It is rational to assume that where there is a law there is a law-giver, and where there is design there is a designer.
Dawkins answers:
"-- Any entity capable of deliberately designing a living creature, to say nothing of a universe, would have to be hugely complex in its own right. --
-- The designer's spontaneous origin ex nihilo would have to be even more improbable than the most complex of his alleged creations.
Unless, of course, he relied on natural selection to do his work for him! And in that case, one might pardonably wonder (though this is not the place to pursue the question), does he need to exist at all? --"
Can you [or anyone here] answer the resulting rational question? -- Who designed the Designer's "spontaneous origin"?
Time to stir the pot. Didn't I see within the last couple years on Discovery Channel, or Nova, or some such--or was it some crackpot thing like Chariots of the Gods--the idea advanced that life on Earth was "seeded" by an advanced civilization of aliens?
If this *was* put forth by some otherwise respectable scientist (or similar fellow traveler), please address your question to them.
If you are addressing your question to the Christians, I had the impression that one of the tenets of Christianity was the eternal existence of God...
If you're asking the Muslims, get a gun and a good lawyer :-)
Cheers!
Dawkins is exposing his lack of training in philosophy here. It's a problem not uncommon in scientists.
Consider that in everything we observe, what a thing is is different from whether that thing exists. These are two real questions which refer two two separate realities. In God, what he is and that he is are one and the same thing. This is not true for all other created things. God's nature is to exist. He is eternal, without beginning or end.
[Argument from motion (change)]The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
[Argument from efficient cause]
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
[Argument from contingency]
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.