Don't be obtuse.
Not only did I address that "book," but I quoted the most authoritative figure of the Central Powers who was physically THERE AT THE TIME, Germany's Kaiser William II, to refute it.
"No excuse for war."
Posted on 04/19/2005 11:56:55 AM PDT by MadIvan
Don't be obtuse.
Not only did I address that "book," but I quoted the most authoritative figure of the Central Powers who was physically THERE AT THE TIME, Germany's Kaiser William II, to refute it.
"No excuse for war."
Nonsense. Lots of people were immune from blame from that war (e.g. Pope Benedict XV), for one thing, and for another thing, Austria forfeited its right to invade when it presented its ultimatum.
Capitulate to an ultimatum and your enemy no longer has the right to invade you.
What you are doing, in perhaps a Freudian slip, is admitting that Austria's ultimatum to Serbia was merely an excuse for war; that whatever Serbia did or said that Austria was still going to invade (which it did).
But invading under false pretenses is by definition not justified...and that's what Austria did.
But the ultimatum was not accepted. Read the Keegan quote. Attaching conditions and rejecting clauses is not what one does with ultimata.
In the Keegan excerpt I point out the moment when it might have appeared to the Kaiser that diplomacy won. It was not a sustainable position militarily, and he was ultimately convinced otherwise.
Keegan gets that point entirely wrong. Austria's ultimatum *was* accepted. Serbia caved on 3 of the 4 major points outright, and merely *suggested* that the 4th major demand be submitted to the Hague for arbitration.
Austria didn't even respond to that suggestion, save to say that they were going to consider it a rejection of their ultimatum. There were no other negotiations. Austria invaded, purportedly because a mere Serbian *suggestion* offended them.
Such rubbish. Here above you attempt to soft-pedal the most authoritative comment by the most authoritative source. Yeah, Kaiser William II said that there was now "no excuse for war" after reading Serbia's capitulation to Austria's ultimatum, but somehow he must not have meant it, you attempt to infer *and* imply.
...And what's this "unsustainable position militarily" nonsense?! The Great Powers had already avoided a major war during the last Balkan War in 1912...it was hardly out of the question that it could have been avoided again 2 years later (save for some hot heads).
Keegan gets that point entirely wrong
How do you know that? Generally, historians have been biased toward Serbia and the Entente. So is Keegan. Yet, he paints a picture of essential rejection. And indeed, mobilizing the army, attaching conditions and rejecting the major demand amounts to a rejection.
You are probably right that Austria would have preferred a local war so that it could eliminate future threats from insurgents (a global war would have required Austria to fight on two fronts, north and south, and was not in Austrian interest). Buth this is a fault of intent only. Austria was injured, presented an ultimatum, and was within its rights to ignore a dithered response.
somehow [the Kaiser] must not have meant it, you attempt to infer *and* imply.
He must not have meant it, as evidenced by the fact that he declared war a few days later.
I explained what constituted the military imperative for war in #238.
You've never been in a fun house? ;-)
Some mirrors are cracked or dirty or losing the back finish.
All of this "who did what to who and when" is merely clouding what is a very simple issue.
The Serbian government sponsored a terrorist group and harbored a militant anti-Austrian streak in their efforts to rebuild a "Greater Serbia". Austria was fully justified in retaliation.
Responsibility for whether or not the war was localized is entirely on Russia for becoming involved, at the urging of the revenge-mad French.
Did the Central Powers provoke war? That is totally absurd, you don't provoke a war in which you will be outnumbered and surrounded at the very outset. Even Hitler wasn't that crazy.
But on the 7th day, God looked down and said it was good.
I know it because:
1. It's a fact,
2. It makes logical sense, and
3. The most authoritative source WHO WAS THERE said that, specificly.
Keegan is a historical revisionist, as are you. Neither of you were there. We don't get to write the History that we want, we write what the past players said and did.
"No excuse for war."
That's Austria's ally speaking after seeing Serbia's capitulation.
That Austria invaded anyway shocked the world, and Germany's "Blank Check" to Austria for war was soon realized as an enormous mistake.
Nonsense. First of all, Austria didn't even *know* of the existence of the Black Hand until far into World War 1.
Second, there appears to be no evidence (and you will fail if you even try to find such) linking the Black Hand with Serbia's in-office government. Moreover, there was a power-struggle going on inside Serbia's government that would have precluded such state sponsorship.
The assasins themselves were mostly high school students with a history of anarchism of random violence for the sake of "making statements."
Serbia rounded up at least 7 of the 9 assassins, possibly more, and turned them all over to Austria. That hardly amounts to protecting them from Austria. I'm aware of only one of those assasins even surviving eventual Austrian justice.
That's poor logic. Of course Austria provoked a war. Austria didn't even negotiate after it decided that Serbia's capitulation wasn't good enough. Austria invaded Serbia, knowing full well that Russia would enter the war.
This was a cold and calculated political decision to provoke a war. It took Austria two months to write up their demands, and their demands against Serbia were so severe as to make it clear that Austria wanted war at all costs. Moreover, Austria was provocative by giving the Serbs a mere 48 hours in which to respond.
Furthermore, the writings of the day indicate that Austria's biggest concern was how to drum up their own public support for such a war prior to invading.
The great mistake was Germany's "Blank Check" promise to support Austria in a war; Germany had underestimated the Austrian desire for war at all costs.
According to U.S. military historian Brig. General S.L.A. Marshall, "Originally that secret society [the Black Hand] had been linked to, and encouraged by, the War Ministry in Belgrade. When friction later developed between the two, the Government still remained well informed of Black Hand operations."
He further states that the man who armed the assassins, with weapons from Serbia, one Milan Ciganovic, was acting for Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievic, who was the SITTING CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE for the Serbian Army and member no.6 of the Black Hand. Furthermore, Prime Minister Nikola Pasic knew of the plot as early as June 1, and though he tried to stop them from leaving the country (how hard he tried we can only imagine) he said absolutely NOTHING to the Austrian government about the extent and seriousness of this plot he knew all about.
If you think they were just mindless fanatics, perhaps you should look into their actions BEFORE the assassination, where they met and what they did, what date was chosen as significant and you will see clearly what they were all about.
The thing I most hate about the modern world is its phenomenal lack of memory about things moral and of ancient roots.
Some people of conscience avoided serving in the Hitler Youth, and many avoided their subsequent service in Hitler's army. Ratzinger did not, and he did not desert the Hitler army until it was quite clear that the Allies were going to overrun Germany, much like his carefully morally ambiguous Pope--and apparent mentor--, at the time, Pius the Silent.
And the basic concern is the same then as in the last 25 years--when Ratzinger's job has been to prevent the church from having to defend itself in an open market of ideas, as the head of the inquisition.
I like my Popes to take more seriously their moral duty to be the Voice of Peter in defense of the wretched and poor and dissident, the natural victims of war and persecutions, and less seriously their duties to cover their own, or their churches, asses, than has been Ratzinger's history. The head of the inquisition--, whose opinions of other religions, older than his, has been openly derogatory and dismissive, whose opinions of nazi anti-semitism were, in interpretation of his actions, sort of neutral--is hardly a promising choice for a church that just managed a strained and strangled apology for its nasty behavior and remarks toward jews for 1400 years, acknowledging its own guilt in securing the intellectual environment Hitler's genocides of the Jews thrived on--said which, apparently, filled Ratzinger only with a mild distaste--rather like any number of Popes one might name who vigorously flailed on jews whenever opportunities arose.
The selection of Ratzinger is giving the finger to the rest of the world whose religeous predelictions vary from the Throne of Peter, and who have enough of a moral memory to remember what religeon invented crusades and thumbscrews as a form of evangelism.
"There is no evidence to suggest that Pasic planned the crime. It is unlikely that the Black Hand officers were acting on behalf of the government, because the military and the Radical Party in fact were engaged in a bitter competition to control the state. After the Balkan Wars, both military and civilian figures claimed the right to administer the newly liberated lands (the so-called Priority Question). After 1903, Pasic knew that Apis' clique would kill to get their way.
Pasic's responsibility revolves around reports that he was warned of the intended crime, and took inadequate steps to warn Austrian authorities. Despite Pasic's denials, there is substantial testimony that someone alerted him to the plot, and that Pasic ordered the Serbian ambassador in Vienna to tell the Austrians that an attempt would be made on the life of the heir during his visit to Bosnia.
However, when the Serbian ambassador passed on the warning, he appears to have been too discreet. Instead of saying that he knew of an actual plot, he spoke in terms of a hypothetical assassination attempt, and suggested that a state visit by Franz Ferdinand on the day of Kosovo (June 28) was too provocative.
Austrian diplomats failed to read between the lines of this vague comment. By the time the warning reached the Habsburg joint finance minister (the man in charge of Bosnian affairs), any sense of urgency had been lost, and he did nothing to increase security or cancel the heir's planned visit. After the murders, the Serbian government was even more reluctant to compromise itself by admitting any knowledge, hence Pasic's later denials."
http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/balkan_causes.htm
"However, when the Serbian ambassador passed on the warning, he appears to have been too discreet. Instead of saying that he knew of an actual plot, he spoke in terms of a hypothetical assassination attempt, and suggested that a state visit by Franz Ferdinand on the day of Kosovo (June 28) was too provocative"
Thanks for proving my point.
Your "point" was that Pasic had said or done "nothing."
He clearly did something, though apparently the message was ill-recieved.
Not true.
Funny how you conveniently left out the rest of my statement:
"...about the extent and seriousness of this plot he knew all about."
Just forgetful I'm sure
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