But there's a degree to which it can be misleading, for this reason: reported incidents and actions result primarily from what our guys do. When we lay back, we're not going to be in the news very much. When we push, we are. In addition, the casualty flows work the same way... they can't hurt our guys much when they're in camps. When our boys poke the hornets' nest, they're gonna get some stings.
A lot of nest-poking is going on now, but it has an Iraqi face. A lot of Iraqi units are running with one or two American NCOs or officers for advice and a native-English speaker to talk to air support. Our advisors tend to be very, very professional and experienced Marines, infantrymen, or special operators and aren't going to get tackled very much no matter how many plays they make. The Joes who are taking the hits are Iraqis, mostly.
None of this is radically novel. We did the same thing in Vietnam, and the press did a crummy job reporting it then, too. What happened in the RVN is that the length of the war, the terrible casualties taken by the ARVN, the dodgy leadership and the draft all undermined their army from the inside.
The radical thing is doing Counterinsurgency with a volunteer Army, which is working much better than it did with the drafted ARVN.
As far as these ideas of yours, your idea of what's possible seems a bit out of whack.
That would work if Baghdad was Fallujah, but it isn't. Most folks in Baghdad would like us to leave, but only when they'll still be safe. Indeed, Baghdad is the place to put an Iraqi face on this war. Let people seeing their own countrymen fighting the death squads and head-cutters.
First, this is not practical given the size of the target, versus the size of the US military (not the military in Iraq: the military, period. To guard all those miles of pipeline and power line [which is a similar target complex from both offensive and defensive standpoints] would need a world war II size Army). Second, it's not the best use of US troops, whose mobiility and power should be put to better use. Third, it's best done by Iraqis, bolstered by American technology. For instance, the Iraqis now patrol these lines with light aircraft (they catch lots of trouble-makers this way).
To a great extent we have done that, which is why there are power cuts in Baghdad even though more power is being generated than pre-1991 (let alone pre-2003) levels. For the first time, the second-class citizens of Saddam's day -- the real majority of the nation -- has a share of the juice. The other reason that there isn't enough power is that demand has exploded faster than supply could be built or restored. The first thing every swingin' Mohammed did was buy himself a satellite dish and TV or an air conditioner. And plug it in.
Meanwhile, Iraqi infrastructure had little spent on it for decades. For instance, when our Rangers seized Haditha Dam in 2003, they found the manager and had him round up his workers right away. "Put the dam back into production!" they told him. He explained he couldn't bring it fully online -- under Saddam, managers had insisted on max output with minimal maintenance and had bent a turbine shaft. That story was repeated all across the Iraqi power sector. US Management can't solve problems like that. The Iraqi manager is perfectly able to run the dam... but under Saddam, it was, "do dumb stuff that damages your machinery, or lose your head." I can't fault the guy for hanging on to his cabeza, under the circumstances.
Keep doing what you're doing. I don't know what age your students are, but you might want to introduce them to Iraqi blogs, where you can get pretty unfettered news and views. Some are pro-US, some are pro-insurgents (like Riverbend, a spoiled young woman whose father was one of Saddam's well-compensated thugs).
One thing that's a great lesson for folks of any age is to look at the same incident as reported in the Left press in the US, the Right press and blogs, and Iraqi news and blogs, and other international papers. Explain different biases (including the fallacy of primacy) and then ask the students to determine -- how much credibility to give each source, can they all be telling the truth, what is the most likely story you can piece together? A very eye opening exercise.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
Hey, thank you for the input. I will pass it on to my students.
I am not certain that we are too far apart on things. What has caught our eyes over, I just looked it up, the period since the middle of May when my students came back from the one week break they get, is the surge of Sunni attacks.
The reason I am saying flood is simply because any insurgency lives on morale. This is what made the MSM particularly wrong in Vietnam. We clobbered them in Tet and the d*mn thing was painted as though we had suffered an appalling defeat. The morale in the US plummeted and the morale of the VC went through the roof. Ugly. And wrong.
My sense is that we need to make a statement that will bust the different militias' morale. It seems to be, from what we have been able to gather. I am not here referring to the foreign insurgents.
I agree on the pipelines with your objective analysis. I just don't have any other thoughts on what to do there since it is not clear that we are getting any more than a draw in the fight over the pipelines. I hope your somewhat more optimistic tactical analysis is correct.
As to the electricity . . . that is a mess and your points are well-taken.
My students are mostly 19-22 with a few older types mixed in. I have been able to keep this project running without the lefties in my college turning it off by hiding it under a journalism cloak. I hope to put it on our website soon so that the kids get the experience that they really can say what they think and make it mean something. (I think I put that clumsily, but you get the point.)
Thanks again. I love FR for the knowledge and objectivity folks bring to the table.
McVey