Victor Davis Hanson: War Myths - An Exchange

Historically Speaking: The Bulletin of the Historical Society ^ | March/April 2005 | Victor Davis Hanson

[quidnunc]

Preface from Historically Speaking:

In recent years, a new voice has entered the crowded field of 20th-century military history to challenge conventional wisdom. John Mosier’s The Myth of the Great War (HarperCollins, 2001) argued, among other things, that American involvement saved the Allies from a German victory. It was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize. Mosier’s sequel, The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II (HarperCollins, 2003), continued his assault on standard military historiography, this time claiming that both sides in the European theater of World War II were seduced by the myth that Blitzkrieg tactics were the decisive way to victory. Mosier’s books amount to a challenge to military historians to admit that they have been propagating myths, and we wondered whether Mosier’s revisionism had prompted a rethinking of 20th-century military history. To get at this, Historically Speaking asked Mosier, a professor of English literature at Loyola University, New Orleans, to draft an essay that would introduce his views, especially on World War II, to our readers. We then asked three prominent military historians — James Corum, Victor Davis Hanson, and Dennis Showalter — to comment. Professor Mosier’s response concludes our exchange on “War Myths.”

Victor Davis Hanson: “An Overextended Argument. A reply to John Mosier’s “War Myths””

John Mosier’s revisionist examination of the First World War has a great deal of merit. Most historians, especially in the United Kingdom, have both underplayed the critical role of the American army that began arriving in force in 1917 and underappreciated the record of qualitative superiority of the German army over its Allied counterparts. …

-snip-

[quidnunc]

FYI

[familyop]

It appears to be good news. Now if the schools over there will only begin to teach the most important parts of history (military, objective),...

[Billthedrill]

Oh, this is a good one. BTT.

[Pelayo]

Not a happy thought, and not a new position. Some have argued for a long time that American entry into the war was not so much a decisive event, but actually prolonged the war since the new pool of American blood made the unconditional surrender of the Central Powers an option. Since at the time the German and Austrian governments were trying to reach a peace. But once the US came into the war they were denied (Churchill himself complained about that in an interview with the New York Enquirer June 1936). Wilson wanted the war to be a “Crusade” for democracy. So no peace unless and until the Central Powers abolished their governments and set up democracies. Combine that with the ridiculously harsh peace treaty and you get Hitler.

[Ramius]

Dang... Hanson really is a heavy hitter. I read that, and I feel like I just got a semester at VMI. :-)

[A Jovial Cad]

bttt

[KeyWest]

On his comments on blitzkrieg and especially Sherman, I am surprised he did not mention B. H. Liddel Hart, though he did offer up "indirect approach" which was Hart's main thesis. The Germans thought Hart a genius and followed his ideas, but his own brits discarded his ideas until they were faced with them in WWII.

[Tolik]

    Victor Davis Hanson Ping ! 

       Let me know if you want in or out

[PzLdr]

Actually, Liddell Hart was not as influential as he led people to believe. Apparently he altered Guderian's biography during some editing, and pulled some of the same shenanigans with Rommel's papers to make himself more important than he may have been. Now Fuller, the Germans used.

[KeyWest]

Post war there was a book, "The German Generals Speak" which told of his influence. In any case, his "Strategy" is still excellent in both war and peace. In essence, it is what we are doing in Iraq.

[Last Dakotan]

I read that, and I feel like I just got a semester at VMI.

But without all the cute girls.

[PzLdr]

[1] The strategy isn't his. It was postulated as far back as Sun Tzu, and practiced by the Mongols, among others. Sherman's March also predates Liddell Hart. As a military writer, he commented on it. [2] Within the last year or two, both the Rommel family and Heinz Guderian's son have made critical remarks about Liddell Hart's influence on their famous fathers, and how the praise in the books he "helped out" with came about. Since Guderian was one of the primary architects of blitzkrieg, and the TO & E of the Panzer Divisions, along with his superior Maj. Lutz, I assume he would have been most influenced by Liddell Hart. He wasn't. The German Panzer concept was built around a combined arms concept. The Brits were into all tank, all the time. Liddell Hart was a creative writer, and a fairly good military treporter. He was neither a military genius, nor the influence on the Germans he insiuated himself to be. And yes, I've read many of his works, "The German Generals Talk"(The U.S version of "The Other Side of the Hill"), "The Rommel Papers",and "Panzer Leader".

[KeyWest]

-Liddell Hart was a creative writer, and a fairly good military treporter.-

Maybe it gets down to this. I bow to your obviously superior knowledge. Sometimes, even though the method/tactics/strategy has been around (most have in one way or another) it takes someone who is articulate and able to put it in lay terms to make it universal. As you note, they often claim it as their own since they are the ones who made it popular.

In any case. I enjoy seeing the strategy of the indirect approach in action. It seems to be a successful approach to warfare (and life in general).

BTW, I am Navy so most of my reading was Mahan. I read Hart when I got interested in Sherman and found Hart's book.

Interesting exchange. Learned something. Thanks. Love FR.