04-108 KELO, ET AL. V. NEW LONDON, CT, ET AL.
Decision Below: 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004)
QUESTION PRESENTED
What protection does the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement provide
for individuals whose property is being condemned, not to eliminate slums
or blight, but for the sole purpose of "economic development" that will
perhaps increase tax revenues and improve the local economy?
Cert. Granted 9/28/04
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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004
1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court
but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S.
321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KELO ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW LONDON ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT
No. 04–108. Argued February 22, 2005—Decided June 23, 2005
After approving an integrated development plan designed to revitalize its
ailing economy, respondent city, through its development agent, purchased
most of the property earmarked for the project from will- ing sellers, but
initiated condemnation proceedings when petitioners, the owners of the rest
of the property, refused to sell. Petitioners brought this state-court
action claiming, inter alia, that the taking of their properties would
violate the “public use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause. The trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting
the taking of the some of the properties, but denying relief as to others.
Relying on cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S.
229, and Berman v. Parker,
348 U. S. 26, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in part, upholding all of the proposed takings.
Held: The city’s proposed disposition of petitioners’ property qualifies as
a “public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Pp. 6–20.
(a) Though the city could not take petitioners’ land simply to confer a
private benefit on a particular private party, see, e.g., Midkiff, 467
U. S., at 245, the takings at issue here would be executed pursuant to a
carefully considered development plan, which was not adopted “to benefit a
particular class of identifiable individuals,” ibid. Moreover, while the
city is not planning to open the condemned land—at least not in its
entirety—to use by the general public, this “Court long ago rejected any
literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the . . .
public.” Id., at 244. Rather, it has embraced the broader and more
natural interpretation of public use as “public pur- pose.” See, e.g.,
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112,
158–164. Without exception, the Court has defined that concept
broadly, reflecting its longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments as to what public needs justify the use of the takings
KELO v. NEW LONDON
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Syllabus
power. Berman, 348 U. S. 26; Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229; Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986. Pp. 6–13.
(b) The city’s determination that the area at issue was sufficiently
distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to
deference. The city has carefully formulated a development plan that it
believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, includ- ing,
but not limited to, new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other
exercises in urban planning and development, the city is trying to
coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational land
uses, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its
parts. To effectuate this plan, the city has invoked a state statute that
specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote
economic development. Given the plan’s comprehensive char- acter, the
thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the lim- ited scope
of this Court’s review in such cases, it is appropriate here, as it was in
Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a
piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that
plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings chal- lenged
here satisfy the Fifth Amendment. P. 13.
(c) Petitioners’ proposal that the Court adopt a new bright-line rule that
economic development does not qualify as a public use is sup- ported by
neither precedent nor logic. Promoting economic develop- ment is a
traditional and long accepted governmental function, and there is no
principled way of distinguishing it from the other public purposes the
Court has recognized. See, e.g., Berman, 348 U. S., at
24. Also rejected is petitioners’ argument that for takings of this kind
the Court should require a “reasonable certainty” that the ex- pected
public benefits will actually accrue. Such a rule would repre- sent an
even greater departure from the Court’s precedent. E.g., Midkiff, 467 U.
S., at 242. The disadvantages of a heightened form of review are
especially pronounced in this type of case, where orderly implementation
of a comprehensive plan requires all interested par- ties’ legal rights to
be established before new construction can com- mence. The Court declines
to second-guess the wisdom of the means the city has selected to effectuate
its plan. Berman, 348 U. S., at 26. Pp. 13–20.
268 Conn. 1, 843 A. 2d 500, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a con-
curring opinion. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion. (emphasis added)
Article [V.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. (emphasis added)
Clearly, the U.S. Supreme Court re wrote the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment, to now mean "public purpose
" instead of "
public use." Or to better put, commingle meaning. IMO, the five judges of the high court usurped the U.S. Constitution, whereas, there should have been a loud outcry from the other two branches of government. There wasn't. Oh there was a small wimper out of a few congressmen, but both remained silent?
IMO, the tip off was: The U.S. government, namely USDOJ, and/or U.S. Solicitor General argue about thirty cases a year or more before the U.S. Supreme court. When our government is concerned, Constitutional questions, has an interest thereof, or if not already in a case, will enter by filing an amicus brief, and request court time to argue. The Court record show, the U.S. Solicitor General did neither, in fact remained absent and silent. Therefore to protect the public's interest, our paid government lawyers avoided any input to save the eminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment. If ever there was an opportunity for two branches of government to voice their disapproval of an unpopular U.S. Supreme Court ruling, since the Court's power grab in Marbury v. Madison, (1803), now was the time. Wouldn't have wonderful, if the congress and executive branch shouted NO, this ruling is unconstitutional, we don't like it, revisit, and redo it...NOW!