire.
Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has to answer to a country and military that is largely outraged by the results of the fighting. For Israel, this shaky cease-fire is not the end -- it has maintained the preponderance of its force and can revisit the issue of breaking Hezbollah's back once again to reaffirm its military prowess in the region. Whether Olmert will still be in charge if and when that revisit occurs, however, is an entirely different question.
The world's focus right now is on the cease-fire deal in the Middle East. We think that's the incorrect focus. The real focus should be on an earthquake that has shaken the region: Hezbollah's forces, even if they are defeated by Israel in southern Lebanon, will have shown themselves capable of mounting an effective resistance for an extended period of time. The Israelis have not been able to deal them a single, sharp blow and fragment them.
A single assumption has shaped Arab-Israeli relations since 1948: that Israel could decide, if it wished, to resort to war and impose its will on Arab armies. That assumption shaped all political considerations in the region. If Israel is no longer capable of doing that, it follows that a range of political assumptions also are untrue. Consider Jordan: Since 1970, Israel has been the guarantor of Jordanian national security. Consider Egypt: Since Camp David, Egypt has refused to engage Israel militarily. Both of these political certainties have been based on a military certainty -- and if that dissolves, so does everything else.
Hezbollah has been fighting a simple, conventional war. It has relied on fortifications, pre-positioned supplies and motivated troops. Israel has sought to defeat Hezbollah without incurring extensive casualties. The first strategy was the air campaign. The second strategy was a complex warfighting/diplomacy strategy designed to achieve Israel's ends without having to systematically destroy Hezbollah. The end result of this strategy -- if it is carried out to its logical conclusion -- is that Hezbollah will have fought and survived, and that in fighting, it will have shaped Israeli political decisions. In other words, we will have moved from a world in which Israel's military force trumps all other considerations to a world in which Israeli military power is circumscribed by Arab power.
It seems clear that Israel could have crushed Hezbollah if it was willing to spend the lives. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's view seems to have been the rational one -- that the rockets Hezbollah has been firing at Israel were creating fewer casualties by far than a war would. On that cost-benefit analysis, Olmert not only was correct, but followed the reasoning of Ariel Sharon. Sharon's strategy focused on building barriers between Israel and Arabs in order to avoid the costs and casualties involved in counter-insurgency operations. Olmert has extended that logic to southern Lebanon, seeking a low-cost solution to the Hezbollah threat.
In so doing, Olmert, intentionally or not, has shifted the basic architecture of Israel's strategic policy. He has avoided an extravagant cost in lives, but in so doing, has undermined the military certainty that was the foundation of Israeli national security. Hezbollah was able to start a war and has survived it defensively. In due course, an Arab force will be able to start an offensive war and win it. There is no inherent reason that an Arab army cannot defeat an Israeli army. Whether there is a cease-fire or not, the psychological foundation of Israeli power has been breached.
Meanwhile, a furious battle continues within Israel. On one side, Olmert is arguing that a diplomatic solution achieves Israel's ends without costing Israeli lives. On the other side, the military and the Likud party are arguing that Olmert has defined the end too narrowly. If a low-cost solution to the current crisis means a newly self-confident Hezbollah swelling with fresh recruits, then the price will merely have been put off to another day.
At this point, the battle shifts from Lebanon to the corridors of power in Israel. The test is whether Olmert has the political power in the country to let the war end here. Part of the question is what the military will do on the ground in Lebanon.
There is the example of Ariel Sharon fighting after a cease-fire regarding forces in Lebanon was announced. The IDF is upset enough to do that here, and the terms of the cease-fire deal leave enough room to drive a tank through. But there is also going to be an attack on Olmert's government if there is a cease-fire. It isn't clear whether he can survive with this outcome on the ground.
Therefore, either the war will continue now -- with or without a cease-fire agreement -- or, there will be a cease-fire, a political crisis in Israel and then, at some point, another day of reckoning. In our view, Israel is not going to let this battle end here. As for Hezbollah, however it comes out, it has achieved more than it could have hoped: It redefined the military balance, at least for the moment.
Yep, pretty good assessment. What is happening in Israel can easily happen here if we let the liberals take control of our government again.