Posted on 07/11/2006 9:50:02 AM PDT by strategofr
By the end of June, over 90 percent of the combat operations in Iraq (raids, cordon & search, quick reaction force run, etc) involved Iraqi forces. About a third of these operations were entirely Iraqi. However, there is a team of about a dozen American advisors attached to each Iraqi battalion, so most "all-Iraqi" operations have at least a few American advisors along. While the advisors are there to give advice, they are also there to observe, and report back the progress, or lack thereof, the Iraqis are making.
The army is making more progress than the paramilitary police units. Iraq army has always had a better reputation than the police, and has always attracted higher caliber people. Although an army coup in 1958 was responsible for over four decades of dictatorship, that was more the fault of evil generals, than of the army as a whole. Lower ranking officers were always more interested in purely military matters. But at the top, as in most countries, the generals held their jobs more for political, than military, reasons. The same is still true, with a broad agreement required before anyone can take on the top twenty or so military commands. But in the lower ranks, the Coalition (mainly the U.S. and Britain) have made a major effort to get the moat qualified people put in charge.
Part of the pitch was the appeal to Iraqi pride, by invoking the brave, capable and selfless officers who led the army in the war with Iran in the 1980s. Despite the fact that Iraqi started the war (by invading and trying to grab an oil rich province), and "won" by wearing the Iranians out (the war was basically a draw), the outcome was, historically, rare, because an Arab army was not crushed by their Iranian foe. Over the last five thousand years, the Iranians almost always won when they went to war with Arabs. So the United States appealed to that rare episode of Arab military achievement, to convince many capable Iraqis that, as the country was again faced with an armed threat, it was again time to get it together and take care of business. Most Iraqi troops admire their American counterparts. Iraqi army uniforms are similar to the U.S. ones.
The Iraqi army has received several thousand hummers and other American military vehicles. The greatest complement G.I.s can pay Iraqi troops is to roll up, usually at night, and hail them in English, and then say, "Oops, we thought you were American." The police combat battalions are another matter. Although the paramilitary police units receive a lot of the same training as the army troops, the police commanders tend to be more political. The "traditions" of the police are different as well. Police are a rather recent development in Iraq, and have not left a very good impression. Long considered corrupt and inefficient, the police were also one of the most visible agents of repression. The Coalition tried to build a new police force that was better than the old one. They succeeded, but the new model still had a lot of bad habits. Corruption was still there. Less than before, but that's not saying much. The new cops are also more lethal than the old ones. Not against criminals, or at least not the usual crooks. Some of the new cops moonlight as partisan death squads.
Lots of bad blood in Iraq, because of all the Kurds and Shia Arabs killed by Sunni Arab secret police and such, over the last four decades. It was all too easy for Kurdish and Shia Arab cops to be convinced to go out and administer some off-the-books justice. The problem with death squads, is that many of them don't have an off-switch. If all this is allowed to continue, the cops will go from being part of the solution, to being part of the problem. Many of them have already made that dubious transition. One lasting effect of the American military presence in Iraq, will be better combat skills. Iraqi soldiers and police are, after three years of expert training, much better at killing people. Army and police leaders are more efficient as well. What is still uncertain is whether, in the long term, these new and Improved Iraqi security forces will be better for Iraq, or just themselves.
A benefit from Iraqification, and perhaps from the death of the Z-Man: Coalition deaths this month number 9 so far. If this holds, July will be the lowest casualty month in over 2 years in Iraq.
http://icasualties.org/oif/
"If this holds..." Obviously I mean if the rate of casualties holds at .82 per day, July will be the lowest month for casualties in over 2 years.
It'll get under control eventually. This latest ramping up is the result of Operation Together Forward. The good guys went on the offensive and the bad guys are responding, but they are also being drawn out of their rat-holes. That was the intent all along.
The U.S. is still very much involved. We hear air cover all day and night long now - helicopters and warplanes. The U.S. is manning some checkpoints around the city, but are mostly taking a more covert role at this point. If our troops have to become more "in-their-faces," they will.
The last three or four days have seen things escalate and I wouldn't be surprised to see a tactical change very quickly.
For "the Iranians" substitute any other ethnic group that ever fought Arabs.
The most amusing wars, with the most comedic performances of men pretending to be soldiers and officers and clusters of ill-assorted individuals masquerading as units, are the Arab-on-Arab ones. In 1977 Egypt and Libya fought a short and nasty border war. One Egyptian commando raid went perfectly, until the helicopters followed their lost leader to the wrong pickup zone. Some of the Egyptian commandos were left alone in the ruins of the installation they'd destroyed, with no water.
The Libyans were also hilarious when Khadafy sent his "crack suicide squad" to assist Ugandan dictator Idi Amin (another practitioner of the Religion of Peace®, who wound up in honoured exile among his Saudi brethren -- despite, or perhaps because, of his cannibalism). The "suicide troops" cracked and ran. Then Moammar the K. sent in his Tu-22 Blinder bombers -- which bombed the demoralized remnants of his own troops.
In 1956, the Israelis captured thousands of boots from Egyptians who found that they hindered running away in the dunes of Sinai. Indeed, the Israelis fought the Arabs in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1969-70, 1973 and each war ended with the Arabs not only defeated but humiliated and looking more pathetic than last time.
Arabs just seem unable to organise anything more complicated than a swingers' party with young boys and caprines. Individual Arabs can be intelligent, cultured, humanistic and highly moral, but put them in a group and all those fine qualities undergo a regression to the mean -- and a mighty low mean it is.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
But there's a degree to which it can be misleading, for this reason: reported incidents and actions result primarily from what our guys do. When we lay back, we're not going to be in the news very much. When we push, we are. In addition, the casualty flows work the same way... they can't hurt our guys much when they're in camps. When our boys poke the hornets' nest, they're gonna get some stings.
A lot of nest-poking is going on now, but it has an Iraqi face. A lot of Iraqi units are running with one or two American NCOs or officers for advice and a native-English speaker to talk to air support. Our advisors tend to be very, very professional and experienced Marines, infantrymen, or special operators and aren't going to get tackled very much no matter how many plays they make. The Joes who are taking the hits are Iraqis, mostly.
None of this is radically novel. We did the same thing in Vietnam, and the press did a crummy job reporting it then, too. What happened in the RVN is that the length of the war, the terrible casualties taken by the ARVN, the dodgy leadership and the draft all undermined their army from the inside.
The radical thing is doing Counterinsurgency with a volunteer Army, which is working much better than it did with the drafted ARVN.
As far as these ideas of yours, your idea of what's possible seems a bit out of whack.
That would work if Baghdad was Fallujah, but it isn't. Most folks in Baghdad would like us to leave, but only when they'll still be safe. Indeed, Baghdad is the place to put an Iraqi face on this war. Let people seeing their own countrymen fighting the death squads and head-cutters.
First, this is not practical given the size of the target, versus the size of the US military (not the military in Iraq: the military, period. To guard all those miles of pipeline and power line [which is a similar target complex from both offensive and defensive standpoints] would need a world war II size Army). Second, it's not the best use of US troops, whose mobiility and power should be put to better use. Third, it's best done by Iraqis, bolstered by American technology. For instance, the Iraqis now patrol these lines with light aircraft (they catch lots of trouble-makers this way).
To a great extent we have done that, which is why there are power cuts in Baghdad even though more power is being generated than pre-1991 (let alone pre-2003) levels. For the first time, the second-class citizens of Saddam's day -- the real majority of the nation -- has a share of the juice. The other reason that there isn't enough power is that demand has exploded faster than supply could be built or restored. The first thing every swingin' Mohammed did was buy himself a satellite dish and TV or an air conditioner. And plug it in.
Meanwhile, Iraqi infrastructure had little spent on it for decades. For instance, when our Rangers seized Haditha Dam in 2003, they found the manager and had him round up his workers right away. "Put the dam back into production!" they told him. He explained he couldn't bring it fully online -- under Saddam, managers had insisted on max output with minimal maintenance and had bent a turbine shaft. That story was repeated all across the Iraqi power sector. US Management can't solve problems like that. The Iraqi manager is perfectly able to run the dam... but under Saddam, it was, "do dumb stuff that damages your machinery, or lose your head." I can't fault the guy for hanging on to his cabeza, under the circumstances.
Keep doing what you're doing. I don't know what age your students are, but you might want to introduce them to Iraqi blogs, where you can get pretty unfettered news and views. Some are pro-US, some are pro-insurgents (like Riverbend, a spoiled young woman whose father was one of Saddam's well-compensated thugs).
One thing that's a great lesson for folks of any age is to look at the same incident as reported in the Left press in the US, the Right press and blogs, and Iraqi news and blogs, and other international papers. Explain different biases (including the fallacy of primacy) and then ask the students to determine -- how much credibility to give each source, can they all be telling the truth, what is the most likely story you can piece together? A very eye opening exercise.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
I am glad to have your response. We can only do so much off blogs and such and, as they say, everybody has a story. It is good to hear from a Freeper who is on the ground.
Stay safe over there. Our thoughts and prayers will be with you.
And God Bless,
McVey
Iraqi police are "long considered corrupt and inefficient".
Now there's a case of "Oops, we thought you were Americans".
Iraqi police are "long considered corrupt and inefficient".
Now there's a case of "Oops, we thought you were Americans".
My posting is "corrupt and inefficient".
Hey, thank you for the input. I will pass it on to my students.
I am not certain that we are too far apart on things. What has caught our eyes over, I just looked it up, the period since the middle of May when my students came back from the one week break they get, is the surge of Sunni attacks.
The reason I am saying flood is simply because any insurgency lives on morale. This is what made the MSM particularly wrong in Vietnam. We clobbered them in Tet and the d*mn thing was painted as though we had suffered an appalling defeat. The morale in the US plummeted and the morale of the VC went through the roof. Ugly. And wrong.
My sense is that we need to make a statement that will bust the different militias' morale. It seems to be, from what we have been able to gather. I am not here referring to the foreign insurgents.
I agree on the pipelines with your objective analysis. I just don't have any other thoughts on what to do there since it is not clear that we are getting any more than a draw in the fight over the pipelines. I hope your somewhat more optimistic tactical analysis is correct.
As to the electricity . . . that is a mess and your points are well-taken.
My students are mostly 19-22 with a few older types mixed in. I have been able to keep this project running without the lefties in my college turning it off by hiding it under a journalism cloak. I hope to put it on our website soon so that the kids get the experience that they really can say what they think and make it mean something. (I think I put that clumsily, but you get the point.)
Thanks again. I love FR for the knowledge and objectivity folks bring to the table.
McVey
It's always refreshing to hear your comments, Allegra. Stay safe.
.82 per day. That equals the murder rate here in Memphis.
They have removed one fatality today. That happens sometimes. It will probably reappear after confirmation by DOD. If not, so much the better.
One thing that has been absolutely vital and has just happened is for predominantly Shia-manned national security forces (mostly Army) take down Shia militia leaders. This is vital to show the Sunni minority that they will be made safe and that the scales of justice weigh all equally. Having a couple of his hatchet men bagged has made Muqtada al-Sadr (whom, frankly, we should have killed when we had the chance in 04, but hindsight's always laser-clear) go all statesmanlike. Why? He's scared. We'll back down from whacking him, but Sistani, who is keenly aware that Muqty is a mere talib who's gotten too big for his britches (he's an ayatollah-school dropout), has no such compunctions. He's bright enough to realise he needs some friends among the less-radical Shia as he hasn't any among the Sunnis and we're not going to be around to play mommy forever.
Watch the Sunni parties in the Iraqi legislature versus the Sunni attacks. Interesting, eh? When the lawyers are holding their breaths and turning blue, the death squads run rampant. When the lawyers come back in from the cold, the death squad activity reduces but does not drop. The element that keeps in nonzero is the Sunni hardcore element that is unresponsive to their own politicians. The "Michael Collins" faction, or the "Real IRA" to update the insurgency. Basically, that group must die and in the end it will be the Sunni politicians who want a monopoly of power for the legitimate government who will kill them.
There are many ways to define the pipeline (and powerline) fight. A draw? Well, it's all in what you measure, exactly. But this is a very, very vulnerable linear target that can be disrupted by a point attack. You can't guard it all, hundreds and thousands of miles of nothing in the desert... if you put a fort within viewing distance of the next fort (think Kitchener in the Boer War) the hostiles could simply mass and take out one fort, make their line cut, and skedaddle.
One tactic we saw as far back as 2002 in Afghanistan was a probing attack to determine how long it takes the cavalry to come. Then when they mount the big attack later, some guy is running a timer and calls withdrawal on T minus fifteen minutes or so (this is a tactic that can be beaten).
An important thing about the Iraq insurgency is that many of the insurgents have had professional training, unlike elsewhere in the world, like Afghanistan or Chachnya where the training is more ad hoc. Saddam trained his Fedayeen Saddam in the tactics they'd need for stay-behind operations... for instance, target analysis. In Afghanistan they'll often attack the "wrong" part of a target complex, the Sunni insurgents seldom do this. (At least, the component that are former regime types, which is most of them. The suicide Saudis are a different thing).
Anyway, the answer to the insurgent's ability to cut the power- and pipelines is to target him where he's vulnerable: whack the cells, especially the leaders with that training. When that starts happening and an insurgency has to fall back on more and more OJT'd leaders, its striking power declines and it ultimately lapses into survival mode. The techniques used to do this are less those of warfare per se (although a cell caught on the pipeline is usually a pin taken off the enemy's situation map for good, the leader may not be present), but more those of counterintelligence and/or police work.
Some of the most effective people at this kind of insurgency have been our reserve and Guard forces. In one outstation we had a Guard SF guy who was a drug cop at home and he was just a natural.
We do need to do more killing and less capturing of insurgents. Given the national insecurity over this, expect a lot of that to be done by the locals, who do it without compunction, as we did once (remember the fate of John Wilkes Booth? Today he'd be lawyered up and made a hero by the press.. in 1865 we just killed him. John Dillinger, too, same kind of deal. The Iraqis still have that national will we don't any more; their Booths and Dillingers are at risk of their lives).
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
Of course, everybody will be able to read between the lines!
Sorry, rambling on here.
McVey
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